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HELMET AND SPEAR

STORIES FROM THE WARS OF
THE GREEKS AND ROMANS

By the

REV. A. J CHURCH, M.A.

Sometime Professor of Latin in University College, London
Author of " Stories from Homer," etc.

" Yea, but of war the righteous last event
In highest Heaven is born,
And from great Zeus with saving power is sent."

Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes.

NEW YORK
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

66 Fifth Avenue
1900

33E\\

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IV

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Flight of the Persians after Marathon.

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PREFACE

I HAVE told again in this volume some
familiar stories, using mostly the original
authorities, but availing myself, where it was
possible, of the help of Plutarch, whose bio-
graphies are always rich in picturesque details.
These narratives never lose their interest, and
they have this special significance, that they
illustrate what we all at least desire to believe,
that results of abiding good come out of the
losses and sorrows of war. I have sought to
draw out this thought with some detail in my
Epilogue.

A. J. C.
Ightham, Sevenoaks.

September 8, 1900.

CONTENTS

BOOK I
GREECE AND PERSIA. THE DEFENCE

PAGE

I. THE MEN OF MARATHONS . . .1

II. THE LION KING . . . .II

III. IN THE STRAITS . . . J 21

IV. THE WOODEN WALLS . . / .29
V. THE BATTLES ON THE PLAIN AND ON THE

SHORE. . . . . -44

BOOK II

GREECE AND CARTHAGE

I. THE LORD OF SYRACUSE . . -65

II. THE STORM FROM AFRICA . . -75

III. DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT . . -99

IV. THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH . . IIO

BOOK III

GREECE AND PERSIA. THE ATTACK

I. THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER . . . I 23

II. THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX . . . 1 35

III. THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES . 1 43

vii

CONTENTS

BOOK IV
ROME AND CARTHAGE

I. THE SERVANTS OF MARS

II. FOR THE RULE OF THE SEA

III. THE MARTYR PATRIOT .

IV. THE SONS OF LIGHTNING

V. THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS

VI. THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE

VII. THE OVERTHROW AT CANNiE

VIII. THE SECRET MARCH

ix. hannibal's last battle

X. THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE

PAGE

154
159
166

174

183
I94
202
213
224
232

BOOK V
ROME AND THE BARBARIANS.

I. THE DAY OF ALLIA

II. APOLLO THE DEFENDER .

III. THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH
IV. BEYOND THE PYRENEES .
V. ACROSS EUPHRATES
VI. THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR
VII. FURTHEST BRITAIN
VIII. BEYOND THE RHINE
IX. THE LAST ADVANCE

BOOK VI
ROME AND THE BARBARIANS.
I. A CENTURY OF DISGRACE

II. A CENTURY OF REVIVAL

III. THREE DEADLY BLOWS .
EPILOGUE

THE RISE

242

253
261

275
286
302
323
331

337

THE DECLINE

343
357
363
377

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

FLIGHT OF THE PERSIANS AFTER MARATHON . Frontispiece

TIMOLEON HOLDING THE FORD OF THE CRIMESSUS . Il8

THE BATTLE OF ISSUS . . . . . 140

THE OVERTHROW OF CANNAE . . . . 2IO

DEFEAT OF THE CIMBRI IN THE BATTLE AT THE

WAGGONS . . . . . .272

CRASSUS DEFEATED BY THE PARTHIANS . . 300

TRAJAN BESIEGING A DACIAN FORT . . . 340

ATTILA AND LEO . . . . 374

MY DAUGHTERS

BOOK I
GREECE AND PERSIA. THE DEFENCE

I. THE MEN OF MARATHON

WE may say of wars what a famous
philosopher said of revolutions, that
they happen about little things, but spring from
great causes. When Herodotus at the begin-
ning of his History proceeds to put on
record the grounds of the great feud between
the Greeks and the Barbarians, he tells us of
various outrages committed by one party or
the other. The Phoenicians began by carry-
ing off Io, daughter of Inachus ; the Greeks
' retaliated by landing at Tyre and bearing away
the king's daughter Europe\ This they
followed by the capture of Medea, a princess of
Colchi. When Paris of Troy ran away with
the fair Helen from Sparta he was only setting

2 GREECE AND PERSIA

the account straight. It was then that, accord-
ing to the Persian sages, with whom Herodotus
seems to agree, the Greeks made a fatal
mistake. They actually led a great army into
Asia to recover a worthless woman, though
" men of sense care nothing about such people."
The fact is that the Greeks, as a very enter-
prising and active race, came into frequent
collision with their Eastern neighbours. We
catch glimpses of this in very remote times.
To these, however, we need not go back.
Towards the end of the eighth or early in the
seventh century B.C., the kings of Lydia began
to encroach on their Greek neighbours and
conquered city after city. Croesus, who was the
last of the dynasty, had made himself master of
all of them before he was himself overthrown
by Cyrus the Persian. This event meant
nothing for the Greeks but a change of
masters, and this was not a change for the
better. Lydians and Greeks had long been
neighbours, and could contrive to live on
tolerable terms. The Persians were strangers
from a remote country, and were of a harsher
temper. In 502 B.C. a general rebellion took
place, in the course of which Sardis, the local
capital of the Persians, was burnt. A con-
tingent of Athenian troops took part in this

THE MEN OF MARATHON 3

affair, and their presence was the immediate
cause of the great struggle that followed. The
war between Greece and Persia lasted, with
intervals of doubtful peace, something less than
180 years. The first great conflict was at
Marathon.

In the late summer of 490 B.C. the Persian
army landed at the Bay of Marathon, distant
from Athens about twenty miles as the crow
flies, about twenty-five by the only road
practicable for wheeled conveyances. Of the
Persian numbers we know nothing. Herodotus,
who is our best authority (born in 480, he pro-
bably talked with men who had fought in the
battle), gives no figures. Later writers speak
of impossible numbers, 600,000 being the largest,
110,000 the smallest estimate. To carry even
1 10,000 across the yEgean sea would have been
a heavy task. If a guess has to be made, one
may venture to say 60,000. The Athenians
numbered 10,000, and they had with them
1,000 men from Plataea, a little Boeotian town,
which they had recently taken under their
protection. The Plain of Marathon is about
six miles long from south-west to north-east, and
in breadth varies from two and a half to one
and a-half miles. On the north-east it is bounded
by a great marsh, which is divided from the

4 GREECE AND PERSIA

sea by a narrow slip of land. There is another
smaller marsh on the south-west. Along the
edge of this swamp ran the road to Athens. It
was probably the immediate object of Datis, the
Persian general, to seize this road, and of the
Athenian commanders to protect it. Their
right wing rested on the seaward slope of what
is now called Agrieliki, the north-eastern spur
of Pentelicus. About a mile from this may still
be seen the remains of the mound which was
raised over the bones of the Athenians slain
in the battle. It is probable that this marks
the spot where the fight raged most fiercely.
If this is so, the Persian lines must have been
advanced to within a short distance of the rising
ground.

The Athenians, on learning the actual
approach of the Persian forces, had sent a
swift runner to Sparta to beg for help. The
man reached Sparta, a distance of about one
hundred and forty miles, in less than forty-eight
hours ("on the second day" is the expression).
The Spartans promised to come, but could not
start, they said, till after the full moon, which
was then five days off. The question then
among the Athenian generals — there were ten
in number and had each his day of command —
was whether they should fight at once or wait

THE MEN OF MARATHON 5

for the Spartan contingent. The ten generals
who shared the command of the army were
equally divided in opinion. But Miltiades, the
most distinguished of their number, was eager
for instant action, and succeeded in winning
over to his views Callimachus the Polemarch,
with whom it lay, in case of an equal division,
to give the casting vote. We shall see that he
had good reasons for his action, and that his
promptitude saved Athens ; and, we may say,
Greece.

The centre of the Persian line of battle was
held by the native Persians and Sacse, these
latter a tribe now represented by the Tur-
comans. Of the rest of the formation we are
told nothing. Some cavalry they had, but it is
not mentioned as taking any part in the battle.
It has been conjectured that it had not been
disembarked when the battle was fought. It
would certainly have been difficult to get the
horses on board again, and if any number of
them had been captured, we should probably
have heard something about it. The Athenian
line was drawn up so as to be equal in length
to the Persian. To effect this it was, of course,
necessary to make it very thin in parts. This
was the case in the centre, where there
were but two or three files. No light armed

6 GREECE AND PERSIA

soldiers, no archers, no cavalry were present.
All were heavy armed men with a few slaves
in attendance. The right wing was com-
manded by Callimachus ; the Plataeans were on
the left.

There was, as has been said, a space of
a mile between the two armies. Miltiades
ordered the Athenians to cross this at a run.
Such a thing had never been done before in
regular warfare. It was an amazing feat of
strength, for the men were in heavy armour.
Not less remarkable was the courage of the
movement, for in those days the Greeks had
not learned to look down upon the Persians.
To the enemy the charge seemed to be the act
of madmen ; but they must have felt that such
madmen were dangerous enemies, and must
have been shaken in the confidence with which
they had looked forward to victory. Still they
stood their ground, and met their assailants
in hand-to-hand fight. They even broke the
centre of the Athenian line, which, as has been
said, was but two or three files deep. Herodotus
even says that "they pursued them into the
middle country," a curious phrase, seeing that
the battle was fought only a mile or so from the
sea shore. But in hand-to-hand fighting, when
the conditions were at all equal, the Persians

THE MEN OF MARATHON 7

were no match, either in training or in equip-
ment, for their adversaries. The poet
^Eschylus, himself " a man of Marathon," the
proudest title which an Athenian could bear,
speaks of the war of the Persian against the
Greek as the battle of the bow against the
spear. In the Perscg, the drama which cele-
brates the crushing defeat of Persia in its
second assault on Greece, he makes the chorus,
consisting of the Great King's councillors, boast
of how their lord would bid

" The arrows' iron hail advance
Against the cumbrous moving lance ; "

a happy stroke of irony when it was known
that the lance had prevailed over the arrow.
It certainly prevailed that day. Both the wings
were victorious in the shock of arms, and when
they had put to flight the ranks opposed to
them they turned to restore the fortune of the
day in the centre. This they soon accom-
plished. Before long the whole Persian line
was in rapid retreat. Pausanias says that
many of the fugitives rushed into the marsh,
and, indeed, that the greater part of their loss
was thus caused.

Miltiades, anxious to complete his victory,
followed up the flying enemy, and endeavoured

8 GREECE AND PERSIA

to cut off his retreat. Here he was less suc-
cessful, and, indeed, incurred serious loss. In
the attempt to burn the Persian ships not a
few distinguished Athenians fell. The Pole-
march and another of the generals were among
them ; so was a brother of the poet ^Eschylus,
who, having laid hold of one of the ships, had
his hand cut off by an axe, and died of the
wound. The Persians contrived to get away,
not losing more than seven of their ships, but
leaving behind them in their richly furnished
tents an ample booty for the conquerors.

Athens, however, was not yet safe. Hippias,
who along with his brother had once held
despotic power in the city, and had been
driven into exile twenty years before, had
come with the Persian army, hoping that his
friends — for he still had a party that plotted for
his return — would move in his favour. They
did not altogether fail him. When the Persians
had re-embarked, a signal — a polished shield
flashing in the sunlight — was perceived on the
summit of Pentelicus. This was to indicate
that the Persians should take advantage of the
absence of the army and sail round to Athens,
and that the party of Hippias was ready to act.
Part of the fleet accordingly took the direction
of Cape Sunium, which it would have to round

THE MEN OF MARATHON 9

before it could reach Athens. Miltiades seems
to have been aware of what was intended, and
at once gave orders to march back to Athens
with all haste. This was done, and the traitors
were foiled. The Persian fleet, it will be seen
from the map, would have to make a circuit of
about sixty miles, while the army would have
to march less than half that distance.

The Persian loss is put down by Herodotus
at 6,200, a moderate figure which is very pro-
bably near the truth. Of the Athenians, one
hundred and ninety-two were slain. They were
buried on the field of battle, and a mound
heaped over their remains. On the top of
this were placed ten stone pillars, one for each
of the Athenian tribes, inscribed with the names
of the slain. An eleventh pillar commemorated
the Platseans, a twelfth the slaves who fell
in the great victory. After the death of
Miltiades a monument was erected to him on
the same spot. The pillars have long since
perished, but the mound remains. It is thirty
feet high and about 200 yards in circumference.
It was excavated in 1890-91 by order of
the Greek Government, and found to contain
human remains, with pottery of the very period
of the battle. Writing about six centuries
later, Pausanias says, " Here every night you

io GREECE AND PERSIA

may hear horses neighing and men fighting,"
and adds that it brings bad luck to go out of
curiosity, but that " with him who unwittingly
lights upon it by accident the spirits are not
angry." The same tradition lingers about many
of the great battlefields of the world. Shep-
herds who fed their flocks on the plains of
Troy saw spectres in armour, and conspicuous
among them the spirit of the great Achilles.
The scenes of the great battles of Attila and
Charlemagne are still said to be thus haunted.
It only remains to say that 2,000 Spartans
arrived on the day after the battle, that they
went to the field of battle to see the Persian
dead, and after greatly praising the Athenians,
returned home.

II

THE LION KING

DARIUS was not by any means disposed
to take his repulse at Marathon as final.
On the contrary, he at once set to work on
making preparations for a new expedition,
which should this time be one of overwhelming
force, and which he determined to lead in
person. A revolt which broke out in Egypt
probably delayed him for a time. Anyhow,
he died in 485 before his preparations were
complete. He had reigned for thirty-six years
and was probably in his sixty-eighth year.
Xerxes, the eldest of the sons born after his
accession to the throne, succeeded him without
any opposition. He is said to have been
averse to the scheme of an invasion, but was
persuaded by those who were interested in
promoting it. However this may be, the
preparations were not seriously interrupted.

12 GREECE AND PERSIA

The Egyptian insurrection was put down, and
in the autumn of 481 the army intended for
the invasion of Greece was assembled at
Sardis. The story of the events that followed
must be sought elsewhere, for I am not
attempting to give a narrative of the Persian
war. It must suffice to say that by August,
490, the Persian army had occupied Thessaly.
It was at the famous pass which leads from
this region into Locris that the Greeks made
their first stand.

Thermopylae (the Hot Gates) consisted of
two narrow passes, neither of them of greater
width than one wheeled carriage would require,
caused by the near approach of Mount CEta
to the sea, or rather to an impassable morass
which here formed the coast-line. (It is well
to remark that considerable changes have taken
place in the character of the country, the coast-
line, in particular, having receded a long way
eastward.) The easternmost of the two passes
was that to which the name properly belonged,
for here there were actual hot springs, dedicated
to Hercules, and supplying medicinal baths.
Between the two passes (the distance of a
mile) the mountain receded from the sea,
leaving a level space of about half a mile
broad. At Thermopylae proper there was a

THE LION KING 13

wall built by the Locrians, but at the time of
which we are speaking it had fallen into ruins.

It was here that Leonidas, one of the two
kings of Sparta, took up his position, late, it
would seem, in July. He had with him 300
Spartans, 2,500 soldiers from other parts of
the Peloponnesus, a contingent of 700 from
Thespiae, one of the Boeotian towns, which
dissented strongly from the pro- Persian views
of their countrymen, and 400 Thebans, who
came on compulsion. Thebes did not venture
to refuse the demands of Leonidas while their
Persian friends were still a long way off. He
was also joined by contingents of the Locrians
and Phocians. Both tribes had given in or
were about to give in their submission to the
Persians, but probably preferred the success of
the Greeks. In any case, they were not pre-
pared to resist the Greek commander-in-chief,
present as he was with a much superior
force.

Leonidas at once strengthened his position
by repairing the half-ruined wall by the Hot
Springs. But he learnt that Thermopylae
was not the only way by which access could
be had from northern to southern Greece.
The Phocians informed him that there was a
mountain path which led from a point beyond

14 GREECE AND PERSIA

the westernmost pass to another point beyond
the defile of the Hot Springs. But they
promised that they would guard it. The fact
came, of course, to the knowledge of the troops
generally, and greatly discouraged them. They
even wished to abandon Thermopylae alto-
gether. Those that came from the Peloponnese
were especially urgent, believing that they
had a much better position for defence in
the Isthmus of Corinth. Leonidas refused to
retreat, but he sent messengers to the various
Greek States with an urgent demand for re-
inforcements. The forces that he had with
him were wholly unequal, he said, to cope with
such an army as the Persians had at their
command.

Xerxes, who had encamped within sight of
Thermopylae, sent a horseman to reconnoitre
the position of Leonidas. The Spartans were
on guard that day in front of the wall, and
the man observed that some were engaged
in athletic exercises, while others were combing
their long hair. Demaratus, an exiled king of
Sparta, who was with Xerxes, when questioned
about the meaning of this behaviour, told him
that his countrymen were particularly careful
with their toilet when engaged in any dangerous
enterprise, and that he must expect a desperate

THE LION KING 15

resistance. "You have to deal," he went on,
" with the first city of Greece, and with her
bravest men." " But how can so small a
company contend with mine," asked Xerxes,
who had not yet learnt to doubt his big
battalions. The king was unwilling to believe
him, and waited for four days in the expecta-
tion that the Greeks would think better of
their purpose to resist, and would retire without
a conflict.

On the fifth day, finding that the Greeks
were still in their positions, Xerxes sent the
Medes and the men of Cissia (now Khuzistan)
with instructions to take the Greeks alive and
bring them into his presence. These troops
rushed with the greatest courage to the attack.
Many were slain, for indeed they were no
match for the Greeks in hand-to-hand fighting,
but others stepped into their places. The
struggle went on during the whole day, with
no result except heavy loss to the assailants.
On the morrow Xerxes sent his Persian corps
d'dlite, which went by the name of the "Im-
mortals," to the attack, confident that they
would be able to force the pass. They met
with no better success. Their spears were
shorter than those used by the Greeks, and the
narrowness of the battlefield did not allow

1 6 GREECE AND PERSIA

them to take advantage of their superiority in
numbers. Herodotus makes special mention
of the practised skill which the Spartans dis-
played. One of their methods was to feign
flight, lure the assailants on, and then turn on
them with deadly effect. Vast numbers of the
Persians were slain ; the Greeks also suffered
some loss, for the best troops of the East could
not have fought wholly in vain, but this loss
was very small. Thrice during the day's en-
gagement the Persian king is said to have
leapt from the seat from which he watched the
combat in terror for his army.

Yet another day was spent in a fruitless
assault on the Greek position. The Persians
hoped to wear out the enemy by incessant
attacks. Some must be slain or wounded, and
when the total number was so small, even a
small loss must tell upon them in the end. As
a matter of fact, however, the strength of the
Greeks was not sensibly impaired. The space
of ground that had to be held was very small,
and the Greeks could change their men actually
engaged at frequent intervals.

The treachery of a native of Malis, a little
Dorian state in the heart of the mountains,
relieved Xerxes of his perplexity. He offered,
for a reward, to show a mountain path by which

THE LION KING 17

the Greek position could be turned. The
name of this wretch, on whose head a price
was set by the General Council of the Greek
States, was Ephialtes. It is doubtful whether
the secret could have been long kept ; but
there seems to have been a general agreement
that Ephialtes was the guilty man, though
other names were mentioned.

Xerxes willingly purchased the secret, and
entrusted the task of outflanking the Greek
position to the Immortals. They started at
dusk and marched all night. The Phocian
guards of the path seem to have neglected to
place any outposts, and were not aware of the
approach of the enemy till the crackling of the
leaves under their feet, carried through the
still air of night, gave them warning. They
started up from their bivouack at the sound,
and the Persians, surprised at the sight of an
enemy whose presence they had not expected,
halted. The Phocians seem not to have
attempted to hold the path, but retreated to
the crest of the hill and then made ready to
defend themselves. The Persians left them
alone, and continued their march.

The Greeks at Thermopylae had by this
time received warning of what had happened.
The soothsayer attached to the force is said

3

18 GREECE AND PERSIA

to have read in the victims which he examined
a prognostic of their fate. More definite in-
formation came from scouts who had been out
on the hills, and who now came hurrying into
the camp with the news. A council of war
was hastily held. It could not agree, but the
result was that the majority of the contingents
retreated. Whether they did this with or with-
out the orders of Leonidas is not certain. It
is one of the matters about which it is almost
impossible to arrive at the truth. Herodotus
thinks that they were ordered to retire by
Leonidas because he saw that they were un-
willing to stay. This has a look of probability.
As for Leonidas himself and his Spartans, they
elected to stay. The inflexible military honour
of their commonwealth forbade retreat. The
seven hundred Thespians refused to depart, and
must be allowed the glory of a still more heroic
courage. r The Theban contingent was detained
against its will. The soothsayer Megistias— his
name ought to be preserved no less carefully than

1 Canon Rawlinson does not show himself as acute as
usual when he suggests that this splendid resolve of the
Thespians was due to an ambition of dispossessing Thebes
from the headship of the Boeotian confederacy. Mr. Grote's
remark that they knew that they must be left homeless is
more to the point.

THE LION KING 19

that of the traitor Ephialtes — refused to depart,
though being not a Spartan, but an Acamanian
by birth, he might have done so without dis-
credit, but he sent away his only son. The
name of the Thespian leader ought also to
have its place on the roll of honour. It was
Demophilus.

In the forenoon the Persians began a double
attack, in front and in rear. They had seen
such proofs of Greek prowess that the men had
to be driven into battle by the whip. As for
the Greeks, they changed their tactics. Leaving
the pass of the Hot Springs and the wall, they
advanced into the open space. Hope of escape
or victory had been given up. They would
fight where they could sell their lives most
dearly. And dearly did they sell them. Crowds
of the Persians fell ; many were trampled under
foot by their comrades ; many more were thrust
into the marsh that bordered the road on the
side of the sea. Among the slain were two
brothers of the king. The Spartans and
Thespians fought till their spears were broken.
Leonidas seems to have fallen early in the day,
and there was a furious struggle for the posses-
sion of his body. Four times did the bar-
barians carry it off, and four times was it
recovered. As the day drew on the Immortals

20 GREECE AND PERSIA

came upon the scene. Aware of their approach,
the Greeks retreated to the pass and prolonged
their resistance to the very uttermost. When
their weapons failed them they used their
hands and even their teeth. Buc the Persians
now surrounded them and showered arrows
and all kinds of missiles upon them. They
perished to a man. One more name from
among the three hundred Spartans must be
preserved — Dieneces, who seems to have been
a wit as well as a warrior. When a man of
Trachis told him that the Persians were so
numerous that their arrows would darken the
sun, " 'Tis well," he replied, "stranger; then
we shall fight in the shade." One of the con-
tingent was absent. He and a comrade had
been lying sick of ophthalmia at a neigh-
bouring village. They could not agree as
to what should be done. One buckled on
his armour and bade his attendant helot lead
him — for he could not see — to the battlefield.
The helot did so, and then turned and fled.
His master plunged into the thick of the fight
and fell. The other sick man returned to
Sparta. There no one would give him light
to kindle his fire, or speak to him. He wiped
away the reproach by falling, after prodigies of
valour, at Plataea.

Ill

IN THE STRAITS

WHILE the army of the allied Greeks
was holding the pass of Thermopylae,
their fleet occupied Artemisium. This was a
promontory at the northern end of the island of
Eubcea, a small stretch of coast on either side
of the actual cape being known by the same
name. The Persian attack was being made
both by land and sea, and the Greek plan of
defence was to check it at two points which
were as nearly as possible in a line.

Both positions were liable to be turned.
The danger at Artemisium was even greater
than at Thermopylae, for there was nothing to
prevent the Persian fleet from sailing down the
east coast of Eubcea. Indeed we shall see that
this was done, though, as it turned out, without
any ill result to the Greeks. It is clear that
the officers in command of the fleet were quite

22

GREECE AND PERSIA

as uneasy as some of the army leaders at
Thermopylae, nor was there any one who
could exercise the control that Leonidas, in
virtue of his commanding personality and his
rank as a Spartan king, exercised over the
allies.

An event of no great importance turned this
uneasiness into panic. Two out of three ships
which had been detached to keep a look out
were captured by an advanced Persian squadron
of ten ships. In consequence of this disaster,
the fleet hastily retreated some fifty miles to
the south to a spot where the channel between
the mainland and Eubcea is at its narrowest.
It would probably have gone still further south
but for the heavy loss which the Persian fleet
suffered during a four days' storm. No less
than four hundred ships were destroyed, and
with them an uncounted multitude of men.
The Greeks were so encouraged by the loss
which had befallen the enemy, that they re-
turned in all haste and took up their former
station. Hence the battle of Artemisium.

The first incident was a Greek success. The
Persian fleet took up its position in the great
natural harbour which is now known as the
Gulf of Volo. Fifteen ships belonging to it
lagged so far behind the rest, that by the time

IN THE STRAITS 23

they reached the south-eastern point of the
gulf the main body had rounded it and were
out of sight. But the Greek fleet was full in
view ; they mistook it for their own, sailed
straight towards it, and were captured without
a struggle. Notwithstanding this stroke of
good fortune the Greek captains were full of
fears. Even after the losses caused by the
storm, the Persian fleet greatly outnumbered
their own. They had two hundred and eighty
ships, reckoning nine fifty-oars with the larger
triremes or " three-bankers " ; the Persians
must have had more than twice as many. The
question of retreat again came up, and seemed
very likely to be decided in the affirmative. A
different result was brought about by a pro-
ceeding curiously characteristic of Greek ways
of acting and thinking. The people of Eubcea
were in despair at the prospect of being deserted.
It would be something, they thought, if they
could secure a few days' grace in which to
remove their portable property to a place of
safety. They went to Eurybiades, the Spartan
admiral, who was in supreme command, and
begged him to postpone his departure for a
short time. He refused the request. It would
not, he said, be for the public interest. Then
they went to Themistocles, the Athenian

24

GREECE AND PERSIA

admiral. He was not the commander-in-chief,
but he commanded the most numerous con-
tingent, one hundred and twenty-seven ships,
only thirteen short of the half. They offered
him a splendid bribe of thirty talents (about
,£7,000 of our money) if he could procure for
them the desired delay. Themistocles seems
to have known the price of the men whom he
had to buy. To Eurybiades he gave five
talents, and the Spartan, to whom this sum
probably seemed a fortune, changed his views
about the public safety. The Corinthian
commander, who had the most powerful
squadron after that of Athens, had also to be
bought. Themistocles dealt with him in the
frankest way. " I will give you," he said,
" more for staying than the Persians will give
you for going." The Corinthian does not seem
to have resented the suggestion that he was
ready to be bribed by the enemies of his
country, and accepted the two talents which
Themistocles sent on board his ship. The
Athenian kept the handsome balance in his
own hands. We cannot say anything more
for him than that he comes out of the transac-
tion better than his colleagues. They believed
that the better and safer course was to retreat.
He, on the contrary, was convinced that the

IN THE STRAITS 25

right policy was to stop and fight. But he
never forgot his personal interests. In this
case he made them harmonise ; on other
occasions his action was more doubtful. There
is reason to think that, before the end of his
career, he postponed the public good to his own.
The Persians, when they saw that the Greek
fleet was still at Artemisium, had, it would
seem, no thought but of how they might make
sure of capturing the whole. They sent a
squadron of two hundred ships to sail down
the eastern coast of Eubcea. These were to
take the Greek in the rear, the main body
waiting till the arrival of the squadron had
been signalled. Meanwhile the Greeks had
received some encouraging intelligence. A
Greek diver, named Scyllias,1 who had been in

1 Pausanias tells us that he saw at Delphi a statue of this
Scyllias, which had been erected by the Amphictyonic
Council. A statue of his daughter Hydna had formerly
stood next to it, but had been carried off by Nero. The
two were famous divers, and some marvellous legends had
gathered about them. Pausanias was told that they had
dragged away the anchors and moorings of the Persian
ships during the storm, and so aggravated the disaster.
Herodotus had heard a yet more marvellous story of how
Scyllias had dived the whole distance, nearly ten miles,
between the Persian station and the Greek, but adds
characteristically, " My own opinion is that he made the
passage in a boat."

26 GREECE AND PERSIA

the employ of the Persians, deserted to them.
He described the damage that had been done
by the storm, and also informed them about
the squadron that had been sent round Eubcea.
The first thought of the Greek admirals was to
sail south, and meet this squadron. But on
reflection, bolder counsels prevailed. Late in
the afternoon they left their station, and sailed
towards the hostile fleet. The Persians viewed
the movement with astonishment, and the
Asiatic Greeks with dismay, for though serving
with the enemy, they wished well to their
countrymen. The Greek ships were inferior,
not only in numbers, but also in equipment,
and they seemed to be rushing on destruction.
The Greeks began by assuming what seemed
like a defensive position, forming a circle, with
the sterns of their ships in close order, and the
prows turned to the enemy. The enemy ad-
vanced to close with them, and then, at a
concerted signal, the Greeks dashed at their
opponents with such success that they captured
thirty of their ships, the first prize falling, as
indeed was fitting, to an Athenian ship. The
Persians, recovered from the first surprise,
began to hold their own better, and when night
fell, the issue of the conflict was still doubtful.
The captain of a ship from the island of

IN THE STRAITS 27

Lemnos had the sagacity to see how the
struggle would end, and deserted to the Greeks,
receiving afterwards a handsome reward for his
timely patriotism.

Again the " stars fought in their courses for
Greece." That night there was a thunder-
storm, with heavy rain and wind. The main
body of the fleet did not suffer much material
damage, but the crews were dismayed to see
fragments of wrecks and bodies of the dead
drifted in by the wind. These were, indeed,
the tokens of a great disaster. The squadron
that was sent round Eubcea had been driven
on a lee shore and absolutely destroyed. On
the morrow the Persians made no movement,
but the Greeks repeated the tactics of the day
before. The news of the disaster to the
Persian squadron had reached them, and they
had been joined by a reinforcement of Athenian
ships. This gave them new courage besides
increasing their strength. Before the close of
the day they captured some Cilician ships.

On the third day the Persian commanders,
made desperate by failure, for they served a
master who exacted a cruel penalty for ill-
success, moved forward to engage the enemy,
the Greeks awaiting their attack. The order
of the Persian attack was in the shape of a

28 GREECE AND PERSIA

half-moon, and its object to outflank the enemy
on either side. The Greeks accepted the
challenge. The result was not decisive. The
Greeks sunk and captured more ships than
they themselves lost. But their own loss was
serious. Of the Athenian fleet especially, more
than half was so injured as to require repair.
By this time, too, the position had ceased
to have any strategic value. The pass of
Thermopylae had been forced by the Persians,
and it was useless, therefore, to hold Artemisium.
That night the Greek fleet retired southwards.
Themistocles, before he went, caused to be
engraved on a prominent rock an inscription
which invited the Asiatic Greeks serving with
the Persians to make common cause with their
countrymen. "If these words," he reasoned
with himself, "escape the knowledge of the
king, they may bring these Greeks over to us ;
if they come to his knowledge, they will make
him distrust them."

IV

THE WOODEN WALLS

THE retreat of the Greek forces from
Thermopylae and Artemisium left
Athens without defence. There had been a
promise that an army of the allies should
make a stand against the invaders in Bceotia.
No attempt was made to keep it. The only
plan of defence that commended itself to the
Peloponnesian States was to fortify the Isthmus
of Corinth — and all the states outside the
Peloponnesus, Athens excepted, were either
pro- Persian or indifferent. As Athens was
unwalled, there was no question of defending
it ; the only thing that could be done was
to save as much life and property as was
possible. For this the time was short, and
might have been shorter than it actually was,
for the Athenians had six days in which to
transport their belongings to a place of safety,

30 GREECE AND PERSIA

though the distance to be traversed by the in-
vaders was not more than ninety miles. All
the women, children, and persons incapacitated
by illness or old age were put on shipboard,
and carried either to Trcezen, a friendly city
in the peninsula of Argolis, which had some
tie of kinship with Athens, to ^Egina, which
was but ten miles away, or to Salamis, which
was even nearer. The Athenians begged the
allies to remain in the neighbourhood till the
work of transport was accomplished, and
Salamis happened to be the most convenient
spot for this purpose.

The whole fighting strength of Athens was
now embarked in its fleet. Years before,
Themistocles, with a sagacity and prescience
that seem almost miraculous, had counselled
his countrymen to spend all their available
resources in building ships. And only a few
months before, the oracle of Delphi had advised
the Athenians to trust in their " wooden wall,"
a phrase which this same statesman had in-
terpreted as meaning the ships. No one, we
may believe, knew better what it meant, as
he had probably suggested it. The time had
now come to put this counsel into practice.
Every able-bodied Athenian took service in
the fleet, the wealthy aristocrats, known as the

THE WOODEN WALLS 31

"knights," setting the examples by hanging
up their bridles in the temple of Athene.

It had never been the intention of the
officers in command of the allied fleet to give
battle at Salamis. They thought of nothing
but the safety of the Peloponnesus ; possibly
they believed that nothing more than this
could be hoped for. But when the Athenians,
compelled as they were to abandon their city,
asked for their help in saving non-combatants
and such property as could be removed, they
could not refuse. And now the question
presented itself — Where are we to meet the
Persian fleet? The captains assembled in the
ship of Eurybiades the Spartan, who was in
chief command, and debated on what was to
be done. The general opinion was that they
should retire from Salamis, from which there
would be great difficulty in escaping, if escape
should become necessary, and give battle some-
where off the coast of the Peloponnesus. In
the midst of the discussion a messenger arrived
with the news that the Persians had overrun
all Attica, and had taken by storm the citadel
of Athens, which a few enthusiasts had insisted
on defending. These tidings could not have
taken any one by surprise, but the fact that
one of the great cities of Greece had fallen

32 GREECE AND PERSIA

into the hands of the barbarians produced a
panic. Some of the captains left without
waiting for the decision of the council, and,
hurrying to their own squadrons, prepared
to depart. Those who stayed resolved to
retire to the Isthmus and make a stand
there.

As Themistocles was returning to his ship
from the council, he was met by a friend who,
in bygone years, had been his instructor in
philosophy. The new-comer, on hearing the
decision at which the council had arrived,
denounced it most emphatically. " It means
ruin for Greece," he said. " The fleet will
not remain together to fight ; every contingent
will steal away, hoping to protect its own
country. Go and persuade Eurybiades to
reconsider the question."

Themistocles went, and using every argu-
ment that he could think of, at last succeeded
in making such an impression on Eurybiades
that he consented to summon another council.
Of course it was the etiquette for the com-
mander-in-chief to state the business which
they had met to discuss, but Themistocles,
who saw that it was a matter of life and
death, could not help urging his case, without
waiting for the president of the council.

THE WOODEN WALLS 33

Adeimantus, of Corinth, angrily interrupted
him. " Themistocles," he said, "at the
Games, they who start too soon are scourged."
"True," replied the Athenian, "but they who
start too late are not crowned." He then
addressed the council in a tone of studied
mildness and conciliation. He said nothing
about the probability that the fleet would be
broken up by a general desertion — such an
argument would have been affront — but he
urged that to fight at Salamis would not be
to risk everything on the issue of one battle.
To retreat would be to leave all northern
Greece at the mercy of the Persians, while
a defeat at the Isthmus would mean the loss
of the Peloponnesus itself. As for the
Athenians, they would loyally abide by any
decision to which the allies might come.

Adeimantus, enraged at the Athenian's per-
sistence, interrupted him with the remark that
a man who had no country had no right to
speak, and even appealed to Eurybiades to
impose silence upon him. Themistocles then
saw that it was time to assert himself. " With
two hundred ships fully manned and armed we
have," he said, turning to Adeimantus, "as
good a country as any man here, for what
s\ate could resist us should we choose to attack

4

34 GREECE AND PERSIA

it ? " Then he addressed himself to Eury-
biades, " Play the man and all will be well.
All depends upon our ships. If you will not
stay here and fight, we will take our families
on board and sail for Italy, where the gods
have provided us a home. Without us, what
will you do ? "

To this threat there was no answer. The
council resolved to stay and fight.

But the matter was not really settled. The
Peloponnesian contingents were determined,
in the last resort, to disobey their chief, and
Themistocles was aware of their determination.
Only one course remained for him, and it
required the courage of despair to take it.
If the allies would not stay at Salamis of their
own free will, they must do it by compulsion.
He sent a trusted slave to the Persian admiral
with this message : " The Athenian commander
is a well-wisher to the King, and he informs
you that the Greeks are seized with fear, and
are about to retreat from Salamis. It is for
you to hinder their flight." A more daring
stratagem was never put into execution. Not
the least strange circumstance about it is the
fact that, years after, when Themistocles had
fallen into disgrace at home, he successfully
claimed as a service to the Persian king that

THE WOODEN WALLS 35

he had given him the chance of destroying the
whole of the Greek fleet at one blow.

The Persian commanders seem not to have
suspected the good faith of the communication
thus received, and at once set about closing
in the Greek ships. The town of Salamis was
built in a little bay on the eastern side of the
island, the distance across to the mainland of
Attica being about two miles. The Greek
fleet was drawn up, in what may be described
as the shape of a bow loosely strung, in front
of the town ; the Persian ships were ranged
along the opposite, i.e., the Attic shore. Both
to the north and to the south the channel
narrowed, being less than a mile across. The
Persians now extended their line northwards
till it touched the shore of the island, and
southwards till it reached an uninhabited island
called Psyttaleia. On this island they landed
a body of troops who were to help the crews
of any of their own ships that might be
damaged, and slaughter any Greek soldiers or
sailors who might be in a similar plight.

While these preparations were going on —
and they lasted nearly through the night —
the Greek leaders still hotly debated the
question of going or staying. An unexpected
end was put to the controversy. The chief

36 GREECE AND PERSIA

opponent of Themistocles in Athenian politics
was Aristides. He had been banished, and,
at the instance of his successful rival, recalled
from banishment when the danger of a Persian
invasion became imminent. He now came
to join his countrymen, and brought startling
tidings with him. He had come from the
island of ^Egina, which lay some twelve miles
to the south of Salamis, and his ship had
narrowly escaped capture in making its way
into the bay of Salamis ; only the darkness
had made it possible to do so. Themistocles
was fetched out from the council to hear the
tidings. " I hope," said Aristides, " that
always, and now especially, our strife will be
who may do his best service to his country.
As for the question of going or staying, it
matters nothing whether the Peloponnesians
talk much or little. Go they cannot. We are
enclosed on every side. This I have seen
with my own eyes."

" This is good news," replied Themistocles,
" for the Persians have done exactly what I
wished. Our men, who would not fight of their
own free will, will now be made to fight."
And he told him of what he had done. " And
now go and tell them. If I was to say it,
they would not believe me."

THE WOODEN WALLS 37

Aristides accordingly went in to the council
and told them his news. Many of them refused
to believe it, but when a ship from the island
of Tenos that had deserted from the Persians
confirmed the report, there was nothing more
to say. All that could be done was to make
all the preparation possible for a conflict which
had become inevitable.

Of the battle we have two accounts, that
of Herodotus, derived doubtless from one or
more persons who had taken part in it, and
that of ^Eschylus, who actually fought there
as he had fought before at Marathon. The
two accounts substantially agree, but they
differ in the number of Greek ships engaged.
Herodotus says that there were 378, made
up to the round number of 380 by the Tenian
ship which deserted on the night before the
battle, and a ship from Lemnos, which had
done the same at Artemisium. He gives the
number of each contingent, the largest being
180 contributed by Athens, while 89 came
from the states of the Peloponnesus, and
57 from ^Egina and Eubcea. One ship only
came from Greece beyond the sea. Even this
was a private rather than a public contribution.
A certain Phayllus of Crotona furnished a ship
at his own expense, and manned it with fellow-

38

GREECE AND PERSIA

citizens who were sojourning in Greece.
Pausanias saw his statue at Delphi six centuries
afterwards. yEschylus says that there were
300 ships, and ten were of special swiftness
or strength. Mr. Grote thinks that this
number is to be accepted in preference, hardly
showing, I think, his wonted acuteness. The
poet had to state his number in verse, and
finds "ten thirties" a convenient way of doing
it. But 380 would have been an unmanageable
figure, and we have, accordingly, a convenient
round number. Very likely Mr. Grote was
not so alive to the exigencies of verse as he
had been forty years before, when he was a
Charterhouse boy.

As soon as the sun rose, the Greek fleet
moved forward to the attack, the crews joining,
as they advanced, in the pcean or shout of
battle. They met no reluctant foe. So confi-
dent, indeed, was the bearing of the Persians,
that the Greeks were checked. Some of the
crews even began to back water. The issues
of great battles are often decided by examples
of courage. So it was at Salamis, for one of
the Greek ships advanced and led the way for
the rest. To whom this credit is due cannot be
said for certain. The Athenians declared that
this brave captain was Ameinias, a brother of

THE WOODEN WALLS 39

the poet ^Eschylus ; the ^ginetans claimed
the honour for a ship of their own, which had
brought over, on the eve of the battle, the
heroes worshipped in their city as auxiliaries
of the Greek people.1 Herodotus had also
heard a legend how the form of a woman,
doubtless the goddess Athene, had been seen
in the air and heard to cry, in a voice which
reached from one end of the fleet to another,
" Friends, how much further are ye going to
back ? " ^schylus gives his authority in
favour of his countryman, not expressly but by
saying that the ship which led the attack broke
off the stern of a Phoenician ship, for we know
that the Phoenician squadron was posted
over against the Athenian contingent. The
y^ginetan was second if not first, and
Simonides gives the third place to a ship
that came from Naxos. By common consent
Athens and ^Egina shared the chief distinction
of the day between them. The Athenian ships
busied themselves with such of the enemy's
fleet as offered resistance or were beached by
their captains ; the yEginetans attacked those
that attempted to escape by the southern
channel (their way to the open sea).

1 These were Peleus and Phocus, sons of ^Eacus. Tela-
mon, also a son of ^Eacus, and Ajax, son of Telamon, were
worshipped in Salamis.

40 GREECE AND PERSIA

The subjects of Xerxes, on the whole, dis-
played great courage, not the less because they
were fighting under the eyes of the king, who
was watching the battle from a projecting point
of Mount /Egaleos on the mainland of Attica.
The native Persians and Medes, as inland
peoples, were serving as what we call marines
on board the ships furnished by the maritime
provinces of Phcenicia, Egypt, and Cilicia.
But they seldom had the chance of showing
their prowess in boarding, and when they had
they were hardly a match for their better-armed
and more athletic antagonists. As for the
management of the ships, the sailors from the
east were not, as a rule, equal, either in resolu-
tion or in skill, to the hardier races of the west.
Their superior numbers, in the narrow space
to which the battle was confined, were a
hindrance rather than a help. There was no
mutual confidence, and no common speech.
And the cogent motive that sent them into
action was fear of punishment or, at the best,
obedience to a ruling race, while the Greeks
were fighting for home and country. The
Persian fleet was more successful where the
Asiatic Greeks were matched with the squadrons
from the Peloponnesus. Herodotus, himself an
Asiatic Greek by birth, vindicates their honour

THE WOODEN WALLS 41

as combatants at the expense of their Greek
patriotism. "I could mention," he says, "the
names of many captains who took ships from
the Greeks." He thinks it prudent, however,
to omit them — and indeed when Herodotus
wrote, such exploits would be better forgotten
— and gives two names only, both of them
well known already. He also mentions with
pleasure the signal discomfiture of some
Phcenician captains, who, having lost their
ships early in the day, sought to excuse them-
selves to Xerxes by laying the blame on the
treasonable practices of the Greeks. The
battle was still going on, and almost while they
were speaking a Samothracian ship was seen
to ram and sink an Athenian. It was in turn
disabled by an y^Eginetan trireme. But the
Samothracian crew were expert javelin-
throwers. They cleared the deck of the
/Eginetan, boarded, and captured it. Xerxes
turned fiercely on the Phoenicians, and ordered
that they should be instantly executed, as
having ventured to slander men braver than
themselves.

Another incident of the day Herodotus
relates from personal knowledge. His native
city of Halicarnassus had been ruled for some
years by Artemisia, the daughter of one

42

GREECE AND PERSIA

Lygdamis and the widow of another. She had
advised Xerxes not to engage the Greek fleet,
speaking with a frankness which might well
have put her life in danger. Overruled by-
other counsellors, she did her best for the
king's cause, but found herself in the greatest
peril. An Athenian ship was in close pursuit
of her, and there was a crowd of Persian
vessels in front which hindered her escape.
One of these belonged to a Carian neighbour,
with whom, it is possible, she was not on the
best of terms. She bore down upon his vessel,
and sank it. The Athenian captain concluded
at once that she had changed sides and was
now fighting for Greece. He abandoned the
pursuit, and Artemisia escaped. And she
earned praise as well. "Sire," said one of the
courtiers who stood by the king's seat, " dost
thou see how bravely Artemisia bears herself ?
She has just sunk a Greek ship." He was
sure, he went on to say, that the exploit was
Artemisia's, for he knew her flag. No one
seemed to have suspected the truth, and fortu-
nately for Artemisia there was not a single
survivor from the Carian ship to tell the tale.
Herodotus gives no estimate of the loss on
either side. A later Greek writer says that two
hundred Persian and forty Greek ships were

THE WOODEN WALLS 43

destroyed, and that the Persian loss in men was
in a much greater proportion. Few of them
could swim, and consequently, when a ship was
sunk, the whole crew perished with it. Most
of the Greeks, on the contrary, were able to
save themselves by swimming. Another
disaster to the king's forces was the total
destruction of the Persian troops landed on the
island of Psyttaleia. Aristides disembarked
with some Greek heavy-armed, and put them
all to the sword. Among them were some of
the king's own guard.

V

THE BATTLES ON THE PLAIN AND ON THE
SHORE

AFTER the defeat at Salamis Xerxes
withdrew his army into Thessaly. The
result of his deliberations with his advisers was
that he should himself go home, protected by
a division of 60,000 men, and that his uncle
Mardonius should stop in Greece with the
intention of renewing the campaign in the
following year. Mardonius was allowed to
choose such portions of the army as he thought
best, and having selected 300,000 men, went
into winter quarters in Thessaly. It is need-
less to relate all that happened during the six
months or so that passed from the opening of
the campaign in the spring of 479 up to the
final struggle in the early autumn of that year.
It will suffice to say that Mardonius did his
best to detach the Athenians from the cause of

Greece by the most liberal offers, and that the

44

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 45

Peloponnesians did all they could to bring
about the same end by the consistent selfish-
ness of their policy. To Mardonius the
Athenians returned a firm refusal. To the
Spartans they addressed a strong remonstrance.
They represented that they had been already
deserted, that the promise of help to be given
for the defence of Attica had been shamefully
broken. They hinted that if the Spartans
and their friends persisted in neglecting every
Greek interest outside the Isthmus they would
be compelled, much against their will, to make
terms with the enemy.

The Spartans would probably have continued
to temporise but for the plain speaking of a
native of Tegea in Arcadia, a friendly state for
which they felt the greatest respect. " No wall
at the Isthmus will protect us," he said, " if you
drive the Athenians into alliance with Persia.
They will put their fleet at the disposal of the
enemy, and you will be helpless." The change
in the Spartan policy was dramatically sudden.
That very night five thousand Spartans set out
for the front, a larger force than the state
ever before put into the field, or was ever to
put afterwards. Each Spartan had seven light-
armed helots to attend him. The same num-
ber of the non-Spartan population of Laconia,

46 GREECE AND PERSIA

each with one helot, followed. Mardonius, on
hearing of this movement, withdrew from Attica
into Bceotia and prepared to give battle.

The contingents of the Peloponnesian States
mustered at Corinth. As they marched north,
the Athenians, who had crossed over from
Salamis, joined them. The whole force
amounted to more than 100,000 men. It is
not necessary to give all the numbers sent by
the various states. The Lacedaemonians had
10,000 heavy armed (with 40,000 light armed),
the Tegeans 1,500, the Athenians 8,000 ; the
other contingents, for reasons which will shortly
appear, may be left out of the account.

Mardonius had constructed an entrenched
camp on the north or left bank of the river
Asopus. In front of this camp he drew up his
line of battle. The Greek army, which was
under the command of Pausanias, uncle of one
of the kings of Sparta and regent, took up
its position on the slopes of Mount Cithseron.
Their unwillingness to descend into the plain
and come to close quarters emboldened
Mardonius to attack them with his cavalry.
The contingent from Megara happened to
be in a peculiarly advanced or otherwise ex-
posed situation, and suffered so severely that
it had to send for help. It explains Pausanias's

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 47

apparent timidity when we find that he could not
induce any of his troops to go to the assistance
of their hard-pressed countrymen. In the end
three hundred Athenians volunteered for this
service. They took with them a force of
archers, an arm in which Megarians were entirely
deficient. Some sharp fighting ensued ; at last
an arrow killed the horse of the Persian general
Masistius, and the general, a man of great
stature and beauty, and a splendid figure in his
gilded chain-armour, was thrown to the ground.
This happened close to the Athenian lines, and
Masistius was soon killed, though it was only
by a thrust in the eye that he could be
despatched, so impenetrable was his armour.
The Persian cavalry, as soon as it became
aware of its leader's fate, charged furiously to
recover the body. For a time the Greeks
were driven back, but they rallied and re-
covered the prize. The Persians, demoralised,
in the usual fashion of Asiatics, by the loss of
their leader, retreated in disorder.

Encouraged by this success, the Greeks
descended into the plain, and took up a second
position on the right bank of the Asopus. The
Lacedaemonians occupied the right wing, the
Athenians the left. A curious instance of the
want of discipline in the army is afforded by

48 GREECE AND PERSIA

the dispute which arose between the Athenians
and the Tegeans as to precedence. The first
post of honour, the right wing, was conceded
by common consent to the Lacedaemonians ;
the second part, the left wing, was the matter
in dispute. Tegea claimed it on account of
various mythical exploits, and on more recent
successes achieved in company with Sparta.
Athens had also its mythical claims, but it
relied on the victory at Marathon. The
decision was given in favour of Athens by a
general vote of the Lacedaemonian soldiery.
The new position taken up by the Greeks was
found to be anything but convenient. The
army suffered from a scarcity of water ; it was
unsafe to approach the river banks, for this was
commanded by the Persian archers, and con-
sequently the sole supply was a spring, known
by the name of Gargaphia, which was close
to the Lacedaemonian position. Mardonius
shifted his line of battle a little to the west, so
as to front the new Greek position. His picked
native troops, the Persians and the Sacae
(Turkomans) were posted, not in the centre,
the post of honour in an Asiatic army, as we
have seen more than once before, but on the
left wing, where they would face the Spartans ;
to the Theban contingent was allotted a place

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 49

on the right where they were opposed to their
old enemies of Athens. This was done at the
suggestion of the Theban leaders, and the
suggestion did credit, as we shall see, to their
sagacity.

For ten days the two armies remained in
position without moving. The soothsayers on
both sides reported that the sacrifices portended
success to a policy of defence ; disaster, if an
attack should be attempted. It was to the
Greek cause that the delay was more perilous.
The army suffered greatly from the incessant
attacks of the Persian cavalry ; the scanty
water supply was a great inconvenience and
even a danger ; and when, at the suggestion
of his Theban friends, Mardonius sent his
cavalry to cut off the supplies that were sent
by the passes of Cithseron into the Greek camp,
the dangers of the situation were still further
aggravated. But the most serious peril of all
was of another kind. The spirit of party,
without which no free state can exist, but by
which every free state is ultimately ruined, was
rife in the Greek ranks. The traitors who had
shown the signal of the shield after Marathon
were not absent from the ranks at Plataea.
The Thebans, with malignant sagacity, sug-
gested to Mardonius that he should rely on

5

50 GREECE AND PERSIA

the influences that were working for him, and
avoid a general engagement. Happily for
Greece, he refused their advice, which was
discreditable, he said, to Persian honour. A
people so superior in war had no need to
resort to such expedients. He resolved to
assume the offensive.

The Greeks were apprised of this change of
plan by a visitor from the Persian camp. After
nightfall, Alexander, King of Macedonia, who
claimed to be descended from the great hero
Achilles, rode up to the Athenian outposts and
demanded speech with the generals. They
were fetched by the guard, and he told them
that Mardonius had tried in vain to obtain
from the sacrifices signs that promised success,
but that, nevertheless, he was determined to
attack. "Be prepared," he went on, "and if
you prevail, do something for my freedom ; I
have risked my life for love of Greece, to save
you from a surprise by the barbarians. I am
Alexander of Macedon."

When Pausanias heard the news he made
a proposition to the Athenian generals, which,
as coming from a Spartan, a race so punc-
tilious in military honour, sounds very strange.
He suggested that they should take the place
of the Spartans on the right wing, where they

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 51

would be opposed to the Persian infantry whom
they had already conquered at Marathon, but
whom the Spartans had never met in battle.
The Athenians promptly agreed, but the move-
ment was detected by Mardonius, and was met
by a corresponding change in his line. On
perceiving this, Pausanias reverted to the for-
mer arrangement.

The first offensive movement on the part of
Mardonius was eminently successful. His
cavalry got past, or broke through the
Spartan line, so as to get at the spring of
Gargaphia. This they choked, and so de-
prived the Greek army of their only available
water supply.

A change of position became necessary.
The new ground which the council of war
determined to occupy was near Platsea, and
went by the name of the Island, because it lay
between two small streams which descend from
Cithaeron. The army would have a water
supply, and would be protected, in a degree,
from the Persian cavalry. It was then too late
to make the movement, which would not be
practicable except under cover of darkness.
The whole of the next day had to be spent
in extreme discomfort ; and when at nightfall
orders were given for a change of position, two

52 GREECE AND PERSIA

somewhat alarming incidents took place. The
centre of the Greek force, comprising all the
smaller contingents, had been so demoralised,
it would seem, by the troubles of the day that,
as soon as the night fell, they marched off, not
to the Island, but beyond it, to a place which
they very probably considered to be better
protected against the harassing attacks of the
cavalry. This was the town of Platsea itself.
They took up a position in front of the temple
of Here\ a building of considerable size, as we
know from the ruins still to be seen, and on
high ground. Here they had the town behind
them, and ground, unfavourable to the action
of cavalry on either side. The other discon-
certing event was the conduct of one of the
Spartan officers, Amompharetus by name.1
This man conceived that the movement
ordered by Pausanias was a retreat, and so
forbidden by the strict code of Spartan mili-
tary honour. Accordingly he refused to move.
An angry dispute followed, Pausanias and his
second in command doing all they could to

1 He commanded a lochos ; there were four in each
mora, the whole force being divided into six mora. The
divisions varied in size according to the number of men
called out. On this occasion each mora would number
830 men (about), and each lochus 207 (about).

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 53

convince their subordinate, he obstinately-
adhering to his decision. In the midst of
the argument a messenger from the Athenians
arrived on horseback. They were perplexed
by the inaction of the Spartans, and, very
possibly, suspicious of some design which
would be compromising to their own safety.
At the moment of this messenger's arrival
Amompharetus had delivered his ultimatum.
Taking up from the ground a huge stone, he
cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying at the
same time, "I give my vote for staying" —
the same word serves in Greek for vote and
pebble, pebbles being used in the ballot-boxes.
Pausanias hurriedly explained the situation to
the Athenian, and begged him to carry back a
message that he hoped his countrymen would
not move till he could overcome the difficulty
in which he found himself. This, indeed,
seemed almost hopeless. At last, just before
dawn, Pausanias made up his mind to leave
the refractory captain behind. Finding him-
self alone with his company, he would, he
hoped, consent to follow. And this was what
actually took place.

By this time day was dawning, and Mar-
donius became aware of what had happened.
He seems to have looked upon the movement

54 GREECE AND PERSIA

in much the same way as Amompharetus had
done. It was a flight. These Spartans, for
all their boasted courage, were running away.
His Persian troops answered the command
by a disorderly advance. They crossed the
Asopus, which, it will be remembered, flowed
in front of their position, and hurried in the
track of the Spartans ; the rest of the Asiatics
followed their example. Pausanias sent a
message to the Athenians, telling them that
the Persians were concentrating their whole
strength against his division, and begging that
they would come to his help, at least by
sending their archers. The Athenians, how-
ever, had by this time work enough of their
own to deal with, for the Thebans and Thes-
salians had commenced an attack upon them.

The Spartans, therefore, had to bear the
brunt of the Persian attack alone. They had
ten thousand heavy-armed and four times as
many light-armed, numbers slightly increased
by the contingent from Tegea, a force of three
thousand, equally divided between the two
classes of troops. Pausanias, who seems to
have shown little ability or presence of mind
from the beginning to the end of the cam-
paign, was busy with the customary sacrifice.
Unfortunately the victims showed no en-

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 55

couraging signs, and he was content, possibly
was compelled by the public opinion of his
men — for a Greek army, even when it came
from Sparta, was a democracy — to postpone
any movement of offence till the Fates seemed
propitious. Meanwhile his men were falling
about him — one of the slain was reputed to
be the handsomest man in the whole Greek
army.1 In an agony of distress, Pausanias
lifted his eyes to the Temple of Here, which
stood on a conspic\ ous height, and prayed for
the help of the goddess. The signs imme-
diately changed, and the welcome signal to
charge was given. The Tegeans seem to
have already moved. Together they ad-
vanced against the Persian line, which was
protected by a rampart of wicker shields,
from behind which the archers had been
pouring volleys of arrows. The rampart was
soon broken down. Then a fierce hand-to-
hand fight began. Again and again the

1 His name was Callicrates, Fair and strong, as it might
be rendered. There is a class of historical critics who
would argue that the name gave rise to the legend, just
as they suggest — this has actually been done — that the
name of the fleet runner who traversed the distance
between Athens and Sparta so speedily, shows the
mythical character of the story. It was Pheidippides, i.e
Horse-sparer's son.

56 GREECE AND PERSIA

Persian braves dashed themselves on the
Spartans' spears and broke or strived to
break them. " They were not one whit
inferior to the Greeks in boldness and war-
like spirit " — such is the testimony which men
who had borne their part in that fierce struggle
bore to the bravery of their antagonists — but
their armament was less effective and their
military training less complete. The battle
raged most furiously about the person of
Mardonius, who was surrounded by a body-
guard of a thousand Immortals. As long as
he lived these picked warriors held their own ;
when he was struck down — a Spartan, Aeim-
nestus 1 by name, had the credit of the deed —
they fled in wild confusion to their camp. A
body of forty thousand was led off the field
by the general in command, when he saw how
the fortune of the day was going.

On the right wing of the Persian army the
Theban infantry, always distinguished for its
steady courage, held its own for a considerable
time against the Athenians. It stood alone,
however. The other Greeks, whom Xerxes or
his lieutenant had pressed into the Persian
service, felt no zeal for the cause, and took
the first opportunity that occurred of retreat-

1 Observe again the significant name — Ever remembered.

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 57

ing. The Thebans, who must have been
much inferior in numbers to their Athenian
adversaries, were driven back, with a con-
siderable loss in killed. They took refuge
within the walls of their city. Their cavalry,
indeed, achieved the only success that the
army of Mardonius could boast. News
reached the Greek centre, in its position out-
side Plataea, that the right wing had put the
Persians to flight, and it hurriedly advanced
to take a share in the victory. The move-
ment was made in a careless and disorderly
way. So relaxed was discipline that the whole
force did not even keep together. Two of the
contingents, from Megara and Phlius (a small
state in the north of the Peloponnese) were
attacked by the Theban cavalry as they
crossed the plain and suffered a very heavy
loss, as many as six hundred being slain.
" So they perished without honour," says
Herodotus. It must be owned that from first
to last the smaller Greek States earned little
distinction in the war.

The Persian entrenched camp was for a time
a difficulty. The Spartans attacked it, but
made no progress, being wholly unacquainted
with the methods of assaulting fortified places.
They had to await the arrival of the Athenians,

58

GREECE AND PERSIA

who seem to have had, if not more experience,
at least more intelligence. With their help the
camp was taken by assault. The spoil was
very great. Pausanias says that he saw at
Athens the golden scymetar of Mardonius,
taken from his tent on the day of the victory.

The loss of the Persians was, of course,
very great. Herodotus says that only 3,000
survived. This may be an exaggeration, but
it is doubtless true that the chances of escape
were very small, and that no mercy would be
shown. Of the Greeks 159 are said to have
fallen. To this number must be added the 600
cut off by the Theban cavalry, and about as
many more who fell in the preliminary conflicts.
Plutarch, while giving the same number as
Herodotus, states that the total Greek loss,
from first to last, was 1,360.

Among the Spartan dead were Amompha-
retus, and Aristodemus, the unhappy survivor
of Thermopylae.

Two of the Greek contingents, from Mantinea
and from Elis, arrived after the battle was over.
They fined the generals whose tardiness had
deprived them of all share in the glory of the
victory.

Much might be said of what was done by the
conquerors to commemorate their victory ; but

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 59

my task is finished when the battle has been
described. For one curious story, however, I
must find room. Out of the tenth of the spoil
dedicated to the Delphian Apollo, a golden
tripod, or caldron, supported by three legs, was
made. This tripod rested on a bronze pedestal.
The gold was plundered by the Phocians about
a century and a half later, but the pedestal was
carried by the Emperor Constantine to his new
capital on the Bosphorus. This relic was seen
by English travellers in the seventeenth cen-
tury, and was more minutely examined at the
time of the Crimean war. The original inscrip-
tion put by Pausanius was erased by the
Lacedaemonians, a list of the states that took
part in the battle being substituted. Solvents
applied to the rust that had accumulated on the
metal made this list legible. It contains the
names of states which we know to have had no
claim to the honour. This exactly agrees with
what Herodotus tells us. Systematic falsifica-
tion of history was carried on by the cities
which by their misfortune or their fault took no
part in the victory.

The combined Greek fleet did little or
nothing after the victory at Salamis, Themis-
tocles proposed, indeed, a vigorous policy. The

6o

GREECE AND PERSIA

Persians should be closely pursued, the bridge
across the Hellespont destroyed, and the whole
of the invading army destroyed. The Spartans
took a different line, urging that Greece would
do well to let an enemy, who might still be
dangerous, depart without further molestation.
This policy had something to be said for it, and
Sparta carried the other allies with her. The
Asiatic Greeks, however, were not disposed to
lose the opportunity of freedom. In the spring
of the following year (479) they sent envoys to
the leaders of the Greek fleet, which was then
stationed at ^Egina, begging them to follow up
the successes already won. The envoys found
their task a very difficult one. The Spartan
Leotychides, who was in command, was un-
willing to undertake the responsibility. He
moved as far eastward as Delos, and there re-
mained. Later in the year another effort was
made, this time by three natives of Samos,
which was then governed by a tyrant established
in power by the Persians. The envoys urged on
Leotychides the duty of helping his fellow
Greeks to escape from the Persian yoke,
and enlarged on the prospects of success.
" Stranger," said the Spartan to the spokesman
of the embassy, " tell me your name."
" Hegisistratus " (army-leader), answered the

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 61

man. " I accept the omen," cried Leotychides,
and the resolution to advance was taken.

The Greek admirals had expected to find the
Persian fleet at Samos. In this they were
disappointed. It had left the island, and had
taken up a position on the mainland, where it
would have the assistance of the army, number-
ing, we are told, 60,000, which had been left to
overawe the Greek cities. The place was
Mycali, now known as Cape St. Mary. The
channel between the mainland and Samos is
here at its narrowest. The ships were beached,
and protected by a rampart made of stones and
timber.

The first thing that Leotychides did, doubt-
less suggested by the action of Themistocles at
Artemisium, was to approach the Greeks serving
in the Persian camp. He caused his ship to be
brought as close as possible to the shore, and
instructed a herald to proclaim, as he moved
slowly along, a message to the Greeks. " Men
of Ionia," such were the words, "when we join
battle with the Persians, remember freedom."
They might, he thought, act upon the sugges-
tion, and turn their arms against the Persians.
Anyhow, it would cause distrust and suspicion.
The latter anticipation was at once fulfilled,
The Persians disarmed the Samians, and sent

62 GREECE AND PERSIA

the contingent from Miletus to a distant spot,
which they were to guard, the real object being
to get them out of the way. This done they
prepared to defend themselves against the
Greeks, who were now advancing to the
attack.

And now there happened one of the strange
events to which we may safely give the neutral
name of coincidence. As the Greeks moved
forward, a rumour ran from one end of the army
to the other that a great battle had been won
in Bceotia. At the same time some one saw a
herald's staff1 lying on the shore. The common
belief at the time was, of course, in a divine
interference. Later on the sceptical explana-
tion that the commanders invented the story to
encourage their troops became current. The
strange phenomena of thought-currents, brain-
waves, etc., familiar to modern experience, will,
perhaps, account for the story as satisfactorily
as can be expected. Anyhow the report was
true ; the battle of Plataea had been fought and
won in the morning of the day of Mycale.

1 The herald's staff (scutale) was a contrivance for sending
messages. A strip of leather, on which the message was
written lengthwise, was rolled slantwise round a baton.
When unrolled it could not be read, but when put on the
similar baton in the hands of the officer abroad it again
became legible.

BATTLES ON PLAIN AND ON SHORE 63

The actual conflict was very like that which
occurred at Platsea. As we hear no more of
the stockade of stone and timber with which
the ships were protected, we may presume that
the Greeks delivered their attack on the flank
of the Persian position. Here a wicker rampart
had been extemporised, just as it had been at
Platsea. With the help of this the Persians
were able for a time to hold their own.
Herodotus goes so far as to say that they had
not the worst of the battle. But the Athenians,
anxious to secure the honours of the day before
the Spartans arrived, renewed the attack with
fresh vigour, broke down the wicker rampart,
and pursued the flying enemy to their fortified
camp. For a time, even when the rampart
had fallen, the valiant Persians maintained the
struggle. Then, overpowered by fresh arrivals,
they slowly fell back. The Greek army
advanced in two divisions, the Athenians and
the contingents brigaded with them marching-
over the level ground by the sea, the Spartans,
with the Peloponnesians generally, taking an
inland route which led them over some rough
and difficult country. Naturally their progress
was not rapid, and the battle was virtually
decided when they reached the field of action.

To the very last the Persians showed all the

64 GREECE AND PERSIA

courage and pluck of a ruling race. The
Greek victory was by no means bloodless.
The contingent from Sicyon, in particular, lost
heavily. The result of the day, however, was
definite enough. Some survivors from the
battle contrived to escape to the hills, and
thence to Sardis, but the army, as a whole,
ceased to exist. The ships were naturally
abandoned. Perhaps this was the most im-
portant of the Greek successes, for it meant
the liberation of the islands of the ^Egean.
These were finally rescued from the yoke
which had been heavy on them for half a
century.

BOOK II
GREECE AND CARTHAGE

I. THE LORD OF SYRACUSE

IN the early part of the year 480, when the
danger from Persia was imminent, the
Greeks sent an embassy to their countrymen
in Sicily, asking for help. The Greek power
in the island was largely in the hands of one
man, Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse. To him, there-
fore, the application was made. Herodotus
gives an account of the interview, profes-
sing to report the speeches which were
made at it. These may be epitomised
thus : —

Ambassadors : " The Persian King is
bringing against us the strength of Asia.
He professes to be seeking vengeance on
Athens ; really, he is bent on subduing the

6 6s

66 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

whole Greek race. If he should conquer us
he will certainly attack you. Join with us
therefore in resisting him. Combined, we
shall be a match for him ; disunited, we shall
certainly be conquered."

Gelo : " When I asked you for help
against Carthage you would not give it. For
anything that you did to stop it, Sicily might
have been conquered by the barbarians. But
I will return good for evil. You shall have
two hundred ships of war, twenty thousand
men-at-arms, two thousand cavalry, as many
more light-armed troops, and corn for your
whole army as long as the war lasts. Only
you must give me the chief command."

Syagrus (the Spartan ambassador) : " What
would King Agamemnon say if he heard
that Sparta had given up her leadership to a
man of Syracuse ? Know that we will not
have your help upon such terms."

Gelo : "It seems but fair that I who send
so large a force should have the command.
Still, if you are so stiff about the leadership, I
will say — ' Command the army, and let me
have the fleet ; or, if you like it better, take
the fleet and give me the army.' "

The Athenian Ambassador {interrupting
before any one else could speak) : " The com-

THE LORD OF SYRACUSE 67

mand of the fleet is ours. We will yield it,
indeed, to the Spartans, if they desire it, but
we will yield it to no one else."

Gelo : " Friends, you seem not to want
for commanders, though you want for men.
As you ask everything and yield nothing, go
back to Greece and say that she has lost the
spring out of the year."

There is nothing improbable about this
dialogue. Questions of precedence and leader-
ship were regarded with great jealousy by
States that were actually independent of each
other and nominally equal. The strange thing
is that Gelo makes no mention of the danger
with which he was himself threatened. He
brings up against the ambassadors the fact that
the States which they represented had given
him no help in conflict with Carthage (an inci-
dent of which we know nothing from any other
source), but he does not mention what was un-
doubtedly the case that he was at the moment
expecting another attack from the same
quarter. It would have been quite impossible
for Gelo to send fifty thousand troops — not to
speak of the crews of the ships — out of Sicily,
when he was certain to want every man that
he could raise in the course of a few months.

The truth is that there was another Asiatic

68 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

power which was scarcely less formidable to
European civilisation than Persia itself. I
speak of Carthage. Though locally situated
in North Africa as an Asiatic power, she was
Phoenician in origin, character, and institutions.
Founded by emigrants from Tyre some time
in the ninth century B.C., she had always kept
up a close connection with her mother- country
of Phoenicia. One of the traditions of the race
was to regard the Greeks as rivals or as ene-
mies. Sicily, where Greeks began to settle in
the eighth century, just about the time when
Carthage was beginning to expand, and which,
at its nearest point, was not more than a
hundred miles from that city, naturally became
a battlefield between the two races. Phoeni-
cian traders had been in the habit of visiting
the island long before the Greeks appeared
upon the scene, and though they seem to have
given up most of their scattered ports and
factories, they continued to occupy three towns
in the western division. Carthage therefore
would find kinsfolk and friends when she
sought to gain a foothold in Sicily. When
this attempt was first made we do not know.
The early history of the city is a blank. About
550 B.C. we hear of one of its leaders making
conquests in Sicily, among other places. That

THE LORD OF SYRACUSE 69

there was a great effort to conquer the island
in 480 we cannot doubt. Probably it was the
result of an agreement with Persia. There is,
it is true, no evidence forthcoming of any com-
pact of the kind ; but it is not likely that there
would be such evidence. On the other hand,
the Persian king may very easily have come to
an arrangement with the Carthaginian govern-
ment through Phoenician intermediaries. The
Phoenician contingent was the largest in
his fleet, and was high in his favour, at least
until the disastrous defeat of Salamis.1 The
coincidence of time is, in itself, a strong argu-
ment for the existence of a common plan.

One of the many Hamilcars who figure in
Carthaginian history was put in command of
an army which is said to have numbered
300,000 men. It was made up of Phoenicians,
probably recruited in Carthage itself, and in
various settlements of that race along the
Mediterranean coast, of Africans from the
home provinces, of natives of Sardinia, Cor-
sica, and the Italian mainland, and, finally, of
Spaniards, for Spain was by this time within
the sphere of Carthaginian influence. Hamilcar
landed at Panoromus and marched to Himera,
which lay some twenty miles to the westward
1 See p. 41.

70 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

on the northern coast of the island. Some of
his large fleet of transports, especially such as
carried the cavalry and the war-chariots, were
lost on the way, or lagged behind. Still the
army, as a whole, was successfully transferred
to Sicilian soil, and Hasdrubal, convinced that
if this could be done his force would be practi-
cally irresistible, is reported to have said :
" The war is over." He had, we must re-
member, another good reason for confidence.
There was a powerful minority among the
Greek cities which was prepared to welcome
the interference of Carthage. Hamilcar had
been actually invited by the banished tyrant of
Himera. Unfortunately, any enemy of a Greek
city could expect to find helpers within its
walls in an unsuccessful party. Eager political
life did much for the development of Greek
character, but a heavy price had sometimes to
be paid for its benefits. Hamilcar divided
his force between two camps. One of them
was for the crews of the fleet, which had
all been beached with the exception of twenty
swift vessels kept for an emergency ; the
other was occupied by the army. Himera,
on the other hand, prepared for a desperate
resistance. Even the gates were bricked up.
The garrison was under the command of

THE LORD OF SYRACUSE 71

Theron, tyrant of Agrigentum. His first step
was to send off a messenger to Gelo with an
urgent appeal for help. Gelo was ready to
march. He had under his command fifty
thousand infantry and five thousand horse.
He reached Himera, and strongly fortified a
camp outside the city. He had, as has been
said, a strong force of cavalry, an arm in which
the Carthaginians were deficient owing to the
accident to the horse transports. This supe-
riority he used to cut off the enemy's foraging
parties. His success in these operations was so
great as to raise the spirits of his troops. The
inhabitants of Himera grew so confident that
they pulled down the brickwork with which, as
has been said, they had blocked up their gates.
The decisive battle was not long delayed.
We have no details of the tactics employed on
either side, but we are told that the contest was
long and bloody, lasting from sunrise almost
to sunset. A daring stratagem seems to have
done something towards deciding the issue of
the battle. Gelo had intercepted a letter from
the magistrates of the Greek city of Selinus to
Hasdrubal, in which there was a promise that
they would send a force of cavalry to his help.
He intended some of his own horsemen to play
the part of the cavalry of Selinus. They were

72 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

to make their way into the enemy's camp and
then take the opportunity of doing all the mis-
chief they could. A concerted signal was to
apprise the commander-in-chief of their success.
On seeing he would press the attack with all
possible vigour. This he did, and the result
was the complete defeat of the Carthaginians.

So far there is nothing improbable about the
story. When we are told that one-half of the
invading army fell on the field of battle we
recognise one of the familiar exaggerations of
ancient history. It is probable that the real
number, both of the combatants and of the
slain, was much smaller than that commonly
received. However this may be, Carthage
certainly suffered a disaster of the first magni-
tude. Her army ceased to exist ; some of the
fugitives probably made good their escape to
the Phoenician strongholds in the island, but
many were compelled to surrender to the con-
querors. Some, doubtless, were ransomed by
their friends at home ; the rest were sold as
slaves.

So fine an opportunity of pointing a moral
and adorning a tale was not likely to be lost
by the Greek writers. The story in the shape
which it ultimately took was this : As both of
the Carthaginian camps were captured by Gelo,

THE LORD OF SYRACUSE 73

the fleet met with the same fate as the army.
But the squadron of twenty ships which had
been reserved for emergencies made good its
escape. But even these were not fated to
reach the African shore. A storm overtook
them on their voyage and all perished. One
little boat, rowed by a single survivor, survived
to carry the story of how the most splendid
armament ever sent forth from Carthage had
ceased to exist. Exactly the same story was
told of the return of Xerxes after the defeat
of Salamis. According to Herodotus, who
had every opportunity of knowing the truth,
the Persian king made his way back over-
land, losing many men on the way from hunger
and disease, but unmolested. So tame a con-
clusion did not satisfy the Greek sense of
the fitness of things. Tradition pictured the
Persian king as making his escape after the
battle in a single ship ; and Juvenal, when he
was seeking illustrations for the great theme
of the vanity of human wishes, found the
legend admirably suited to his purpose. Xerxes
had lashed the winds and put the sea in fetters
when they hindered his triumphal march. But
how did he return ? —

" In one poor ship the baffled monarch fled
O'er crimsoned seas and billows clogged with dead."

74

GREECE AND CARTHAGE

The fate of Hamilcar himself was wrapped
in romantic mystery. Some said that he was
slain by one of the horsemen who made their
way into the camp ; according to others he
destroyed himself. While the conflict was
raging he remained in the camp, occupied in
soliciting the favour of the gods by costly
sacrifices. He was not content to offer the
victims in the usual way, by pieces taken from
this or that part. They were thrown whole
into the fire, which was built high in order to
consume them. When he found that his
devotion was unavailing and that the tide of
battle was turning against him, he threw him-
self into the furnace. Certain it is that he was
never again seen alive. Gelo erected a monu-
ment to him on the field of battle, and the
Carthaginians paid to his memory yearly
honours of sacrifice. There must have been
some greatness in the man which was thus
recognised by the conqueror, and by the city
which had, one would think, no reason to be
grateful to him.

II

THE STORM FROM AFRICA

THOUGH the Carthaginians, for some
reasons which we do not understand,
commemorated Hamilcar on the field of
Himera, they did their best at home to banish
all recollection of his disastrous expedition.
They even sent his son, Gisco, into exile for
no reason except his unfortunate parentage.
Gisco took up his abode in the Greek city of
Selinus. A Greek city was not likely to be an
agreeable home for a stranger not of Hellenic
blood. The Greek's pride of race was intense ;
all the outside world was barbarian to him.
Anyhow, one of Gisco's children, Hannibal by
name, carried away from the place where his
youth was spent an intense dislike of the
race. " He was by nature," says Diodorus,
"a Greek-hater." The guilt of his race had
been expiated, it would seem, by his father's

76 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

lifelong exile, and he had been permitted to
return home, and had even risen to the highest
office in the State.

An opportunity now came to him for grati-
fying the animosity which he felt against the
city of Selinus. This seems to have been in a
state of chronic enmity with its neighbour
Egesta. The quarrel between them had
already led to the most disastrous conse-
quences. It was the complaint of Egesta
against their neighbours of Selinus that had
given Athens a pretext for their Sicilian expe-
dition. Only two years had passed since this
expedition had come to an end, disastrous
beyond all precedent in Greek history, and
now this paltry quarrel was about to cause
another devastating war. Egesta was, of
course, worse off than when she made her
unlucky application to Athens and was hard
pressed by her Greek neighbours. She now
sent envoys to Carthage. Hannibal, as I have
said, saw his opportunity. He persuaded his
countrymen to take up the cause of the weaker
State. The first thing was to send envoys to
Sicily with instructions so to manage the affair
as to make an appeal to arms certain.

They were to go to Syracuse in company
with a deputation from Egesta, lay the affair

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 77

before that State, and offer to submit to arbi-
tration. It was pretty certain that Selinus
would refuse its consent, for it was practically
in possession of the territory which was the
matter in dispute. This, indeed, was exactly
what happened. Selinus represented its case
before the Syracusan assembly, but refused
arbitration. Syracuse, accordingly, resolved
to stand neutral, to maintain its alliance with
Selinus, and to remain at peace with Carthage.
Selinus, left to itself, failed to understand the
danger in which it was placed. Five thousand
Africans and eight hundred mercenaries from
Italy, veterans who had served with the
Athenians in the siege of Syracuse, but had
left them or been discharged before the final
catastrophe, came to the help of Egesta.. The
Selinuntines took no heed of their arrival, but
continued to ravage the enemy's territory. As
they met with no opposition, they grew more
and more careless. But the enemy was on the
watch, and taking the invading force by sur-
prise inflicted on them a heavy loss, killing or
taking prisoners as many as one thousand
men.

Even now Selinus, it is possible, might have
escaped her doom. My readers will remember
that the State had been on friendly terms with

78 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

Carthage, and had actually sent, or at least
promised, help to Hamilcar when he was
attacking Himera.1 Had it asked for peace
and appealed to these associations in support
of the petition, Hannibal might not improb-
ably have granted tolerable terms. His great
quarrel was not against Selinus, but against
Himera. It was at Himera that his grand-
father had perished, and it was his grandfather's
death that he desired above all things to
avenge. But the Selinuntines appear to have
been totally insensible of their danger. They
asked for help from Syracuse, should the need
arise, and received a promise that it would be
given. But nothing was actually done.

The fact is that no one in the island was
aware of the vast preparations which Hannibal
was making for an expedition in the following
year. We are not told how the secret was
kept ; but kept it was. When the storm burst
on the Sicilian Greeks it took them by surprise,
and it came with overpowering force.

The numbers given by historians are, as
usual, various and untrustworthy.2 One writer

1 See p. 71.

2 It may be as well to explain that our knowledge of this
period is derived chiefly from Diodorus Siculus, a writer of
the first century of our era. He was a native of Sicily, and

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 79

gives 100,000, and this we may take as approxi-
mating to the truth. The army was made up
as usual of mercenaries, commanded, as far at
least as the superior officers were concerned,
by native Carthaginians. The city was now at
the very height of its prosperity and could
command a practically unlimited supply of men
from the fighting races of the world. Africans,
Spaniards, and Italians made up the force,
with a mixture of Greeks, always ready to sell
their swords to any paymaster. This great
army was carried across the sea in fifteen
hundred transports, and were landed in the bay
of Motye\ not far from Lilybaeum, the western
extremity of the island. Selinus is on the
southern coast of the island, but Hannibal
preferred to disembark his troops at some
distance. Had he sailed any distance along
the southern coast his advance might have
been regarded as a menace to Syracuse and

while writing something like an Universal History, gave
special attention to the affairs of his own country. He had
before him, it would appear, two writers of much earlier
date, both of them Sicilians. These were Ephorus, who
was born about 404 B.C., and Timaeus, who was about
half a century later. Fragments only of their works
survive, but practically all that Diodorus tells us about
Sicilian affairs comes from them. Some details we get from
Plutarch.

80 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

the other Greek cities. His sagacity served
him well. Syracuse, whether informed of what
had happened or not, made no movement.
Hannibal, on the other hand, lost no time, but
marched straight to Selinus, his forces being
increased by contingents from Egesta and the
Carthaginian settlements. The walls of the
town were ill-adapted to resist the attack of an
army far outnumbering the force available for de-
fence and amply furnished with everything that
the engineers of the time could put at the dis-
posal of a besieging force. Powerful catapults
discharged showers of missiles which cleared
the walls ; archers and slingers were posted at
points of advantage where they could serve
with the best effect the same purpose ; wooden
towers, filled with armed men, were brought
up to the walls, with which they were very
nearly on a level ; elsewhere huge battering-
rams were driven against such spots in the
fortifications as showed any signs of weakness
or decay. Every one of these methods of
attack was made formidable in the extreme
by the multitudes of men available for pushing
them home. And Hannibal was present
everywhere, urging on his soldiers with an
almost fanatical energy. The siege lasted
for nine days, the besiegers pressing the

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 81

assault with unabated energy, the besieged
maintaining the defence with all the resolution
of despair. There was no thought of capitu-
lation. Indeed, the Carthaginian general
would grant no terms. He had promised the
plunder of the town to his soldiers, and Selinus
had no other prospect than to resist or to
perish.

Assault after assault was delivered and
repulsed. But it was a conflict that could not
be indefinitely continued. The combatants in
the place could hardly have exceeded ten
thousand ; probably their number, even when
swelled by every one who could hold a weapon,
was under this figure. And they had all to be
on service, with the very briefest intervals of
rest, or with no intervals at all. The assailants
came on by relays, of which there were so
many that no one had to fight for more than
three or four hours at a time. On the third or
fourth day a body of Campanian mercenaries
found their way into the town over a breach
that had been made by the battering-rams.
But Selinus was not yet taken. The towns-
men gathered themselves up for a supreme
effort, and the Campanians were driven out
with the loss of many of their number. On
the tenth day a Spanish force — the Spaniards

7

82 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

were always the most resolute fighters in the
armies of Carthage — made their way into the
town. This time the wearied citizens could
not drive the storming party back. Yet they
still resisted. Barricades were set up and
desperately defended in the narrow streets,
while the women and children showered tiles
and bricks from the roofs and upper stories on
the enemy below. A last stand was made in
the market-place. Thus most of those who
still survived were slain. Some fell alive into
the hands of the enemy; two or three thousand
made good their escape to Agrigentum.

And all the while not a single soldier from
any one of the Greek cities of Sicily came
to help the unhappy town. Messenger after
messenger had been sent to tell how pressing
was the need, and to implore assistance, but no
assistance was given. Agrigentum and Gela
had indeed their forces ready to march, but
they waited for Syracuse, and Syracuse was
culpably tardy in moving. Possibly, as had
been suggested, its rulers fancied that Han-
nibal would waste time as they had lately seen
Nicias, the Athenian commander, waste it
before their walls. Anyhow, they waited first
till a petty quarrel with two of their Greek
neighbours was finished, and then till the

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 83

very largest and best equipped force that
could be raised was ready to march. By this
time the opportunity was lost. With horror,
not unmixed with a certain fear for its own
future, Syracuse heard that Selinus, a Dorian
Greek city, like itself, had fallen.

The fall of a city taken by storm has always
been miserable in the extreme. In whatever
respects the world may have advanced and
improved, in this it remains much about the
same. But the Carthaginians seem to have
used their victory with more than common
barbarity. That the prisoners should be
slaughtered in cold blood was unhappily a
common incident. A Greek conqueror was
more likely than not to treat fellow Greeks in
this way. But mutilation was a hideous
barbarity, and in this Hannibal permitted his
soldiers to indulge. I mention the fact because
it helps us to realise how the world would have
been put backward if Carthage had triumphed
over Greece. Selinus was again inhabited,
but it never recovered the terrible blow inflicted
upon it by Hannibal. To this day the pros-
trate columns of its temples, some of the most
magnificent ruins in the world, bear the marks
of the crowbars which the barbarous invaders
used in overthrowing them.

84 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

The main purpose of Hannibal was still to
be accomplished. It was against Himera, the
scene of his grandfather's defeat, that his
expedition was really aimed, and, Selinus
destroyed, he marched against the other city,
which was on the north coast of the island, and
about fifty miles distant. His numbers were
swollen by recruits from the native Sicilian
tribes, who had never reconciled themselves
to the presence of the Greek settlers, and now
gladly seized the opportunity of expelling them.
Hannibal repeated at Himera the tactics which
he had employed with success at Selinus. He
delivered his attack without any delay, bringing
his battering-rams to bear upon the walls, and
bringing up his movable towers. Nothing was
accomplished on the first day. The people of
Himera had the help and, what was probably not
less effective, the encouragement of a Syracusan
contingent of 4,000 men. Repeated assaults
of the besiegers were repulsed with great
slaughter, and the spirits of the defenders rose
high. So great indeed was the confidence
which they felt in their superiority to the enemy
that they resolved to take the offensive. At
dawn on the second day a body of 10,000 men
sallied forth from the town and fiercely attacked
the investing force. The Carthaginians were

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 85

not prepared for any such action. Their first
line was easily broken. The Greeks pursued
the fugitives and inflicted upon them a heavy
loss, killing, it is said by one writer, as many as
20,000 men. As this number would allow an
average of two victims to each combatant, it
may safely be rejected. The 6,000 given by a
more sober historian is probably much nearer,
though not under the number. But the easy
success of the sally led to disaster. Hannibal
was watching the affair from some elevated
ground in the rear of the position, and he now
moved forward. He found the Greeks
exhausted and breathless, and after a fierce
struggle drove them back. The main body
reached the gates of Himera, though not
without loss, but 3,000 men were isolated on
the plain and perished to a man.

While the struggle was proceeding, a
squadron of twenty-five ships of war arrived
from Syracuse. Unfortunately they brought
with them some alarming news. In passing
the Carthaginian port of Motye they had
observed signs of preparation in the fleet.
The explanation suggested and received was
that the enemy were preparing to attack
Syracuse. The captain of the Syracusan
contingent, Diodes by name, was profoundly

86 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

alarmed by this intelligence. The defence of
Himera became a secondary consideration in
view of what he believed to be the instant
danger of Syracuse itself. He ordered the
warships to return immediately. He even
insisted on taking back the troops under his
own command. The Himeraeans remonstrated
against this desertion, but remonstrated in
vain. It could hardly be denied that Diodes
was acting in the interest, at least in the
immediate interest, of Syracuse. All that he
would agree to, in the way of compromise, was
that the ships should transport as many of the
Himeraeans as could be taken on board to
Messana, which was about 150 miles distant
(Syracuse was 100 miles further off), and that
they should return with all speed to take away
the remainder. Those who were left behind,
or elected to remain, should do their best in
the meantime to hold the city. As for Diodes,
he marched away in such haste that he left the
bodies of such of his own men as had fallen in
the recent conflict unburied — the most shame-
ful confession that a Greek general could
make of weakness or defeat. The next day
Hannibal renewed the attack. The brave
Himeraeans still repulsed him. For the whole
of that day they were able to hold their own.

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 87

If they could have maintained their resistance
for yet another twelve hours, all might have
been well, for the ships, which clearly could
not have gone so far as Messana, were seen
to be returning. But their strength was
exhausted. A breach had been made in the
walls, and the Spaniards, again showing their
superiority over Hannibal's other troops, forced
their way through it. A few of the Himerseans
made their way to the ships ; but the great
mass of the population was either slain or
captured. Hannibal, while giving up the
spoil of the city without reserve to his soldiers,
did his best to stop the massacre. But there
was no mercy in his motives. The women
and children were either distributed among the
conquerors or sold as slaves. The male
captives of full age, 3,000 in number, were
taken to the precise spot where Hamilcar had
been last seen alive, cruelly mutilated and
slain. We read of many barbarous acts in
Greek history, but of nothing so atrocious as
this. If we can see but little trace of humanity,
as we understand it, in the Greek character,
the people had a sense of fitness, a restraining
power of taste, if not of conscience, that forbad
such horrors.

The danger that threatened civilisation must

88 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

have seemed great at the time, though it was
probably less than had been the case when the
fate of the world, so to speak, had been in sus-
pense on the day of Salamis. But the fears of
Sicily, felt also, we may believe, in mainland
Greece, were suddenly relieved. Hannibal
had accomplished his object. He had exacted
a never-to-be-forgotten vengeance for the death
of his grandfather, and he wanted no more.
Half Sicily was now in the hands of Carthage,
and the Greek name was more humbled than it
had been within the memory of man. He
disbanded his army, and returned, laden with
the spoils of war, to Carthage, where he was
received with enthusiasm.

But the danger was only postponed. If
Hannibal had been satisfied with the results of
his campaign, Carthage was not. Its old
ambition of dominating Sicily was revived, and
for the next four years it made costly and
incessant preparations for another invasion of
the eastern or Greek portion of the island.
Unfortunately the Sicilian Greeks spent the
time, not in consolidating their strength, but in
intestine strife. The most eminent citizen of
Syracuse had made repeated attempts to
establish a despotism. He had met with
failure and death, but he left behind him a

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 89

legacy of political hatred that might well have
proved fatal to the State.

In 407 the hostile intention of Carthage
became known to the Sicilian Greeks. They
sent envoys to make a remonstrance, and to
suggest a treaty of peace. No answer was
given, and the preparations went on with
unabated zeal.

In the following year the expedition sailed.
Hannibal was again in command, but he shared
his power with a young kinsman, Himilco by
name. His force, on the most moderate
computation, amounted to 120,000 men, with
a fleet of 120 ships of war. It was in Agrigen-
tum, to which the frontier of Greek Sicily had
now been pushed back, that the storm was first
to fall.

Agrigentum was a splendid city, second only
to Syracuse in population, and not yielding
even to it in magnificence and wealth. No
city in the island or even in mainland Greece,
Athens only excepted, could boast more stately
temples and public buildings. Surrounded by
a large and fertile territory, it carried on a
profitable trade with the African coast. It
could boast of one kind of wealth in which
few Greek cities could vie with it — a noble
breed of horses, which were seen at least as

90 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

often in the front at the chariot- races of
Olympia as the teams sent from Syracuse or
Argos. Only two years before the time of
which I am speaking an Agrigentine citizen
had won the prize for four-horse chariots, and
on his return home had been escorted from the
frontier by three hundred private chariots each
drawn by two white horses.

Agrigentum was built on a site naturally
strong and had been skilfully fortified. It
occupied a group, or rather part of a group,
of hills which on all sides but one, the south-
western, rose precipitously from the plain, so
precipitously indeed that attack was impossible.
On the north-east, crowning the height of the
most lofty hill, was the citadel, approachable
by one narrow path only.

While the fortifications were strong and well
cared for, they were also adequately garrisoned.
Besides a numerous force raised from her own
citizens Agrigentum had in her pay eight
hundred Campanian mercenaries, who three
years before had served under Hannibal, and
had thrown up their engagement dissatisfied
with their pay. She had also secured the
services of fifteen hundred other mercenaries
who were under the command of Dexippus,
a Spartan soldier of fortune. The citizens

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 91

were confident in their ability to repel any
attack that might be made on them. When
Hannibal proposed a treaty of alliance, which,
however, would permit Agrigentum to stand
neutral in the approaching conflict, it was
promptly rejected.

For a while all went well with the defence.
Hannibal assaulted the town at the only point
where an assault was possible, but accom-
plished nothing. He even lost his siege train,
for the Agrigentines made a sally, captured,
and burnt it. He then adopted the alternative
plan of constructing a mound which would put
the assailants on a level with the walls. The
cemetery of Agrigentum was situated outside
the walls in the same quarter as that which was
the scene of the attack. Indeed, it was only
here that there was any level space. Massive
tombs of stone, in which reposed the remains
of distinguished or wealthy Agrigentines of past
days, abounded, and Hannibal, with the national
carelessness of all religions other than his own,
determined to make use of these materials for
his siege work. His workmen had destroyed
many of the tombs, and were busy with the
most splendid of them all, that of Theron
(tyrant of Agrigentum from 488 to 472) when
a thunderbolt fell on the spot. This was

92 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

regarded by the Carthaginians as a manifest
token of the divine displeasure. The panic
which followed largely increased the fatalities
from a disease which now appeared in the
camp. Thousands perished, Hannibal himself
being one of the victims. It was not till
various expiations, one of them a human sacri-
fice, had been made that Himilco, who now
succeeded to the chief command, was able to
resume the operations of the siege.

But fortune still seemed to favour the Greek
cause. The other Greek cities had been
actively employed in raising a relieving force.
A Syracusan army, made up by contingents
from Gela and Camarina to 30,000 foot and
5,000 horse, reached the Agrigentine territory.
Himilco despatched a force of Spaniards and
Italians to contest their further advance. After
a fierce fight the Carthaginian mercenaries were
broken, and compelled to retreat to their camp.
Daphnseus of Syracuse, who was in chief
command, possibly recollecting the disastrous
result of the too vigorous pursuit of the enemy
before Selinus, held back his men when they
would have followed up the victory. The
officers in command at Agrigentum were
equally cautious. Their troops were eager
to sally out from the gates and fall upon the

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 93

flying mercenaries as they hurried past in
disorder, but the generals absolutely refused
their permission, and the opportunity of com-
pletely destroying the enemy — so at least the
malcontents contended — was lost.

The allies now entered the town amidst
general rejoicing. It was not long, however,
before a discordant note was heard. Loud
complaints were made of the supineness of
the Agrigentine generals in allowing the
enemy to escape. Some went so far as to
suggest that a treasonable understanding
existed between the Agrigentine generals and
Himilco. A public assembly was hurriedly
convened, and the accused generals were
put upon their trials. The leader of the
contingent from Camarina, Menes by name,
ranged himself with the accusers. What
evidence was brought against the generals we
do not know. It is quite possible that there
was nothing worthy of the name, for a
Southern mob was ready then, as, indeed, it
is now, to take its wildest guesses as truth.
Anyhow their defence, whatever it was, availed
nothing. Four out of the five were stoned to
death, the fifth was allowed to escape in con-
sideration of his youth. At the same time the
Spartan Dexippus was severely censured.

94 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

This deplorable affair bears a curious resem-
blance to a well-known incident in Athenian
history, which indeed almost coincided with it
in time : the execution of the Athenian generals
after the victory at Arginusae, on the charge
of having neglected to do all that was possible
in saving the lives of the shipwrecked crews.
It shows, as any one who tells the story of
Greece has many occasions of showing, the dark
side of free political life. For the time, how-
ever, no ill result seemed to follow, as far as
the war was concerned. The tide of fortune
still ran strongly against the invading army.
Himilco had practically to raise the siege of
Agrigentum, and was besieged in his own
camp. This was too strongly fortified to be
taken by assault, but it seemed in danger of
being reduced by famine. Daphnaeus was
strong enough to cut off the supplies, and
the Carthaginians were reduced to the greatest
straits. Some of the mercenaries mutinied,
and were with difficulty pacified by having
handed over to them the plate which the
wealthy Carthaginians who held high com-
mand in the army had brought with them.
Then by a bold coup Himilco effected a total
change in the situation. Agrigentum was
mainly supplied from Syracuse, and towards the

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 95

end of the year a fleet of transports carrying
stores was on its way under the escort of some
Syracusan ships-of-war. The Carthaginian
fleet had been inactive since the beginning
of the campaign, and the Greek commanders
seem to have thought that it might safely be
neglected. In this they were soon undeceived.
A squadron of forty ships-of-war issued unex-
pectedly from Moty4 attacked the escorting
ships, of which they destroyed eight, driving
the rest ashore, and succeeded in capturing the
whole of the convoy. The positions of the
two armies were now reversed. The Cartha-
ginians were possessed of abundance of sup-
plies ; the Greeks were threatened with famine.
The mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
approached him with a complaint. He was
unable to satisfy them, and they marched away
to Messana, alleging that the time for which
they had been engaged was expired. The
alarm caused by this desertion was great, and
Dexippus took no pains to allay it. He had
not forgotten the fate of the Agrigentine
generals or the censure passed upon himself.
The magistrates of Agrigentum instituted an
inquiry into the condition and amount of the
supplies still remaining in the city, and found
that very little was left. They lost no time

96 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

in deciding on a course of action. Agrigentum
must be evacuated, and that at once. That
very night all the population, except the sick
and helpless, and a few patriots who preferred
dying in their native city to leaving it, hurriedly
fled to Gela, their rear being guarded by the
Syracusan and Agrigentine troops. They
escaped with their lives and with such property
as they were able to carry off. Those that
remained behind were slaughtered without
mercy, unless they preferred to put an end to
their own lives. Some had hoped to find
safety in the temples, but the Carthaginians
showed no respect for the sacred places of the
city, which they plundered and destroyed as
remorselessly as they did the secular.

But the tide of Carthaginian success had not
yet reached its height. Two more Greek cities,
Gela and Camarina, had to be evacuated.
Practically Syracuse and Messana alone re-
mained. If this success had been attained in
480 the prospect of European civilisation would
have been dark indeed. Happily by this time
Persia, Carthage's natural ally, had ceased to
be formidable.

It would demand too much time, and would
take me too far from my proper subject, if I
were to relate in detail the history of the war.

THE STORM FROM AFRICA 97

It can hardly be doubted that there had been
much mismanagement on the part of the
Syracusan generals. But all the mistakes
which they made might have been repaired
without serious loss to the State and to the
welfare of the Greek race in Sicily, if it had not
been for the unscrupulous ambition of a
Syracusan citizen. A short time before the
Carthaginian invasion there had been attempts
on the part of one of the leaders of the aristo-
cracy of Syracuse to make himself an absolute
ruler. He perished in the enterprise, but his
plan did not die with him. A certain Dionysius,
who had married the daughter of the deceased
man, now saw in the popular indignation against
the incompetent generals an opportunity of
securing his own ends. He brought about
their condemnation, and procured his own
election in their place. A crafty manoeuvre
enabled him to surround himself with a body-
guard. In the end he made himself master of
the city. Ostensibly he was the chief citizen
of the republic. The coins of Syracuse still
bore the figure of the personified city, for
Dionysius did not venture to put his own like-
ness upon them. But practically he was
absolute. So far the success of the Carthaginian
invasion had helped him. He would never

98 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

have risen to supreme power had it not been
for the terrible disasters which had overtaken
Agrigentum, Camarina, and Gela, and had
seemed to make him a necessary person. But
he felt, of course, that Syracuse must not fall.
Fortunately for his plans, he found that
Himilco was not in a position to carry the war
further. The Carthaginian army, loosely con-
stituted of mercenaries gathered from many
countries, had fallen into a disorganised con-
dition. The sickness that had worked such
havoc during the siege of Agrigentum had
broken out again, and had claimed thousands of
victims. Without much difficulty an agree-
ment was arrived at. The Carthaginians were
to keep all their former possessions and their
recent acquisitions. Only Gela and Camarina
might be reoccupied by their former inhabitants,
on the condition of paying tribute. And — for
here was the important article of the treaty —
Syramse was to be subject to Dionysius. Peace
was concluded on these terms, and the Cartha-
ginian army returned home, carrying back with
it, we are told, the terrible disease which had
wrought so much damage in Sicily.

Ill

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT

WE may feel pretty certain that neither
of the two parties to the treaty which
brought the war of 407-6 to an end had any
intention of keeping it longer than it might suit
his or their convenience. Dionysius had skil-
fully used the war to raise himself to despotic
power ; Carthage probably expected that once
again, as so often before, the internal quarrels
of the Greek people might give her the
opportunity of some fresh aggrandisement.
She had accomplished much in a few years,
though not without severe losses. But these
losses, after all, counted but for little. The
blood of mercenaries was cheap. As long as
the city's sources of income were untouched,
she could reckon with certainty on gathering as
many recruits from Africa, Spain, Italy, and
the shores of the western Mediterranean as she
might choose to pay for. She had therefore no

09

ioo GREECE AND CARTHAGE

small reason to believe that her long-cherished
scheme of subjugating Sicily might be accom-
plished at no distant date.

Peace lasted for some eight years — years
which Dionysius utilised to consolidate his
power at home, and to extend his dominions
abroad. He felt acutely the reproach levelled
against him by his enemies that his power
rested on Carthaginian support, and was anxious
to remove it. In 397 he felt himself strong
enough to act, and taking the people into his
counsel, for he was careful to observe the forms
of constitutional government, proposed to com-
mence hostilities. No declaration of war was
made, but the property of Carthaginian residents
in Syracuse was given up to plunder, and the
trading vessels in the harbour were seized as
prizes. If Carthaginian wealth excited the
cupidity of their Greek neighbours, so their
oppressive rule and brutal manners were the
objects of universal hatred. As soon as the
news of what had been done in Syracuse with
the consent, and, indeed, at the suggestion of,
Dionysius spread through the Island, it was
followed by a general massacre of the Cartha-
ginian inhabitants. In all the cities which the
late campaigns had left in a dependent or
tributary condition there was a rising of the

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT 101

population against their Carthaginian masters,
and a massacre followed not unlike that which
was planned and partially carried out amongst
the Danes of East Anglia on St. Brice's Day,
1006, a.d., or that which is known as the
Sicilian Vespers in 1282. In a very short
time the region actually held by Carthage in
the Island did not extend beyond her strong-
holds on the western coast.

Dionysius followed up these proceedings by
an ultimatum. Carthage might have peace if
she would renounce her dominion over all the
Greek cities ; failing this, she must prepare for
war. To such a demand there could be but
one answer. Dionysius did not even wait for
the inevitable negative, but marched with the
whole military strength of the Island — never
probably gathered in such strength or with
such unanimity before — against the stronghold
of Motye. The Carthaginians resisted with an
obstinacy which is characteristic of the Semitic
race. One line of defence after another was
stoutly maintained. When the walls had to be
given up, the streets were barricaded. In this
kind of fighting the Greeks lost heavily. At
last a stratagem which is not without parallel
in modern warfare proved effective. For some
days in succession the assailants ceased fighting

102 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

at sunset, the signal for recall being sounded on
a trumpet. This came to be expected by the
townspeople, who began to relax their watch-
fulness. But Dionysius prepared a picked
force which was to make a night attack. This
was done before the Motyans were aware of
what had happened, and the town was taken.
A massacre followed in which many were
destroyed, though Dionysius did his best to
stop it. He was certainly not specially humane,
but he did not approve of the useless destruc-
tion of what, in the shape of slaves, might be
valuable property. It is to be noted that the
Greeks respected the lives of those who fled
to the temples for protection. It shows them
to have been on a somewhat higher plane
of feeling than were the Carthaginians. The
temples, it must be remembered, were those of
Punic gods.

Carthage had no intention of allowing these
attacks to pass without retaliation. A large
force, amounting at the lowest estimate to
100,000 men, was levied in Africa and landed
in Sicily, where it received an accession of
another 30,000. Himilco, who had commanded
in the last campaign, was made general-in-
chief. He conceived a novel and bold plan of
campaign. He marched to north-eastern Sicily,

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT 103

a part of the Island which up to that time had
been exempt from attack. Messana was his
objective point, and Messana was almost help-
less. It had walls, indeed, but these were in
repair so bad that they were useless for any-
real defence. And then a considerable part of
the army was with Dionysius and the Syra-
cusans. What was left boldly confronted the
enemy in the field. Himilco did not offer them
battle, but embarking a considerable force in
the ships' which moved along the coast as the
enemy advanced, made a direct attack on the
town. He calculated that the ships would out-
strip the Messanian army, and he proved to be
right. The Carthaginians found the place
almost deserted, and simply poured into the
town by the gaps in the walls. The forts he
could not take. Some of the inhabitants were
slain in a hopeless attempt to hold the town ;
some attempted the desperate expedient of
swimming across the Strait of Scylla and
Charybdis, whose terrors were not so formidable
as the ferocity of the Carthaginians — out of two
hundred swimmers fifty got safe to the Italian
side. Messana gained, Himilco marched on
Syracuse, intending to take Catana on his way.
The army was to follow the line of the seashore ;
the fleet was to keep on a level with it. At

104 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

yEtna a diversion had to be made. The volcano
was in action, and the streams of lava that
flowed down the eastern slope compelled the
army to make a detour to the west. Dionysius
thought he saw his opportunity in this division
of the invading force. He put both his army
and his fleet in motion, and proceeded to meet
the enemy. Only the fleets, however, came
into collision, and the result was a serious defeat
of the Syracusans. The admiral, Leptines by
name, had been strictly enjoined to be cautious ;
to keep his fleet in close order, and on no
account to break the line. This tactic did not
suit him. He attacked the enemy with a
squadron of thirty quick-moving ships, at first
with brilliant success. Then what the more
prudent Dionysius had feared came to pass.
Leptines could not hold his own against the
overpowering numbers of the enemy. After
some hours of fighting he had to make his
escape with what ships were left to him. He
had lost a hundred ships and, it was said, as
many as twenty thousand men.

Dionysius had watched the disaster from the
shore without being able to give any help to
his comrades. The question what he was
himself to do became urgent, His bolder
counsellors urged him to save battle to Himilco.

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT 105

He was half disposed to follow their advice,
but the risk seemed too great. It would be to
hazard everything on one throw of the dice.
He retreated on Syracuse, and took shelter
within the walls. Himilco promptly followed.
His army, said to have numbered 300,000, and
certainly large, was easily able to invest the
city on the landward side ; his fleet filled the
Great Harbour, though this had an area of
nearly four square miles. The Syracusan
army did not dare to leave the shelter of their
walls ; the fleet was glad to be protected by
the defences of the Inner Harbour, a refuge
which had never yet been entered by a foe.
Never had the Greek race in Sicily been
reduced to straits so desperate. Only one
city remained to it, and this closely invested.
Syracuse was like Jerusalem as Isaiah describes
her in the height of the Assyrian invasion, " a
cottage in a vineyard, a lodge in a garden of
cucumbers."

Then the tide began to turn. The Syracusans
obtained some successes at sea. Some corn
ships carrying supplies to the Carthaginian
camp were captured, and a squadron of men-of-
war which attempted to recover them defeated
with a loss of more than half its number,
including the admiral's ship.

106 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

Then pestilence, an attack of bubonic plague
if we are to judge from the description given of
it, broke out in the camp. It was aggravated
by religious terrors. Himilco had shown
himself as careless about sacred things as his
predecessor in command. He had broken
down tombs to use their materials, and had
plundered temples, one of them of especial
sanctity, the shrine of Persephone, Queen of
Hell, and her mother Demeter (the Ceres of
Roman mythology). Thousands of men
perished — the historians, dealing, as usual, in
enormous figures, say one hundred and fifty
thousand. The mortality was certainly great,
and Dionysius did not fail to use his oppor-
tunity. He delivered simultaneous attacks by
land and sea, and was successful in both. The
fleet was nearly destroyed. Many ships were
captured ; many more were burnt. Part of the
camp was taken. Dionysius took up his
quarters at the close of the day near the
temple of Zeus, in which Himilco had had his
headquarters that very morning.

The Carthaginian general then opened secret
negotiations with his antagonist. To tell the
story in a few words, he purchased the safety
of himself and the native Carthaginian officers
in the army by a bribe of three hundred talents.

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT 107

The money went into the private coffers of
Dionysius, and Himilco was allowed to escape
with his countrymen, though some of the forty
ships filled with the fugitives were captured.
The Syracusan admiral, of course, knew
nothing about the arrangement, and Dionysius,
while he contrived to postpone, could not
absolutely forbid pursuit. The mercenaries
thus left to their fate had various fortunes.
Dionysius took some of them into his own
service ; the native Sicilians contrived, for
the most part, to escape unmolested to their
own homes. A considerable number sur-
rendered, and were sold as slaves. Himilco
reached Carthage in safety, but could not
endure the humiliating position in which he
found himself. He blocked up the doors of
his house, refused admittance to friends and
kinsmen, even to his own children, and died by
voluntary starvation.

Whether Carthage would have made any
attempt to recover what had been lost, we
cannot say. The events that followed made
it impossible. Her African subjects revolted
from her ; her allies deserted her. For a few
weeks she stood as much alone as Syracuse
had stood a few weeks before. But the com-
bination against her was not one that could

108 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

hold together long. It soon began to fall to
pieces, Carthage helping the process by heavily
bribing the leaders. But her power was
crippled for a time, and she had to be content
with withdrawing her boundary line in Sicily
to its old place in the western portion of the
Island.

It would be tedious to follow in detail the
wars of the next few years. War followed war ;
sometimes one party triumphed, sometimes
another. We have just seen Carthage reduced
again to the narrow limits within which she
had been confined before 409. Then, twelve
years afterwards (383), Dionysius is compelled,
after a disastrous defeat at Cronium, at which
he is said to have lost 14,000 men, to concede
nearly half of the Island. In 368 again — our
knowledge of these campaigns is sadly broken
and confused — there is another change of
fortune, a brilliant victory of Dionysius, fol-
lowed, however, by a reverse, which had the
effect of leaving things very much as they had
been when the campaign began.

In 367 Dionysius died, after a reign of thirty-
eight years. I am not concerned now with
his character as a domestic ruler. In this
respect his name is proverbial for a cruel
tyranny, amply punished by the torturing

DIONYSIUS THE TYRANT 109

suspicions with which the life of the tyrant
was harassed. But it is impossible to deny
his great merits as a soldier. He had faults,
but he certainly supported the Greek cause in
Sicily against the incessant attacks of a very
powerful enemy. We shall see how much his
abilities were missed when his power passed
into the hands of a feebler successor.

IV

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH

THE younger Dionysius was indeed wholly
unequal to the position into which he
was thrust by the accident of birth. He was
entirely inexperienced in government, for his
father had jealously excluded him from all
share in public affairs, and he had little capacity
for learning the art of rule when he found
himself under the necessity of practising it.
Some ability he had, but it was not in the
direction of politics. In this direction he seems
to have had few ideas beyond securing his own
safety and getting as much enjoyment as
possible out of the opportunities of power.
The history of his reign may be told in a very
few words. He held the power inherited from
his father during a period of fourteen years.
Then he was expelled from Syracuse, but
contrived to establish himself at Locri, with

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH in

which city he was connected through his
mother. After the lapse of ten years he re-
gained possession of Syracuse. But his power
was not secure, and he could not spare any
thought or energy for the general interests of
the Island. The other Sicilian cities were no
better off. Carthage, of course, made use of
the opportunity thus given, and steadily in-
creased her power. The situation became so
threatening in 344 that some Syracusan exiles
bethought them of invoking the aid of Corinth,
their mother city. Corinth acceded to their
request, but rather by way of permission than
of giving active help. No expedition was sent
by the State. But a general was nominated
and appointed at a public assembly ; Corinthian
citizens were allowed to volunteer for service.
Finally seven ships were sent by the State, two
being added to this number by Corcyra,
another Corinthian colony, and one by Leucadia,
also Corinthian in origin. But the greater part
of the force that was raised were mercenaries.
Something must be said about the general, who
was one of the most remarkable figures in
Greek history.

Timoleon was a noble citizen of Corinth
who had saved the liberties of his country by
a terrible sacrifice, His elder brother Timo-

ii2 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

phanes, an able and unscrupulous soldier, had
established himself as a despot by help of a
band of mercenaries who had been hired for
the protection of the city against the threatened
danger of Athenian invasion. Timoleon re-
monstrated with him, but in vain. Then he
resolved to free his country at any cost. He
communicated his intention to two, one account
says three, friends. They went together and
asked for an interview with Timophanes.
Timoleon addressed another appeal to his
brother, and was contemptuously repulsed.
His companions then drew their swords, for,
thanks to their introducer, they had been per-
mitted to enter the tyrant's presence with arms,
and put Timophanes to death. Timoleon took
no part in the deed, but stood apart, his face
covered with his mantle and weeping bitterly.
The act met with enthusiastic approval from
the great majority of Corinthian citizens.
Some who had looked for some personal gain
from the favour of the despot, and in their
hearts regretted his death, pretended to be
shocked by the way in which it had been
brought about. To Timoleon himself the
event was the cause of the deepest and most
permanent sorrow. He shut himself up in his
house, took no part in public affairs, and

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH 113

refused the visits of his friends. The arrival
of the Syracusan exiles delivered him from this
miserable existence. At the Assembly held for
the appointment of a general, name after name
had been proposed in vain. The internal
dissensions of Syracuse were so notorious at
Corinth that no one was willing to undertake
the thankless task of intervening in its affairs.
Unexpectedly some one in the Assembly — it
was thought at the time by a divine inspiration
— proposed the name of Timoleon. It was
received with general acclamation, and Timo-
leon thankfully accepted the post. He con-
trived to elude the Carthaginian squadron
which was sent to watch him, and reached
Sicily. Some four years were spent in re-
storing order and freedom in the Greek cities.
For some reason with which we are not
acquainted, Carthage did not interfere with
him whilst so engaged. War is said to have
been precipitated by a violation of the Cartha-
ginian territory. That it would certainly have
broken out sooner or later may safely be
affirmed.

Carthage evidently made a great effort to
bring the war to a successful issue. She
seems to have been aware that circumstances
were unusually favourable, for the Greek cities

9

ii4 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

of Sicily had never before been in so deplorable
a condition of weakness. It was, indeed, a
happy thing for the cause of freedom that so
exceptionally able a man as Timoleon had the
conduct of affairs. The army landed at Lily-
baeum, under the command of Hasdrubal and
Hamilcar, numbered 70,000. Of these, not
less than 10,000 were native Carthaginians.
Carthage was always sparing of the blood of
her own citizens, preferring to buy even at
lavish prices the valour and skill which she
needed. On this occasion she raised an un-
precedently large native force. They were
equipped, too, in the most costly fashion.
Each soldier was clothed in complete armour,
much heavier and, therefore, more impenetrable
than that usually worn. Each, too, had an
elaborately ornamented breastplate. A corps
d' elite, numbering 2,500, was the nucleus of
the force. A fleet of two hundred ships of war
accompanied the army, whose needs were
supplied by a vast multitude of nearly a
thousand transports. One important item in
the war material was a number of chariots.
The personal effects of the Carthaginian
soldiers, many of whom belonged to the
wealthiest families in the city, splendid tents
and rich goblets and other plate for the table,
were costly in the extreme.

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH 115

Timoleon could not raise more than 12,000
men. He had 3,000 Syracusan citizens, an
unknown number, possibly about 6,000, of
volunteers from other Greek cities, and a
force of mercenaries. His cavalry numbered
one thousand. But he could not keep with
him even the whole of these. When he had
nearly reached the border of the Carthaginian
territory there was a mutiny among the mer-
cenaries. Their pay was considerably in
arrears, and one of their officers took advantage
of this fact to rouse them against the com-
mander-in-chief. " He is taking you," he
said, "on a desperate errand. You will have
to encounter an enemy who can match every
one of our soldiers with six of his own.
And he does not even pay you your wages."
Never did the strong personality of Timoleon
show itself to more advantage. The mutineers
got, in a way, all they wanted. They were
sent back to Syracuse with instructions to
the authorities at home that they were to be
paid off at once, whatever it might cost to raise
the money.1 This concession seemed to put a

1 It is difficult not to feel a certain satisfaction at
knowing that the mutineers came to a bad end. They
had a disreputable record, for they had taken the pay of
the Phocians, knowing that it had been provided out of

n6 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

premium on mutiny. Nevertheless, Timoleon
by his personal influence succeeded in checking
the movement. The troops that were left,
when the discontented element was removed,
followed him with unabated loyalty and courage.
Marching westward into the heart of the
Carthaginian territory, he reached the stream
known as the Crimessus.1 If he had before to
contend against the avarice of his soldiers, he
had now to deal with their fears. The army
was encountered by some mules carrying loads
of parsley. The men were dismayed at what
they took as an unlucky omen, for parsley was
commonly used for the garlands that are placed
on tombs. Timoleon was equal to the occasion.
" With this," he cried, seizing a sprig of the

the sacred treasures of the temple at Delphi. On receiving
their arrears they sailed to Southern Italy, where they
attempted to form a settlement, were entrapped by the
native inhabitants, and perished to a man.

1 It is uncertain where this stream is to be located.
Some geographers (Sir E. Bunbury among them, in the
" Dictionary of Classical Geography ") suppose it to be a
little river that flows into the sea near Castellamare ; by
others it is identified with one that has its mouth on the
south coast of the island, a few miles to the east of
Selinus. This is the view taken by the author of the
map recently published by Mr. John Murray, where the
name is given to one of the upper tributaries of the Hypsas,
now known as the Belici.

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH 117

herb, " we crown our conquerors in the Isthmian
Games at home. It is our symbol of victory,"
and he put a chaplet on his own head and
adorned his officers in the same way. The
Greek army had now reached the brow of the
hill which forms the eastern bank of the valley
of the Crimessus. The whole country was
covered with a mist, but there came up from
the valley beneath a confused sound as of a
great host in motion. Suddenly the mist
lifted, and Timoleon saw below him the great
Carthaginian army. The war-chariots had
already crossed the river and were drawn up
on the eastern shore ; the Carthaginian infantry,
in their splendid armour, were in the very act
of the passage ; pressing on their rear in a
disorderly crowd was a multitude of mer-
cenaries and native African levies. Timoleon
saw his opportunity, and promptly seized it.
He could never have so good a chance of
delivering a successful attack on the enemy as
when they were thus divided, some being
actually in the river and some on the further
shore. After a brief exhortation to his men,
he led them down the steep slope to the river.
The cavalry went first, and charged the native
Carthaginians, who were just struggling out of
the river and forming themselves in line on the

n8 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

bank. But for a time they charged in vain.
Indeed, they had to do their best to save them-
selves from being broken up, for the chariots
were driven furiously backwards and forwards
among them. They could hardly keep their
own lines ; on the lines of the enemy they made
no impression. Timoleon then changed his
plan. Recalling the cavalry, he sent it to
operate on the flank of the enemy, while he
proceeded to lead his infantry to a front
attack. He took his shield from the attendant
that carried it, and bade his men follow him.
"He shouted to the infantry to be of good
cheer and follow him," says Plutarch, " in
a voice much louder than was his natural
wont. It may have been the excitement of the
conflict that lent it such a power, but the
common belief at the time was " that some-
thing divine was speaking through him." The
work that they had to do required no little
enthusiasm of courage. The Carthaginians
were stout soldiers and splendidly armed.
The spear availed little against them ; the
Greeks had to get under their guard and
assail them with the sword. At this critical
point of the battle something happened which
convinced Timoleon's soldiers that their leader
had powers more than mortal on his side.

TlMOLEON HOLDING THE FORD OF THE CRIMESSUS.

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH 119

The mist that had cleared away from the
valley, and risen to the hilltop, now seemed
to descend again in a furious storm. Besides
the sound and sight of the thunder and the
lightning — and there were but few spirits
in that day hardy enough to despise these
terrors — there was a blinding storm of rain
and hail driven fiercely by a tempestuous wind
into the faces of the Carthaginians. To the
Greeks, who had it behind them, it caused
little inconvenience. And then the river began
to rise. The Carthaginians began to stagger
under the weight of their heavy armour and
saturated clothing, and when once a man had
fallen there was no hope of his rising again.
It was not long before the four hundred picked
soldiers who formed the front ranks were cut
down. These champions gone, the rest broke
up and attempted to flee. This was almost
impossible. Many were slain in the attempt ;
many others were drowned ; and there were
thousands of prisoners. Never before had
such a blow fallen on Carthage. She lost, not
as usual, the mercenaries whom it was easy to
replace as long as her wealth held out, but
her noblest sons. On the other hand, the
Greeks, besides winning a very complete
victory, gathered a spoil more magnificent

i2o GREECE AND CARTHAGE

than the most experienced campaigner had
ever seen.

Timoleon had not yet finished his work.
He had still to put down the despots whose
thrones were propped up by the power of
Carthage, and Carthage was not inclined to
give up her position in Sicily. In the course
of the next year, however, the despots were
all destroyed, and Carthage was glad to con-
clude a peace. By this she bound herself
to keep to the western side of the Halycus
(Platani) and not to interfere with the internal
affairs of the Greek cities.

It is needless to continue in detail the story
of the conflict between Greece and Carthage.
The result was practically fixed by the victory
of Timoleon at the Crimessus. Carthage did
not indeed altogether abandon her ambition.
She still coveted Sicily, still hoped, it may be,
to acquire it, and came, once at least, as near
to attaining to this end as she had ever done
before. In 309 B.C. Syracuse had again lost
the freedom which Timoleon had given back
to her, and had fallen under the domination of
one of the ablest and most unscrupulous in the
long list of Sicilian tyrants, Agathocles. This
man provoked a war with Carthage, but found
himself unequal to his antagonist, and after a

THE DELIVERER FROM CORINTH 121

series of defeats was shut up in Syracuse.
This city was, as it had been eighty-odd years
before, the only place in the Island which the
Greeks could call their own. Then Aga-
thocles conceived a daring scheme. He would
transfer the war to Africa, and attack Carthage
at home, where, as he shrewdly perceived, her
weakest points were to be found. An invader
could always reckon upon the sympathy and
support of the subject races, which suffered
from the exacting rule of the Carthaginian
government. Agathocles carried out his
plan, and for a time achieved a brilliant
success. He afterwards met with reverses, but
his main object, the rescue of Sicily, was fully
achieved.

Agathocles died in 289 B.C. Pyrrhus, King of
Epirus, famous for the victories which he won
over Rome, was the next to take up the part of
the leader of the Sicilian Greeks in their long
struggle with Carthage. He accomplished
little. In fact he spent two years only in the
Island. The most memorable incident of his
stay was that Carthage offered him alliance on
most advantageous terms, and that he refused
it unless she would agree to evacuate the Island.
This was an honourable action, for the offer
would have given him a most important advan-

122 GREECE AND CARTHAGE

tage- in the renewed attack upon Rome which
he was planning. But the Sicilian Greeks
showed little gratitude for his self-denial ; in
fact, they became so hostile that he had no
alternative left him but to leave the Island.
"How fair a wrestling-ring," he is reported to
have said as he took his last look of Sicily,
" are we leaving to Rome and Carthage ! "
With this departure of Pyrrhus, Greece, we
may say, disappears from the scene, and Rome
takes her part. Pyrrhus left Sicily in 276, and
Rome came for the first time into collision with
Carthage twelve years afterwards in what is
called the First Punic War. These wars will
be the subject of my Fourth Book.

BOOK III
GREECE AND PERSIA. THE ATTACK

I. THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER

ALL danger to Greece from Persian attack,
so far as the mainland and the islands in
the i^gean were concerned, practically ceased
with the victory of Mycale\ But the Greek
cities in Asia Minor were not safe. In the
years 466-5 B.C. Cimon, son of Miltiades, the
hero of Marathon, conducted operations in
South-Western Asia Minor, which had for their
object the expulsion of the Persians from
certain Greek settlements in that region. In
450 a formal convention was made which
brought to an end, it may be said, the first act
of the drama. The great king bound himself
to leave the Asiatic Greeks free and untaxed,
and not to send troops within a certain distance
of the coast ; Athens, on the other hand,

i24 GREECE AND PERSIA

agreed to leave Persia in undisturbed posses-
sion of Cyprus (though this island had a large
Greek population) and of Egypt.

The next period was one in which the rela-
tions of Persia and Greece were largely deter-
mined by the exigencies of Greek politics.
The two great rivals for supremacy, Athens
and Sparta, found Persian help, especially in
the shape of gold, very useful ; and Persia, for
her own purposes, played off the two against
each other. There is an amusing scene in Aris-
tophanes which illustrates this state of affairs.
A pretended Persian envoy is introduced to the
Assembly. He wears a mask which is made of
one big eye, in token that he is the King's
Eye, and mutters some gibberish which his
introducer interprets as a promise to send
some gold. The scene goes on : —

"Tell them about the gold; speak louder
and more plainly."

The Eye spoke again : " Gapey Greeks, gold
a fooly jest."

"That is plain enough," cried a man in the
Assembly.

Ambassador. " Well, what do you make of
it ? "

Citizen. " Why, that it is a foolish jest for
us Greeks to think that we shall get any gold."

THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER 125

Amb. " You're quite wrong. He didn't say
'jest' but 'chest.' We are to get chests of
gold."

Cit. (turning to the Eye). "Now listen to
me ; is the king going to send us any gold ? "

Eye shakes his head.

Cit. " Are the ambassadors cheating us ? "

Eye nods.

Cit. " Well, anyhow the creature knows how
to nod in the right way."

This humiliating state of things reached its
worst in 387 B.C., when what was called the
Peace of Antalcidas was concluded between
Persia and Sparta. It is enough to quote one
clause from the treaty, which, it should be said,
all the Greek States agreed to accept,

" King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the
cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomense
and Cyprus should belong to him. He thinks
it just also to have all the other Hellenic cities
autonomous, both small and great, except
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to
belong to Athens as they originally did. Should
any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will
make war upon them, along with those of the
same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships
and with money."

It looked as if all that had been won at

126 GREECE AND PERSIA

Marathon and Salamis had been lost, and Persia
had become the arbiter of the fate of Greece.
The Asiatic Greeks did lose what had been
gained for them, for they fell again under the
power of Persia. But these evils worked, in a
way, their own cure. The States which had
abused their power for selfish purposes fell, one
after another, into the background, and others,
which had not exhausted themselves in futile
struggles for supremacy, came to the front.
One of the claims which these new representa-
tives of Greek feeling put forward was the
resolve to exact vengeance — for this was the
common form which the idea took — for the
wrongs which Persia had done to Greece.
At the same time there had been various reve-
lations of the real weakness of the gigantic
Empire which stretched from the Mediterranean
to the Indian Ocean. The Expedition of the
Ten Thousand, though it had failed of its
immediate object of dethroning one prince in
favour of another, had shown the immense
superiority of the Greek race over its ancient
enemy. Ten thousand men had marched into
the very heart of Persia without meeting with a
check, and had made their way back again
under circumstances of almost incredible diffi-
culty, without suffering anything like disaster.

THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER 127

Jason, tyrant of Pherse in Thessaly (d.
370 b.c.) was the first, as far as we know, to
form a definite scheme for the invasion of
Persia. Thessaly I have had occasion but
once only to mention. This was in de-
scribing the battle of Plataea, when some
cavalry from this region did good service to
the Persians. It is strange to find in it
the first advocate of what we may call the
anti- Persian Crusade. But Jason had not the
means to carry out so important a scheme.
Anyhow, his career was cut short by assassin-
ation.

About a quarter of a century later we find
the idea further developed. Its exponent is
now the greatest rhetorician of the time, and
the champion whose services are invoked is
Philip of Macedon. About 346 b.c. Isocrates
addressed a letter to Philip, who had recently
been made president of the Amphictyonic
Council, suggesting to him that he should
reconcile the Greek States to each other and
with their help wage war against Persia. The
counsel was not offered, we may be sure,
without a previous assurance that it would be
welcome to the prince to whom it was given.
Philip certainly cherished some such purpose.
This was the ultimate object which he set

128 GREECE AND PERSIA

before himself in his struggle for supremacy in
Greece. He even went so far as to make
definite preparations for the enterprise. It
may well be doubted whether he had genius
enough for so gigantic an enterprise. It was
not put to the test. His career also was cut
short by the sword of the assassin. He was
slain in 336 B.C., in the forty-seventh year of
his age. Able as he was, he left a still abler
successor the inheritance of his preparations
and his plans.

Alexander, who at his father's death was
not quite twenty, had first to consolidate his
position. He began by crushing his barbarous
neighbours in the north ; he then stamped out
a rebellion in Greece. This done he turned
his attention to preparing his great plan. All
was ready in less than two years.

In April, 334, Alexander crossed the Helles-
pont into Asia. He had about 35,000 men
with him, one-seventh being cavalry. March-
ing slowly eastwards, he came, a few weeks
later (May 25th), on the Persian army, which
was encamped on the eastern bank of the
Granicus, a small stream which flows down
from the Ida range into the Sea of Marmora.
Of the Persian strength differing accounts are

THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER 129

given. The total probably exceeded that of
Alexander's army. The proportion of cavalry
to infantry was certainly much larger. The
front line, indeed, which held the bank of the
river, consisted wholly of this arm. On the
right were the Medes and Bactrians, wearing
the national dress, a round-topped cap, gaily-
coloured tunic, and scale armour. In the
centre, similarly accoutred, were the Paphla-
gonians and Hyrcanians ; on the right was a
small body of Greek horse, and the Persian
cavalry proper, largely made up of men who
claimed descent from the Seven Deliverers,
the little company of nobles who delivered
Persia from the sway of the false Smerdis.1
Here Memnon, the Rhodian, the ablest
counsellor of King Darius, was in command.
The infantry, both Asiatic and Greek, was
posted in reserve, on the rising ground which

r Cambyses, in a fit of frantic jealousy — so the story ran
— had put his brother Smerdis to death. Cambyses died
in Egypt. The magi, Median soothsayers and priests,
contrived that one of their number should personate the
murdered prince. After he had occupied the Persian
throne for a few months, seven nobles conspired against
him and slew him. One of the seven, Darius, became
king ; the others were rewarded by perpetual immunity
from taxes, for themselves and their descendants, and other
privileges.

10

130 GREECE AND PERSIA

marked the limit of the winter floods. The
river was now flowing within its banks, but
with a full, strong stream.

Alexander, who was mounted on his famous
charger Bucephalus, rode along the line, ad-
dressing a few words of encouragement to
each squadron and company as he passed it,
and finally placed himself at the head of the
right division of the army. As soon as the
Persian leaders perceived his intention, they
began to reinforce their own left. The fame
of the king's personal prowess had not failed
to reach them, and they knew that the fiercest
struggle would be where he might be in
immediate command. Alexander saw the
movement and the opportunity which it offered
him. He would have his antagonists at a
disadvantage if he could catch them in the
confusion of a change. Accordingly he ordered
the whole line to advance, the right division
being thrown somewhat forward. Here was a
famous corps dUlite, a heavy cavalry regiment
that went under the name of the " Royal
Companions." This was the first to enter the
river. A number of javelin-throwers and
archers, on either side, covered their advance ;
they were supported by some light horse and
a regiment of light infantry.

THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER 131

The van of the attacking force made its way
across the stream in fair order. The river-bed
was rough, full of great stones brought down
by floods and with here and there a danger-
ously deep hole, but there was no mud or
treacherous sand. The first assault was
checked. A line of dismounted troopers stood
in the water, wherever it was shallow enough
to allow it ; on the bank itself was a mass of
horsemen, two or three files deep. The com-
batants below plied their swords ; those on
the higher ground showered javelins on the
advancing foe. Only a few of these could
struggle up the somewhat steep bank ; of the
few some were slain, others thrust back upon
the troops that followed them. The attack
seemed to have failed. But when the king
himself took up the attack the fortunes of the
day were rapidly changed. For the first of
many times throughout his marvellous career
the personal courage of Alexander, his strength,
his dexterity in arms, turned the tide of battle.
He was a matchless soldier as well as a match-
less general, and seemed to combine the old
soldiership and the new, the personal prowess
of an Achilles and the tactical skill of an
Epaminondas. He sprang forward, rallying,
as he advanced, his disheartened troops, struck

132 GREECE AND PERSIA

down adversary after adversary, and climbed
the bank with astonishing agility. The example
of such a leader seemed to give the Companions
an irresistible strength. In a few minutes the
bank of the Granicus was won. But the battle
was not yet over. The Persians had been
beaten back from their first line of defence ;
but they still held the level ground, and till
the whole of the Greek army had crossed
the stream they had a great superiority in
numbers, enabling them to deliver charges
which the weight of men and horses might
well have made irresistible. Again Alexander
was in the thick of the conflict. His pike had
been broken in the struggle for the bank. He
asked his orderly for another. The man
showed him his own broken weapon. Then
the king looked round to his followers, holding
high the splintered shaft. The appeal was
answered in an instant. It was a Corinthian,
Demaratus by name, who answered his call
and supplied him with a fresh lance. It was
not done a moment too soon. The Persian
cavalry charged in a heavy column, its leader,
Mithradates, son-in-law to King Darius, riding
a long way in front of his men. Alexander
spurred his horse, charged at Mithradates with
levelled pike, struck him in the face, and hurled

THE FIGHT ON THE RIVER 133

him dying to the ground. Meanwhile another
Persian noble had ridden up. He struck a
fierce blow at Alexander with his scymetar, but
missing his aim in his excitement, did nothing
more than shear off the crest of the helmet.
Alexander replied with a thrust which broke
through his breastplate and inflicted a mortal
wound. There was a third antagonist behind,
but his arm was severed by a sword-cut from
a Macedonian officer just as he was in the act
of delivering a blow. The struggle, however,
was continued with unabated fury. It was not
till almost every leader had fallen that the
Persian cavalry gave way.

Elsewhere in the field the victory was more
easily won. The Uite of the Persian army
had been brought together to oppose Alex-
ander, and the remainder did not hold their
ground with equal tenacity. When the phalanx
had made its way across the river, and re-
formed itself again on the eastern bank, it
encountered no opposition.

There still remained, however, a force to be
dealt with which, had it been properly handled,
might have been found a serious difficulty for
the conquerors. The infantry, as has been said,
was posted in reserve, and of this force not
less than a half, numbering as many as ten

134 GREECE AND PERSIA

thousand, consisted of Greek mercenaries.
These had remained in absolute inaction, idly-
watching the struggle on the level ground
below. They had no responsible leaders ; no
orders had been issued to them. The Persian
generals, confident in the strength of their
special arm, the cavalry, neglected to make
any use of this invaluable force. And yet they
might have known what ten thousand Greeks,
well led, could do ! Alexander came up and
charged the unprotected flank of the Greek
force. "He had the defects of his virtues,"
and was too eager in " drinking the delight of
battle." His charger — not the famous Buce-
phalus, which had fallen lame, but another
horse — was killed, under him. The light
infantry also delivered an attack, but the
mercenaries still held their ground. But when
the phalanx came up, their strength or their
courage failed. The front ranks were crushed
by the advance of the ponderous machine, and
the rest first wavered, then broke up in hope-
less confusion. Not less than half of their
number were killed in their places or in the
attempt to escape. The rest were either
admitted to quarter, or contrived to make their
way to some place of safety.

II

THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX

THE eighteen months that followed the
battle of the Granicus Alexander spent in
Asia Minor. A few strong places resisted him,
but on the whole he met with little opposition.
On the other hand, he did not move very quickly.
At Gordium, in Phrygia, he gave his army a
long rest, and at Tarsus, in Cilicia, he was
detained against his will by a severe illness,
contracted, it was said, by bathing in the ice-
cold waters of the Cydnus. Meanwhile Darius
had been gathering together from all parts
of the Empire a vast army which would be
sure, he thought, to crush the invader. So
confident did he feel that he did not attempt
to check Alexander's advance. He feft the
strong passes into Cilicia undefended. He
did the same with the passes from Cilicia into
Syria. He desired nothing better than that

136 GREECE AND PERSIA

the enemy should come to close quarters with
him. His original plan was to wait for the
Macedonian army at a place named Sochi,
where there was a great expanse of level
ground. Then he began to fear that Alexander
might after all escape him. He left Sochi, and
marched by one of the passes of Mons Amanus
(Sawur Dagh) to Issus, where he would be in the
rear of the enemy, and so be able to cut off the
retreat which he believed would be attempted.
Alexander, who had in the highest degree the
faculty of guessing what his antagonist was
thinking, saw his advantage. At Issus, Darius
could not make use of his numbers, and so
might be attacked with good hope of success.
He made a night march, recrossed into Cilicia,
and fought at Issus the second of his great
battles.

Darius took up his position on the north
bank of the River Pinarus {Deli Tschai). The
centre of his line of battle was composed of
90,000 heavy-armed infantry, drawn up in three
bodies of 30,000 each. One of these consisted
of Greek mercenaries, and occupied the middle
place ; on either side were the other two —
Asiatics armed in Greek fashion. His own
place was behind the Greeks. It was in them
that he really trusted, though he had violently

THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX 137

resented the suggestion when it was made by
another. Some weeks before, when reviewing
the army with which he was about to encounter
Alexander, he had asked for the opinion of
Charidemus, an Athenian exile, who was in
attendance on him. Charidemus was bidden
to speak his mind freely, and he was imprudent
enough to take the king at his word. The
substance of his advice to the king was not
to trust Asiatics, but to spend his accumulated
treasure in hiring Greeks. Darius was deeply
offended, and the great nobles about him were
furious with rage. Charidemus was put to
death, but his advice must have been followed.
The cavalry was massed on the right wing —
that end of the line which was nearest to the
sea, for there alone was there any ground suit-
able for their action. On the left wing, reaching
far up the mountain-side, were twenty thousand
light-armed infantry, who were to throw them-
selves on the flank of the Macedonians as soon
as these should attempt to cross the river.
Behind this line of battle, numbering, it is pro-
bable, not less than 120,000 men, stood a mixed
multitude, swept together from all the provinces
of the vast Persian Empire. This mass of
combatants, if combatants they can be called,
already unwieldy, received the addition of

138 GREECE AND PERSIA

50,000 troops, who had been posted on the
southern bank of the river to cover the opera-
tion of forming the Persian line, and who were
brought back when the formation was com-
pleted. The ground had been over-crowded
before, and this addition to the numbers of the
second line only made it more hopelessly-
unmanageable.

Alexander put his light infantry on the
extreme right of his line, opposite, it will be
remembered, to a similar force in the Persian
array. Here also was the cavalry regiment of
the " Companions," and with them some Thes-
salian horse. The main line was composed of
the phalanx in five divisions, the fifth, on the
extreme left, being close to the sea, which was
little more than a mile and a half from the foot
of the mountains — so narrow was the space
which Darius had chosen for a battlefield. He
could have done nothing better calculated to
destroy any advantage that might have been
given by his vast superiority in numbers. On
the left were some squadrons of Greek cavalry,
and bodies of light-armed troops from Crete
and Thrace.

On coming in sight of the enemy Alexander
made some changes in the disposition of his
forces. The most important of these was to

THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX 139

transfer some light infantry, cavalry, and
archers to act against the 20,000 Persians
who had been so placed as to threaten his
right flank. It was a wise precaution, but,
as a matter of fact, it was not needed. The
Persians made no move, and Alexander soon
perceived that they might be safely neglected.
He left a few hundred cavalry to watch them,
and placed the rest of the force destined for
this service in his main line.

A brief time was allowed for rest when the
river was reached. It was well, too, to wait
for a possible forward movement on the part
of the Persians. The confidence that had
prompted the march to Issus might also prompt
an attack. But the Persian line remained in
its place, and Alexander crossed the stream.
He had with him his light infantry, not slingers
and archers, it should be explained, but regular
soldiers, with armour and weapons so modified
as to enable them to move quickly, the "Com-
panions," and two divisions of the phalanx.
The phalanx was drawn up in companies each
sixteen deep. All the soldiers were armed
with a pike (sarzssa), which was twenty-one
feet in length. The pikes of the front rank
projected fifteen feet, the other end being
weighted so that the weapon could be held

140 GREECE AND PERSIA

without difficulty. The pikes of the second
rank projected twelve feet, of the third, nine,
of the fourth, six, of the fifth, three. The other
ranks held their pikes in a slanting direction
over the shoulders of those who stood in front.
Alexander led the attack, as usual, in person.
The Macedonians, moving as quickly as the
phalanx could go, fell upon the Asiatic heavy -
armed, who occupied the left division of the
main Persian line. They were mainly Carduchi,
the Kurds of to-day, better hands, it would
seem, then as now, at plundering than at fighting.
The Carduchi gave way, not waiting for the
Macedonians to come to close quarters with
them. Their flight endangered the safety of
the king, or, rather, the king himself believed
that it was endangered. He bade his charioteer
turn the horses' heads and fly. As long as the
ground allowed he kept to the chariot ; when
it became too rough he sprang upon a horse,
and fled in such haste that he threw away his
royal mantle, his bow, and his shield. The
mixed multitude that stood behind the main
line of Persian battle, as soon as they saw the
king quit the field, fled, or, rather, attempted
to fly. But, so narrow was the space in which
they had been crowded together, they could
scarcely move. A scene of frightful terror and

THE IRRESISTIBLE PHALANX 141

confusion followed. The fugitives struggled
fiercely with each other in the frantic attempt
to escape. Had they shown as much energy
in resisting the enemy as in thrusting aside
and trampling down their friends, they might
have changed the fortune of the day. In less
than half an hour from the time when
Alexander crossed the Pinarus the left wing
of the Persian host was a hopeless mass of
confusion.

Yet the Persians had a still unbroken strength
with which much might have been done, if only
there had been a leader to make use of it.
The Greeks in the centre stood their ground
bravely. They even advanced, charged the
left divisions of the phalanx, which had not
completed the passage of the Pinarus, and
inflicted some loss upon it, killing as many as
150 of the front rank men, and the officer in
command. But by themselves they could not
hope to hold the field. When Alexander,
wheeling round after his victorious assault on
the Persian right, attacked them in flank, they
were forced to give way. But they retired in
good order, and the main body of them made
good their escape. The Persian cavalry, too,
had shown themselves not altogether unworthy
of their ancient renown. They had actually

142 GREECE AND PERSIA

crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thes-
salian horse, which had been transferred, it
should be said, by Alexander from the right
to the left of his army. In the combat that
ensued they held their own. But their courage
failed when they became aware of the flight
of Darius. When their king had given up
the struggle what was there for them to stay
for ? To him they were bound, but they had
no conception of a country to whose service
it was their duty to devote their lives. They
fled, suffering greatly in the pursuit.

The Macedonians lost 450 in killed,
Alexander himself being slightly wounded.
The slaughter among the Persians cannot be
estimated. It was put down at more than
100,000. Ptolemy, afterwards King of Egypt,
who was one of Alexander's most trusted
generals, declared that he found a ravine so
choked with dead bodies that he could use
them as a bridge. Ptolemy kept a diary of
the war, which he afterwards embodied in a
regular narrative. Arrian, who wrote the
story of Alexander's campaign in the second
century of our era, had this work before him.

Ill

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES

DURING the twenty months which
followed the victory of Issus, Alexander
continued to make fresh conquests and to
consolidate those already made. He subdued
Syria — a name which must be taken to include
both Phoenicia and Palestine. Here the two
cities of Tyre and Gaza made an obstinate
resistance, the two detaining him for no less
than nine months. Egypt, which hated its
intolerant Persian masters, gave itself up with-
out a struggle. Early in 331 he heard that
Darius had collected another huge army, with
which to make another effort for his kingdom.
The king had lost the western half of his
dominions, but the eastern still remained to
him, and from this he drew forces which
exceeded in number even the great host which

he had put into the field at Issus. The

143

144 GREECE AND PERSIA

meeting-place was at Arbela, a place still known
by the slightly changed name of Erbil, and
situated on the caravan-route between Erzeroum
and Bagdad ; but the actual battlefield must be
looked for some twenty miles away in a level
region known by the name of Gangamela.

On the extreme right were the Medes, once
the ruling people of Asia and still mindful of
their old renown, the Parthian cavalry, and the
sturdy mountaineers of the Caucasus ; on the
opposite wing were the Bactrians — mostly
hardy dwellers in the hills, and famous both for
activity and for fierceness — and the native Per-
sians, horse and foot, in alternate formation. But
it was in the centre of the line, round the person
of Darius, where he stood conspicuous on his
royal chariot, that the choicest troops of the
Empire were congregated. Here were ranged
the Persian Horseguards — a force levied from
the noblest families of the race that had ruled
Western Asia for more than two centuries.
They were known by the proud title of
" Kinsmen of the King," and the Footguards,
also a corps d'e'lite, who carried apples at the
butt-end of their pikes. Next to these stood
the Carians, probably a colony from the well-
known people of that name in Asia Minor,
possibly transported by some Persian king to

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES 145

a settlement in the East. Of all Asiatic races
the Carians had shown themselves the most
apt to learn the Greek discipline and to rival
Greek valour. Next to the Carians, again,
stood the Greek mercenaries.

In front of the line were the scythed chariots,
numbering two hundred in all, each with its
sharp-pointed sides projecting far beyond the
horses, and its sword-blades and scythes
stretching from the yoke and from the naves
of the wheels. (This is the first time that we
hear of the scythed chariot. It was a device
of a barbarian kind, and seldom, as far as we
know, very effective.) Behind the line, again,
was a large mixed multitude, drawn from every
tribe that still owned the Great King's sway.

Alexander saw that this time he had a
formidable enemy to deal with. He had an
entrenched camp constructed, as possibly useful
in case of a reverse, and he consulted his
generals— a course which he seldom followed
— as to how an attack might be most advan-
tageously delivered. But when one of his
most experienced officers suggested an assault
by night, he emphatically rejected the idea.
It was, he declared, an unworthy stratagem ;
victory so won would be worse than defeat. A
more powerful reason was probably the danger

11

146 GREECE AND PERSIA

of such an attempt. A night attack is always
a desperate device.

The first day after coming in sight of the
enemy Alexander spent in preparation and
consultation. On the morrow he drew out his
order of battle. As usual he put himself at the
head of the right wing. This was made up of
the " Companions," the light infantry, and
three out of the six divisions of the phalanx.
The left wing, if it may be so called, for there
was no centre, consisted of the rest of the
plalanx, with a body of cavalry from the allied
Greek states.

And now, for the first time, Alexander had a
second line in reserve. His numbers were
considerably increased, the 35,000 with which
he had crossed into Asia having now mounted
up to nearly 50,000. And the nature of the
battlefield made such an arrangement
necessary. The enemy had an enormously
superior force and it was necessary to guard
against attacks on the flank and the rear.
The second line consisted of the light cavalry,
the Macedonian archers, contingents from
some of the half-barbarous tribes which
bordered on Macedonia, some veteran Greek
mercenaries and other miscellaneous troops.
Some Thracian infantry were detached to
guard the camp and the baggage.

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES 147

The Persians, with their vastly larger
numbers, were, of course, extended far beyond
the Macedonian line. Left to make the attack,
they might easily have turned the flank, or even
assailed the rear of their opponents. Alexander,
seeing this, and following the tactics which had
twice proved so successful, took the offensive.
He put himself at the head of the " Companions,"
who were stationed, as has been said, on the
extreme right, and led them forward in person,
still keeping more and more to the right, and
thus threatening the enemy with the very move-
ment which he had himself reason to dread.
He thus not only avoided the iron spikes, which,
as a deserter had warned him, had been set
to injure the Macedonian cavalry, but almost
got beyond the ground which the Persians had
caused to be levelled for the operations of their
chariots. Fearful at once of being outflanked
and of having his chariots made useless,
Darius launched some Bactrian and Scythian
cavalry against the advancingenemy; Alexander,
on the other hand, detached some cavalry of his
own to charge the Bactrians, and the action
began.

The Bactrians commenced with a success,
driving back the Greek horsemen. These fell
back on their supports, and advancing again in

148 GREECE AND PERSIA

increased force, threw the Bactrians into
confusion. Squadron after squadron joined
the fray, till a considerable part of the
Macedonian right and of the Persian left
wing was engaged. The Persians were
beginning to give way, when Darius saw, as
he thought, the time for bringing the scythed
chariots into action, and gave the word for
them to charge, and for his main line to
advance behind them. The charge was made,
but failed, almost entirely, of its effect. The
Macedonian archers and javelin - throwers
wounded many of the horses ; some agile
skirmishers even seized the reins and dragged
down the drivers from their places. Other
chariots got as far as the Macedonian line, but
recoiled from the bristling line of outstretched
pikes ; and the few whose drivers were lucky
enough or bold enough to break their way
through all hindrances were allowed to pass
between the Macedonian lines, without being
able to inflict any serious damage. Then
Alexander delivered his counter attack. He
ceased his movement to the right. Wheeling
half round, the "Companions" dashed into the
open space which the advance of the Bactrian
squadrons had left in the Persian line. At the
same time his own main line raised the battle-

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES 149

cry, and moved forward. Once within the
enemy's ranks he pushed straight for the place
where, as he knew, the battle would be decided,
the chariot of the king. The first defence of
that all-important position was the Persian
cavalry. Better at skirmishing than at hand-
to-hand fighting, it broke before his onslaught.
Still there remained troops to be reckoned with
who might have made the fortune of the day
doubtful, the flower of the Persian foot and the
veteran Greeks. For a time these men held
their ground ; they might have held it longer,
perhaps with success, but for the same cause
which had brought about the disastrous result
of Issus, the cowardice of Darius. He had been
dismayed to see his chariots fail and his cavalry
broken by the charge of the " Companions," and
he lost heart altogether when the dreaded
phalanx itself, with its bristling array of
pikes, seemed to be forcing a way through the
line of his infantry and coming nearer to
himself. He turned his chariot and fled, the
first, when he should have been the last, to
leave his post.

The flight of the king was the signal for a

general rout, so far at least as the centre and

left wing of the Persian army was concerned.

It was no longer a battle ; it was a massacre.

150 GREECE AND PERSIA

Alexander pressed furiously on, eager to
capture the fugitive Darius. But the very
completeness of his victory, it may be said,
hindered him. So headlong was the flight that
the dust, which, after the months of burning
summer heat, lay thick upon the plain, rose
like the smoke of a vast conflagration. The
darkness was as the darkness of night. Nothing
could be seen, but all around were heard the
cries of fury and despair, the jingling of the
chariot wheels, and the sound of the whips
which the terrified charioteers were plying
with all their might.

Nor was Alexander permitted to continue
the pursuit. Though the Persian left, demora-
lised by the cowardice of the king, had fled, the
right wing had fought with better fortune. It
was under the command of Mazseus, who was
probably the ablest of the Persian generals, and
knew how to use his superiority of numbers.
Whilst the sturdy Median infantry engaged the
Macedonian front line, Mazseus put himself
at the head of the Parthian horse and charged
the flank. Parmenio, Alexander's ablest lieu-
tenant— his one general, as he was reported
to have said — who was in command, sent an
urgent request for help, so hard pressed did he
find himself to be. Alexander was greatly

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES 151

vexed, for he saw that all chance of capturing
Darius was lost, but he knew his business too
well to neglect the demand. He at once called
back his troops from the pursuit, and led them
to the help of the left wing. Parmenio had
sent the same message to that division of
the phalanx which had taken part in the
advance of the right wing.

As things turned out, however, the help was
hardly needed. On the one hand, the Thes-
salian cavalry had proved themselves worthy of
their old reputation as the best horsemen in
Greece. Held during the earlier part of the
engagement in reserve, they had made a bril-
liant charge on the Parthians, and had restored
the fortune of the day. And then, on the other
hand, Mazaeus and his men had felt the same
infection of fear which the flight of Darius had
communicated to the rest of the army. Par-
menio felt the vigour of the enemy's attack
languish, though he did not know the cause,
and had the satisfaction of regaining, and more
than regaining, the ground which he had lost,
before the reinforcements arrived.

The day was virtually over, yet the hardest
fighting of the battle was yet to take place.
The Parthian cavalry, with some squadrons of
Persian and Indian horse among them, encoun-

152 GREECE AND PERSIA

tered, as they retreated across the field of
battle, Alexanderhimself and the " Companions."
Their only hope of escape was to cut through
the advancing force. It was no time for
tactics, only for a desperate charge for life.
Each man was fighting for himself, and he
fought with a fury that made him a match even
for Macedonian discipline and valour. And
the enemy had among them some of the most
expert swordsmen in the world. Anyhow, the
" Companions" suffered more severely than they
did in any other engagement in the war.
Sixty were slain in the course of a few minutes,
three of the principal officers were wounded,
and even Alexander himself was in serious
danger. But the Parthians thought only of
saving their lives, and when they once saw the
way clear before them they were only too glad
to follow it.

The Persians achieved one more success.
A brigade of Indian and Persian horse had
plunged through a gap which the movement of
the phalanx had left in the line, and attacked
the camp. The Thracians who guarded it
were hampered by the number of the prisoners
whom they had to watch. Many of these
escaped. The mother of Darius — the effort
had been made for her — might have been one

THE ARMY OF THE HUNDRED PROVINCES 153

of them, but she refused to go. By this time
some troops had come to the rescue of the
camp, and the Persian cavalry had to fly.

The great battle of Arbela was over. It
was the most hardly won as it was the most
conclusive of all Alexander's victories. The
Persians made no further stand. The great
enemy of Greece had disappeared from the
stage of history. But we shall find the powerful
forces which Persia represented appear again in
another shape.

BOOK IV
ROME AND CARTHAGE

I. THE 'SERVANTS OF MARS

I HAVE had to speak more than once of
mercenary troops employed by the Greek
cities in Sicily to help them in their long
struggle with Carthage. The use of such
troops was a regular practice with Carthage ;
it was only on great occasions that this State
put its own citizens in the field. With the
Greeks, on the contrary, it was the exception
to employ any but citizen soldiers. The mer-
cenary was suspected, and not without reason,
of being a ready instrument in the hands of
any unscrupulous person who might be seeking
to establish a tyranny. As time went on, how-
ever, he became more and more a necessity.
As society became more complex, the citizen

found himself less willing to bear arms and less

154

THE SERVANTS OF MARS 155

capable of doing it. And the exhaustion
caused by almost incessant wars made it
necessary to seek elsewhere for men who
should fill up the depleted ranks. Hence the
employment of mercenaries even by free cities.
Whatever their use in time of war, these
auxiliaries were naturally difficult to manage or
dispose of when peace had . been restored. 1
Such certainly the Syracusans found to be the
case with a body of Italian mercenaries whom
Agathocles 2 had had in his service. They
were paid off and peremptorily ordered to
return home. This prospect was not agree-
able ; it meant a return to regular and not
very profitable labour ; they greatly preferred
to live by the sword. They professed, how-
ever, to be willing to obey the command, and
accordingly marched in the direction of Italy,
intending, it appeared, to be ferried across the
Straits of Messana. Whether they had fixed
on any settled plan, or yielded to the sudden
attraction of a chance that seemed to offer

1 Xenophon gives in the later books of the Anabasis a
graphic description of the troubles that arose when the
" Ten Thousand," or such as were left of them (between
eight and nine thousand), had made their way to the coast,
and were looking out for employment.

2 See pp. 120-21.

156

ROME AND CARTHAGE

itself, cannot be determined. What we know
is that when they reached Messana, from
which they were to have embarked, and had
been imprudently invited within the walls by
its citizens, they seized the town with all that
it contained. Here they established them-
selves, taking the name of Mamertini, or
" Servants of Mars " (Mamers was the Oscan
name for the deity known to the Romans as
Mars). A similar body held the adjacent
mainland, and the two, joined as they were by
an informal alliance of interests, became a
formidable power. They practically lived by
robbery by land and sea, and their existence
became an intolerable nuisance to the two
powers that shared Sicily between them. For
once the interests of Syracuse and Carthage
were identical. The Syracusan troops inflicted
a severe defeat on the Mamertini, and, with
the help of their new allies, closely besieged
their town.

The Mamertini had for some time perceived
that they could not stand alone, but must take
sides either with Rome or with Carthage.
They were divided as to the choice, but cir-
cumstances inclined them to Rome, and they
sent envoys asking for protection and help.
The Senate, to whom this application was

THE SERVANTS OF MARS 157

addressed, were not a little perplexed. They
had just inflicted a severe punishment on a
body of mercenaries who had done at Rhegium
exactly the same thing that the Mamertini had
done at Messana. They postponed the matter
more than once, possibly in the hope that the
necessity of deciding might pass away. But
the General Assembly of the People, to whom
the Senate referred the matter — this dual
government had at times its convenience — was
not disposed to be so indifferent. A resolution
was passed that the Mamertini were to be
helped, and Appius Claudius, one of the
Consuls of the year, was sent in command
of an expedition.

When he arrived, he found the situation
considerably changed. There was a Car-
thaginian as well as a Roman party among the
Mamertini, and the former had now gained the
upper hand. A Carthaginian fleet was in the
harbour and a body of Carthaginian troops in
possession of the citadel. Fortunately for
Rome, there was no one of energy or deter-
mination to manage affairs. The officer in
command of the fleet was seized by the pro-
Roman faction, and Hanno, who was in charge
of the citadel, consented to evacuate it, if he
were allowed to withdraw with the honours of

158 ROME AND CARTHAGE

war. Rome became possessed of Messana
without having to strike a blow. She never
lost it — it was not her way to lose what she
had once gained — and she found it a most
valuable position. But the acquisition of
Messana meant war with Carthage. Carthage
began by crucifying the unlucky general who
had abandoned the citadel, and then, entering
into close alliance with Hiero, invested the
city. Appius Claudius made proposals for
peace, which were not accepted. Then he
made a sally from the town and inflicted such
a defeat on the enemy that they raised the
siege. The next year Hiero, who had the
sagacity to see that Rome would be a more
useful ally than Carthage, changed sides.
Rome had its foot down in Sicily and never
took it up.

II

FOR THE RULE OF THE SEA

I AM not going to tell the whole story of the
Punic Wars. In each of them, however,
there is something that belongs to my subject.
In the First, with which I am now concerned,
there is the extraordinary effort by which the
Romans put themselves in a position to con-
tend with Carthage for the dominion of the
sea. There is nothing quite like it in history,
and nothing, one might say, which more
plainly showed the wonderful fitness of the
nation for its great destiny of ruling the world.
Polybius, one of the most thoughtful and
judicious of ancient historians, becomes enthu-
siastic in his praise of this marvellous effort.
He says: "There could be no more signal proof
of their courage, or rather audacity. They
had no resources at all for the enterprise ; they

had never even entertained the idea of a naval

159

i6o

ROME AND CARTHAGE

war — indeed it was the first time they had
thought of it — but they engaged in the enter-
prise with such daring that, without so much
as a preliminary trial, they took upon them-
selves to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on
which they had held for generations an undis-
puted supremacy." The first thing, of course,
was to build the ships. They had not even a
model to copy, till one of the Carthaginian
men-of-war happened to run aground, and so
fell into their hands. And while the ships
were being built the crews which were to man
them were being exercised. Sets of rowers'
benches were constructed on dry ground ; the
crews sat on them as they would have to sit in
actual vessels. In the middle the fugleman,
as we may call him, was stationed. As he
gave the signal, they stretched their bodies and
arms forwards, and drew them back again, all
in time. By the time the ships were finished,
the crews were as ready as this kind of
teaching could make them. A little practice
in actual rowing on the sea was given them,
and then the new fleet entered upon its first
naval campaign.

The first experience of the new force was
not encouraging. A squadron of seventeen
ships under one of the Consuls for the year, a

FOR THE RULE OF THE SEA 161

Scipio, great-uncle of a famous man of whom
I shall have to speak hereafter, was shut up in
the harbour of Lipara, and had to surrender.
The other Consul was put in command of the
fleet and at once set about suiting it better to
the actual conditions of warfare. He had the
sagacity to see that there was more in seaman-
ship than could be acquired by a landsman in a
few weeks, and the object that he set before
himself was that seamanship should not be
allowed to count for more than could possibly
be helped. To put the matter shortly, a battle
on sea was to be made as like to a battle on
land as could be managed. He adopted
accordingly the suggestion of an ingenious
inventor that the ships should be fitted with
boarding-machines, or "crows" (corvi), as they
afterwards came to be called. The actual
" crow " was a gangway, four feet wide and
thirty-six feet long, with a wooden railing on
either side, about the height of a man's knee.
This construction was fastened to a pole, some
twenty-four feet high, that was placed near the
bowsprit. It was fitted with pulleys and ropes
so that it could be dropped at pleasure in any
direction that might be convenient. When it
was dropped to the deck of a hostile ship it
acted as a grappling-iron, for it was fitted with

12

162 ROME AND CARTHAGE

a heavy spike which ran into the timber. If
the two ships came together side by side the
boarders could scramble over the bulwarks,
and the chief use of the machine was for grap-
pling. If they met prow to prow the gangway,
which was broad enough for two men to pass
over it abreast, became very useful.

When this equipment was complete, Duilius
boldly put to sea, sailing for a spot on the
north coast of Sicily where the Carthaginians
were busy plundering. As soon as the Roman
fleet came in sight the Carthaginian admiral —
one of the many Hannibals who figure in these
wars — manned his ships, and went out of
harbour to meet it. He was superior in num-
bers, having 130 ships, while the Romans
could have had but few over 100 (they had
built 1 20 and had lost 1 7). But it was on his
superiority in seamanship that he most relied.
For the Romans as sailors he had, and not
without reason, a profound contempt. So
strong was this feeling of superiority that he
did not take ordinary pains in keeping his ships
in order. " He advanced," says Polybius, "as
though he was about to seize an easy prey."
He and his officers saw the " crows," and could
not make out what they meant. That there
was anything dangerous about them no one

FOR THE RULE OF THE SEA 163

seems to have imagined, for the Carthaginian
captains that led the van of the fleet charged
straight at their antagonists. When they
came to close quarters they made a very dis-
comfiting discovery. Any ship that came into
contact with a Roman vessel was immediately
grappled ; no sooner had it been grappled than
it was boarded by a number of armed men,
and became the scene of a conflict that was
practically the same as if it were being fought
on dry land. The Carthaginian crews were
not prepared for this ; it is not improbable
that they were insufficiently armed, for they
counted on ramming and sinking their antago-
nists. Thirty ships were captured in this way;
the rest of the fleet sheered off when they saw
what had happened to the van, and tried to
manoeuvre, taking the enemy, if possible, at a
disadvantage. They were able, however, to
affect little or nothing. If they were to do any
damage to the enemy, they had, sooner or
later, to come into contact with him. But this
contact was very likely to be fatal. The
" crow " was promptly dropped, and the
dreaded Romans had to be encountered.
Twenty more ships were thus lost, and the
rest were glad enough to make their escape.
This victory was undoubtedly a great

164 ROME AND CARTHAGE

achievement, and Rome did not fail to appre-
ciate it properly. The Consul Duilius became
at once one of the most famous of Roman
heroes. He did not perform, possibly had no
opportunity of performing, any other service
of much importance, but the victory of Mylae
established his reputation for ever. A story is
told of the privileges accorded to him in his
old age. He had a fancy for being attended
by a couple of flute players when he was
returning home from an entertainment, and
though the practice was thought inconsistent
with the simplicity of Roman manners, his
fellow-citizens endured it with patience in con-
sideration of the singular service which he had
rendered to his country.

Nor was the victory at Mylae a solitary
success. Four years afterwards there was
another great sea-fight at Heraclea, * on the
south coast of Sicily. The Romans had deter-
mined to adopt a policy which, as we have
seen, had been previously followed with success,
and to attack Carthage on her own territory.
A very large fleet was collected or constructed
to carry out this purpose. There were, accord-
ing to Polybius, 33° ships, each carrying on an

1 The battle is sometimes spoken of as the battle of
Ecnomus.

FOR THE RULE OF THE SEA 165

average 300 rowers and sailors and 120 soldiers
or marines. This gives a total of nearly
140,000, a huge number which Polybius
mentions with astonishment, but apparently
without disbelief. The Carthaginian fleet,
which numbered 350 men-of-war, prepared to
dispute the passage.

The battle that followed was fiercely con-
tested. The description that Polybius gives of
it is not easy to understand, but the main
features are clear enough. In manoeuvring the
Carthaginians more than held their own.
Whatever success they won was due to the
rapidity and skill with which they moved ; but
they could not contend on equal terms with
their antagonists when they had to come to
close quarters. " Over thirty " of their ships
were sunk. Polybius does not give, doubtless
because he could not ascertain, a more definite
figure, while the Romans lost twenty-four. So
far there was no great disparity. But, on the
other hand, sixty-four Carthaginian men-of-war
were captured, whereas not a single Roman
ship was taken. Plainly, when the "crows"
could be brought into use, and the struggle
between ship and ship was decided by hand-to-
hand fighting, the old Roman superiority
declared itself.

Ill

THE MARTYR PATRIOT

THE two Consuls of the year were in com-
mand of the fleet at Heraclea, and the his-
torian attributes some of the energy and deter-
mination with which the battle was fought to the
encouragement of their presence. The junior
of the two, M. Atilius Regulus, is one of the
most romantic heroes of Roman story, and it
is impossible not to give a short account of the
rest of his career. It was by an accident, the
death of the duly elected Consul of the year
very shortly after his coming into office, that
Regulus happened to share the command of
the expedition to Africa. But he had held the
Consulship before, and had then so distinguished
himself — he had in fact the glory of completing
the Roman conquest of Italy — that he had
obtained the honour of a triumph. After the
victory at Heraclea, he effected a successful

THE MARTYR PATRIOT 167

landing on the African coast. The departure
of his colleague, who was summoned home,
left him in sole command. Aided by an insur-
rection of the native tribes, always ready to
revenge themselves on their oppressive masters,
he reduced Carthage to great straits. That
haughty State even brought itself to ask for
peace. Regulus demanded such conditions —
what they were we are not told — that the
Carthaginians unanimously resolved to bear
any extremity of suffering rather than submit
to them.

And now there was a change of fortune. It
came with dramatic suddenness, and signally
illustrated the aphorism which the moralists of
antiquity repeated with such frequency and
emphasis, "pride goeth before a fall." The
Carthaginian recruiting agents, when they
visited Greece, found a man who was admir-
ably suited for their purpose. Xanthippus was
one of those Spartan soldiers of fortune who
in several conspicuous instances affected the
course of history. It was the Spartaji Gylippus
who saved Syracuse when it was almost in the
grasp of Athens ; and now it was another
Spartan who at least prolonged for a century
the existence of Carthage. Xanthippus had,
it would seem, taken service in some subordi-

ROME AND CARTHAGE

nate capacity as an officer of mercenaries. He
was an acute observer, and saw that the
resources of Carthage were but ill employed.
In the two arms of elephants and cavalry her
army was so superior to the Romans that
defeat could not but be the result of mis-
management. These opinions, freely expressed
to his comrades, came round before long to the
ears of the authorities. Xanthippus was sum-
moned before them ; he explained his views
and pointed out some changes in the manage-
ment of the campaign which it would be neces-
sary to make. His hearers were greatly
impressed by the force and clearness of his
statement, and gave him what was probably a
provisional command of the army. He had
now the opportunity of showing his military
abilities. He began by manoeuvring bodies of
troops, and showed such tactical skill as to
excite the admiration of the men. They loudly
demanded to be led against the enemy, stipula-
ting that the leader should be Xanthippus. It
is needless to describe the battle which followed.
The hundred elephants which Xanthippus put
in part of his line were used to good effect.
They did not actually break the Roman legions,
but they inflicted a great deal of damage, and
prepared the way for the infantry behind them.

THE MARTYR PATRIOT 169

In cavalry the Carthaginian army was so much
stronger than the Roman — four thousand, we
are told, to five hundred — that there was
practically no conflict. In the end the army
of Regulus was nearly annihilated. Two
thousand men made good their retreat to the
town of Aspis on the coast ; five hundred,
among whom was the Consul himself, were
taken prisoners ; the rest, more than twelve
thousand in number, perished on the field of
battle.

For five years Regulus remained in captivity.
Then — so runs the story — he was sent to Rome
in company of some ambassadors who were to
propose a treaty of peace. It was expected of
him that he should do his best to recommend
the proposal to his countrymen ; his release
was to be the reward of his help. But Regulus
had very different views of the situation. He
thought that peace, at least on any such terms
as Carthage was willing to accept, would not be
for the interest of Rome, and he determined to
oppose. He asked permission to speak; his right
to deliver an opinion as a member of the Senate
he considered himself to have lost by having
fallen into the hands of the enemy. Leave
granted, he delivered an oration in which he
did his best to dissuade his countrymen from

170

ROME AND CARTHAGE

making
was

peace,

and succeeded. But his success

fatal

»t only to his chances of liberty, but
to his life. He was taken back to Carthage,
and there — so the story has it — put to death
by cruel tortures. The tale is told by many
writers, but Polybius, who is by far the best
authority for events of the time, is absolutely
silent about it, and his silence, in view of the
strong feeling in favour of the Romans which
is noticeable in him, is a very important con-
sideration. According to another story, which
seems to have as little or as much foundation,
the Senate handed over to the widow of
Regulus two noble Carthaginian prisoners.
The woman, in revenge for her husband's
death, treated them with such barbarity that,
for very shame, the Senate took them out of
her hands. Perhaps we shall be justified in
regarding both legends as specimens of that
wonderful crop of inventions which springs up
whenever the feelings of a nation are greatly
roused by the agitations of war.

This was not the only loss that Rome
suffered during the latter part of the war. She
lost one fleet by a storm, and another by the
folly of its commander. This man was one of
the Claudian family, a house which showed more
ability in politics than in war. He seems to

THE MARTYR PATRIOT 171

have fallen into the mistake of underrating
the enemy, made an attack upon them from
which he was compelled to withdraw, and when
he saw that the day was lost, made his own
escape with a discreditable precipitancy. The
battle was fought in and outside the harbour of
Drepanum, a town in the extreme west of the
Island. Claudius was indicted on his return to
Rome, heavily fined, and thrown into prison.
He is said to have committed suicide. In later
writers we find a story which has something of
the look of having been invented to point a
moral. It was represented to him on the
morning of the battle by the keepers of the
sacred chickens, that the sacred birds, whose
conduct was held to foretell the future, would
not eat. This was a most sinister sign. The
insolent soldier received the intimation with
contempt. " If they won't eat," he cried,
" they shall at least drink ! " and he gave
orders that they should be thrown into the sea.
It is certainly, whether true or not, a character-
istic illustration of the arrogance of the Clau-
dian family. Such, too, is the other story
which supplements it. Some years afterwards
a sister of the unlucky or impious general was
greatly incommoded by the crush of people
coming out of the amphitheatre. " I wish," she

172 ROME AND CARTHAGE

cried, " that my brother were alive again, and
would take another fleet to Sicily, and ease us
of some of this superfluous crowd." She was
fined for her incivility, the use of language
unbecoming a citizen.

In B.C. 241 this long war at last came to an
end. Both sides had suffered fearfully both in
men and means. The Romans lost 700 ships
of war and the Carthaginians about 200 less,
for though they had not shown themselves a
match for their antagonists in fighting, they
knew better how to deal with bad conditions of
weather. The Romans had a way of going
straight to their point, whatever obstacles were
in their way. Storm or no storm, they went
on, and the result of their obstinacy was often
not a little disastrous.1

On the whole the balance of success was
considerably in favour of Rome, and the con-
ditions of the peace showed a distinct gain.
The most important article was the total
withdrawal of Carthage from Sicily. For more
than three centuries she had renewed her

1 We may compare the way in which they made their
great military roads. These went by the nearest way
from point to point, not engineered according to modern
practice.

THE MARTYR PATRIOT 173

attempts to possess herself of the Island. Now
she was compelled to definitely renounce her
ambition. This renunciation marks an im-
portant stage in the history of the world.

IV

THE SONS OF LIGHTNING

THE later years of the First Punic War
had brought to the front a man of
extraordinary genius, Hamilcar, surnamed
Barca.1 As his son, Hannibal, was born in this
very same year, we may safely put his age at
twenty-five. Hamilcar kept the Romans in
check, first at Ercte, a stronghold in Sicily, and
afterwards at Eryx in the same island, for five
years, and might have even changed the course
of the war if he could have been adequately

1 "Barca " is equivalent to the Hebrew Barak, and means

" lightning." We may compare the surname of Boajterges,

"Sons of Thunder," given by Christ to the sons of Zebedee.

In 247 B.C. he was appointed to the chief command of the

forces of Carthage, being then " a very young man," if we

may so translate the term adolescentidus which Livy applies

to him. This word, however, is very vague. It covers

any age from eighteen to upwards of thirty. Cicero, for

instance, uses it of Caesar at the age of thirty-two.

174

THE SONS OF LIGHTNING 175

supported from home. So greatly did his
military ability impress the Romans that when
negotiations for peace were commenced, he was
permitted to march out of Eryx with all the
honours of war. During the next four years
he rendered the greatest service to his country,
which had been brought to the very verge of
ruin by the revolt of the mercenaries. It was
Hamilcar, in fact, who saved Carthage from
destruction. This done, he devoted the
remainder of his life to the working out of a
great scheme which was to restore his country
to the commanding position from which she
had been deposed by the disasters of the First
Punic War. Sicily had been lost ; another
province, far larger, and possibly more valuable,
might be found in Spain. Carthage had had
for several generations a large trade with Spain,
and probably possessed some trading ports or
fortified factories on the southern coast.
Hannibal crossed over into Spain with a
general commission to do what he could for
the interests of Carthage in that country. We
know next to nothing about the details of his
action, but it is clear that he was eminently
successful. He practically conquered a con-
siderable part of Spain, and did it without any
charge on the home revenues, which, indeed,

176 ROME AND CARTHAGE

were largely augmented by the sums which he
sent home. After a prosperous career of nearly
nine years he fell in battle. This was 229 B.C.,
when he was little more than forty years of age.
His work was taken up by his son-in-law, Has-
drubal. Hasdrubal was, by all accounts, more
of a politician than a soldier. The interests of
Carthage, however, were furthered rather than
hindered by this difference of character.
Hamilcar had impressed the Spanish tribes by
his military genius and resources. Hasdrubal
conciliated them. His wife was the daughter
of a Spanish chief. Altogether he did much
to consolidate the Carthaginian power in the
Peninsula. Not the least of his services was
his foundation of New Carthage, a place
admirably chosen for strength of position and
convenience of access. After eight years of
rule he was assassinated by a slave whose
master he had put to death.

The successor of Hasdrubal was the son of
Hamilcar, a son who possessed a military genius
even greater than that of his father. Han-
nibal is ranked by common consent among the
greatest generals of the world. If Rome could
have been overthrown by any enemy, it would
have been by him, so brilliant was his strategy,
so great his capacity for leadership — nothing is

THE SONS OF LIGHTNING 177

more remarkable in his career than his power
of giving unity to the varied components of a
mercenary army — and so resolute his hostility
to Rome. He himself narrated towards the
close of his life the incident which seems to
have made this feeling the dominant motive of
his life. He was then in exile, and the guest
of Antiochus the Great, King of Syria. Some
jealous courtiers had suggested to Antiochus
that Hannibal was not indisposed to come to
terms with Rome. He then told his story.

" When my father was about to go on his
expedition to Spain, I was nine years old. I
was standing near the altar when he made the
usual sacrifice to Zeus. This successfully per-
formed, he bade all the other worshippers stand
back, and calling me to him, asked me whether
I wished to go with him. I gave an eager
assent, and begged him most earnestly to take
me. On this he took me by the right hand, led
me up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand
upon the victim, and swear eternal enmity to
Rome."

No vow was ever more faithfully per-
formed.

Of Hannibal's early years we know but little.
He was present at the battle in which his father
was killed, being then in his nineteenth year.

13

178 ROME AND CARTHAGE

During the period of his brother-in-law's com-
mand he was continuously employed on active
service. Hasdrubal's ability, as has been
already said, was political rather than military,
and the operations in the field were largely
conducted by the younger man, and conducted
with conspicuous success. His habit of victory
and his great personal qualities made him the
favourite of the army. Livy gives us a vivid
picture of the man as he was in his youth.

" Bold in the extreme in incurring peril,
he was perfectly cool in its presence. No toil
could weary his body or conquer his spirit.
Heat and cold he bore with equal patience.
The cravings of nature, not the pleasure of the
palate, determined the measure of his food and
drink. His waking and sleeping hours had
no relation to day and night. Such time as
business left him, he gave to repose, but it was
not on a soft couch or in stillness that he sought
it. Many saw him, wrapped in his military cloak,
lying on the ground amidst the sentries and
pickets. His dress was not one whit superior
to that of his comrades, but his accoutrements
and his horses were conspicuously splendid.
Of all the cavalry and the infantry, he was by
far the first soldier, earliest to join the battle
and last to leave it."

THE SONS OF LIGHTNING 179

The quarrel with Rome, undoubtedly pro-
voked of set purpose by Hannibal, began with
his attack on Saguntum (now Murviedro, i.e.,
Muri Veteres, " The Old Walls," in Valencia).
This town was in alliance with the Romans,
who sent envoys to Hannibal bidding him desist
from the attack, and to Carthage, complaining
of their general's action. Hannibal refused to
receive the embassy ; at Carthage the answer
given was practically a refusal to interfere.
Meanwhile Saguntum was left without help.
When it fell, after a siege of several months, the
Romans felt that war was inevitable, and made
preparations for carrying it on with vigour.
They probably under-estimated the strength of
the enemy. The army voted, largely made up,
it must be remembered, of recruits enrolled for
the purpose, amounted to about 70,000; and the
fleet was to number about 250 ships. Every-
thing, however, was to be done in due form.
Another embassy was sent to Carthage, with
instructions to put the direct question, whether
the government accepted the responsibility for
the destruction of Saguntum. There was, it is
true, a peace-party in Carthage, but it had been
reduced to helplessness. The envoys could
obtain no satisfaction. Their spokesman, one
of the great Fabian House, on receiving a reply

180 ROME AND CARTHAGE

which could have no meaning but war, gathered
up his robe into a fold and cried, " We bring
you peace and war ; take which you please."
He was met with a fierce cry, " Give us which
you will." Fabius shook out the fold with the
words, " I give you war," and the answer was,
" We accept it."

I shall pass as quickly as possible over the
early operations of the war. Early in the
spring of 218 B.C. Hannibal left his winter
quarters at New Carthage, crossed the Ebro,
and fought his way from that river to the foot
of the Pyrenees. The Pyrensean range itself
presented no great difficulties. At the Rhone
he encountered formidable opposition, but
effected a crossing with great skill. In his march
from the Rhone to the Alps, and in his passage
of the Alps themselves he suffered little from
hostile attacks. But the natural difficulties of
the route were great, and he was late. He
appears to have left New Carthage at the
beginning of May. We may be sure that the
start was made at the earliest practicable
moment, but the delay was to cost much.
Could he have moved a month earlier it would
have been well. As it was he did not reach
the Alps till the beginning of October, when
the snows have already begun to fall on the

THE SONS OF LIGHTNING 181

higher ranges. The crossing was effected in
fifteen days, but the cost in men and beasts of
burden was tremendous. Hannibal had started
from New Carthage with 90,000 foot and
16,000 horse ; he descended into the Lombard
plains with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 horse.
He had very little more than one-fourth of his
original numbers. He had not indeed lost the
other three-fourths by battle or by disease.
Many had deserted, many had been sent home,
and the troops that remained were thoroughly
trustworthy. But the fact remains that an
army of 26,000 was even ludicrously small to
be confronted with such an enemy as Rome.
(It may be noted that the infantry was made
up of Africans and Spaniards. The higher
posts in the army were filled by Carthaginians,
and some probably served in the cavalry, but
in the main the army consisted of mercenaries.)

It would be a pity to omit so picturesque
an incident as Hannibal's dream. Livy
thus relates it : "He saw — so the story goes
— a youth of godlike shape, who said that
he had been sent by Jupiter to conduct the
army of Hannibal into Italy ; that he was
therefore to follow, without ever turning away
his eyes. At first Hannibal followed, trembling,

182 ROME AND CARTHAGE

looking neither round him nor behind ; after a
while, with the curiosity natural to the human
mind, as he thought what that on which he was
forbidden to look back might be, he could no
longer restrain his eyes. What he saw was a
serpent of portentous size moving onward with
fearful destruction of bushes and trees ; close
behind the creature followed a storm-cloud with
crashing thunder. He asked what this portent
meant, and was told, 'It means the devastation
of Italy.' He must go straight on, and leave
the fates in darkness."

V

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS

A FEW days for rest and refreshment of the
army were imperatively needed, but only
a very few could be spared. Hannibal could not
hope to face his antagonists without a large
increase to his army, and this increase he could
only get for the moment from the Gauls, the
people in whose country he was, though later
on reinforcements might be expected from
Carthage. The Gauls would be ready enough
to join him, for they were permanently hostile
to Rome ; but they would have to be satisfied
of his strength. A war had opportunely broken
out between the Taurini (Turin) and the
Insubres (Milan). Hannibal took the part
of the latter, and stormed a stronghold of
the Taurini. From that moment he could

practically command the services of as many

183

1 84

ROME AND CARTHAGE

Gauls as he wanted. But he had now to meet
the Romans for the first time in the field.

P. Cornelius Scipio, one of the Consuls of
the year, had had the province of Spain allotted
to him. His intention had been to dispute the
passage of the Rhone, but Hannibal had moved
with such rapidity that Scipio found himself
anticipated. The Carthaginians were already
across the river when Scipio reached its
mouth, and had secured so long a start that it
was useless to follow him. But the news of
the Carthaginian's arrival in Italy seemed to
demand instant action. He handed his army
over to Cnaeus, his brother and second-in-
command, reserving for himself a few picked
troops only, and sailed for Italy, where he took
over the division under the charge of the
praetor Manlius. He marched as rapidly as
possible to Placentia (Piacenza), where he
crossed the Po, and advanced up the left bank
of the river till he reached the Ticinus ( Ticino),
one of its tributaries. Over this stream he
threw a bridge, which he protected by building
a fort. Hannibal was encamped some ten
miles to the westward, at a spot called Ictumuli,
and had sent out Maharbal in command of
some Numidian cavalry to ravage the country ;
sparing, however, all the territory belonging to

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS 185

the Gallic tribes. Maharbal was recalled when
the advance of the Romans became known,
and Hannibal moved out of his camp, in
personal command of his cavalry. Scipio did
exactly the same. The battle that ensued was
therefore wholly a battle of cavalry. This put
the Romans at a great disadvantage. They
were distinctly inferior in this arm, and the
nature of the country, an expanse of un-
incumbered plain, gave the enemy every
opportunity of making the best of the advan-
tage. Scipio had put some light-armed troops
in the van. They seemed to have been of the
poorest quality, for they fled at the first impact
of the two armies. The regular cavalry of the
Romans showed to better advantage. They
held their own for some time against their
assailants, also a force of regular cavalry. But
they were at a great disadvantage. The
fugitives from the front had thrown their lines
into disorder. These it was impossible to keep
firm when those panic-stricken creatures were
trying to find their way through them. Then
there happened a great misfortune. Scipio was
so seriously wounded that he had to give up the
command. According to the most generally
received account, he was saved from capture
by the valour of his son, then a lad of eighteen.

1 86 ROME AND CARTHAGE

We shall hear of him again, for he became in
later years the great hero of the war, Scipio
Africanus the elder. Some of the Roman
cavalry made a determined stand round their
wounded chief and contrived to carry him off
the field. But the battle was lost. The defeat,
however, was not so complete that the Roman
camp was in any danger. Hannibal, who was
still hampered by his scanty numbers, was
content to rest on the field oi battle. That
night the Romans hurriedly retreated to
Placentia, hoping to find their bridge unbroken.
They had actually reached their destination
before Hannibal became aware of their depar-
ture. He was in time enough, however, to
capture some six hundred stragglers whom
he found lingering on the left bank of the
Po. A great raft had been constructed for
the passage of the river, and they were at
work in loosing it. Hannibal came upon
them while they were so employed. He
captured the men, but the raft, which it would
have been a great advantage to secure, floated
down-stream. Two days were spent in look-
ing for a practicable ford. Before this could
be found the Roman army had recovered its
order and confidence. It suffered, however, a
most damaging blow within the next few days.

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS 187

A body of Gallic auxiliaries, two thousand
infantry, and two hundred cavalry, deserted to
Hannibal, cutting down the sentries at the
camp gate. The Carthaginian general gave
them a hearty welcome, and held out to them
great promises of advancement and reward.
For the present he sent them to their homes.
The best service, in his judgment, that they
could do was to spread abroad the report of his
generosity and of the Roman defeat.

Scipio now moved southward, falling back to
a position near the river Trebia, a tributary of
the Po, which flows into it on its right or
southern bank. Here he fortified a camp, and
sat down to await the arrival of Sempronius,
his colleague in the Consulship, who had been
recalled from his province (Sicily) to take part in
the defence of Italy. He was suffering greatly
from his wound, and was unequal to the active
duties of command, which, however, he was un-
willing to hand over to a substitute. Probably
it would have been unconstitutional to do so,
when the other Consul was within reach. Yet
the praetor Manlius, in whose charge the army
had originally been, was probably in the camp.
Constitutional forms, as we shall see again and
again, weakened the military energies of Rome.
Nothing could be imagined more absurd than

1 88 ROME AND CARTHAGE

that the army should have been entrusted to
generals, changed every year, and elected by
popular vote. To oppose such men to the
unequalled genius of Hannibal was to ensure
defeat. The mere permanence of the Cartha-
ginian command gave him an immense
advantage. But we must never forget the
other side of the case. Without these constitu-
tional forms neither Rome nor Greece (about
which the historian has to say much the same
thing) could have been what they were. We
must expect to find in a nation as in a man the
defects of its great qualities.

Sempronius joined his colleague some time,
it would seem, during the month of November.
He was all for action. "It is intolerable,"
he urged, " that Italy should be invaded and
Rome threatened in this fashion. And what
are we waiting for ? There is no third army
that can join us. Our men will lose all heart if
we let them sit in their camp while the enemy
plunders our friends." All this is natural
enough, especially when we know that the
Romans had very little idea, so far, of what
Hannibal really was. But Livy, doubtless, is
right when he adds that Sempronius had before
his eyes the approaching election of Consuls.
On the i st of January ensuing he would have

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS 189

to go out of office, and yield up his command.
If he was to gain the distinction of a victory he
must strike at once.

He was encouraged by success in an affair in
which he had engaged against the more prudent
counsels of his colleague. He had strongly
urged the duty of defending the friendly Gauls,
had overruled the opposition of Scipio, and had
actually carried off the honours of victory in a
considerable cavalry skirmish.

Hannibal's plan was sufficiently simple. He
was well aware — for what we should now call his
"intelligence department" seems to have been
admirably managed l — of Sempronius's eager-
ness for battle. In the country that lay between
the two camps was a spot which seemed admir-
ably suited for an ambush ; the bed of a stream,
closed in on either side by steep banks, and
enclosing a considerable space of level ground,
thickly covered with bush. Here he put his
brother Mago with a picked force of 2,000
men, composed of equal numbers of cavalry and
infantry. " You have an enemy," he said in
dismissing them, "who is blind to these
stratagems of war." How familiar the words
have been made by recent experiences of our

1 The Gallic auxiliaries in the Roman camp were his
chief sources of information.

190

ROME AND CARTHAGE

own ! These arrangements made, Hannibal
sent his Numidian cavalry at dawn the next
day with instructions to ride up to the Roman
camp, to pour a shower of missiles upon the
sentries, and, if possible, to provoke an engage-
ment. Sempronius was, he knew, eager to
fight. This insulting demonstration would stir
the temper of the men in such a way that they
would obey with enthusiasm a command to
advance. The device was completely successful.
Sempronius led forth his men in hot haste after
the Numidians, who retreated in apparent dis-
order. The Romans, thus hurriedly summoned,
had not had a meal ; their horses had not been
fed ; and they suffered from cold as well as
from hunger. It was a snowy day in November,
and the region, the marshy, low-lying ground
between the Alps and the Apennines, had an
inclement climate. More than this, they had to
cross the river, whose waters, swollen by the
autumn rains, and now breast high, struck a
piercing cold into their limbs. When they
emerged on the other side of the stream they
could scarcely grasp their weapons.

Hannibal's men were in very different case
when they were led forth to encounter the enemy,
warmed by fires in their tents, and strengthened
by a leisurely meal. The order of battle was

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS 191

this. The slingers were in front ; on either
wing the cavalry and the elephants ; in the
centre the heavy-armed infantry. The total
number is given by Polybius at about forty
thousand. Half of these were infantry,
Spaniards, Africans, and Gauls, these last
representing the addition which Hannibal had
been able to make to the army of the Alps.
The cavalry numbered more than ten thousand,
Here also Gauls appear as " Celtic allies." Of
the slingers there were eight thousand. The
Roman force was almost exactly equal, but
differently made up. It had but four thousand
cavalry, as against ten thousand. Of the
infantry, sixteen thousand were Romans, and
twenty thousand auxiliaries.

It was among the light-armed and the cavalry
that the first signs of disorder and weakness
could be seen. They were specially depressed
by suffering and exhaustion. A light-armed
soldier is nothing if he has lost his mobility,
and this is exactly what had happened to the
Romans. They could render little or no help
to the heavy-armed, whose flanks and front
were alike exposed, without any kind of cover-
ing, to hostile attack. The centre, nevertheless,
offered a stout resistance to the enemy. For a
time they held their ground manfully, and in

192 ROME AND CARTHAGE

one direction did more than hold it. A body of
ten thousand men broke through the Cartha-
ginian line, and steadily made their way to
Placentia, where, of course, they were in safety.
Of the rest of the army few survived. Their
line was first broken by the unexpected charge
of the ambushed force. This was actually in
the rear of the Roman infantry, and the attack
which they made from behind on the legions,
occupied as they were with what was going on
in front, was very destructive.

Many, also, were crushed by the elephants,
which gave valuable help to their side, not,
however, without some counterbalancing mis-
chief. The animals, once wounded, became un-
manageable, and were quite as likely to damage
their friends as their foes. This was, indeed,
the last as well as the first occasion on which
Hannibal used them, for the cold was so severe
that all but one perished. We may sum up
what is recorded of the effectiveness of the
elephant in ancient warfare by saying that his
first appearance was terrifying, that experience
greatly lessened the fear with which he was
regarded, as the means of dealing with him
were soon learnt, and that he was always an
incalculable and unreliable force.

The season was now far advanced, consider-

THE AVALANCHE FROM THE ALPS 193

ably beyond the time when it was usual to
suspend military operations for the year.
Hannibal retired into winter quarters, though
his cavalry never ceased to scour and ravage
the country. At Rome there was much alarm,
shown, however, in a resolute attempt to do all
that was possible in the way of preparation for
the future.

H

VI

THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE

THE winter of 218-217 Hannibal spent in
Cisalpine Gaul. Livy tells us that his
position here was uneasy, that the Gauls were
dissatisfied with the state of affairs, that they
had expected the plunder of Italy, but found
themselves burdened by the presence of a
powerful guest, and that, in consequence, more
than one plot was laid for the assassination of
Hannibal. Whatever truth there may be in
this story, it is certain that the Carthaginian
general made good use of his time by recruiting
among the Gauls. As many as sixty thousand
foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen are
said to have joined his standard. Early in the
spring of 217 he crossed the Apennines. The
passage of this mountain range was made with-
out difficulty ; it was when he reached the low-
lying country between the Arno and the Serchio

194

THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE 195

that his troubles began. His troops were
decimated by sickness ; multitudes of the
baggage and cavalry horses perished ; he was
himself attacked by ophthalmia in so severe a
form that he lost the sight of one eye. When
he had extricated himself and his army from
the marshes, he marched on, plundering and
wasting the country as he went.

Of the two Consular armies one was at
Ariminum (Rimini), nominally watching an
enemy who was now busy elsewhere, the other
was at Arretium (Arezzo). It was the latter
that Hannibal designed to engage, his plans
being laid in such a way as to show that his
political sagacity was not less remarkable than
his military genius. The Roman general was
C. Flaminius, a vehement advocate of plebeian
rights. He had denounced the incapacity of the
Senate and of the patrician generals. He had
gained some distinction as a soldier, though,
as a matter of fact, his victories had been won
by the valour of his troops, which had triumphed
in spite of their general's blunders. During his
canvass for the Consulship he had loudly pro-
claimed that, put at the head of the army, he
would speedily make an end of the invader.
Now the time was come for him to make good

196 ROME AND CARTHAGE

his boast. If he had been himself disposed to
hang back, though there is no reason for
supposing that he doubted of the result, he
could not disappoint his friends and followers.
The camp was half filled, we are told, with
adventurers who had thronged to get a share in
the Carthaginian plunder. Hannibal marched
slowly past the Romans, ravaging the country
as he went, and Flaminius, infuriated by the
sight, immediately broke up his camp and
pursued him. The omens were, it was said, of
the gloomiest kind. When the Consul mounted
his horse the animal stumbled and threw him ;
when the standard was to be removed all the
efforts of the officer whose business it was to
take charge of it was unable to stir it from the
ground. Flaminius was wholly unmoved by
these occurrences, and followed Hannibal in
hot haste. The Carthaginian laid a trap for
his antagonist, into which the Roman fell with
an almost ridiculous simplicity. The road
southward led past Lake Trasumennus. Here
it was narrow, the mountains approaching near
to the water-side ; a little further on there was
an open space of some extent ; after this again
the mountains closed in again and made a
narrow defile. These features are not visible
to any one who approaches the place from the

THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE 197

north ; and the Consul seems to have taken no
pains to acquaint himself with the road which
he was following. Hannibal barred the southern
outlet with a strong force of his picked troops ;
his cavalry he put in ambush at the point of
entrance ; the high ground that bordered the
road on the landward side he occupied with his
slingers and light-armed troops. Flaminius
reached the lake at sunset on the day of his
breaking up his camp at Arretium, and bivou-
acked there for the night. Next day, at early
dawn, he moved forward, again without recon-
noitring, and reached the open space described
before. A heavy morning mist hung over the
country, and the Romans saw nothing but the
road on which they were marching. Their first
sight of the enemy was when they reached the
defile where Hannibal himself was in position.
Almost at the same moment the mist rolled
away, and they saw that the mountain-sides on
either hand were alive with enemies, and that
their retreat was barred by the Carthaginian
cavalry. At the same moment they found
themselves attacked, before, says the historian,
they could form their lines, or even draw their
swords.

The result of this surprise was something
like a panic. The march had been conducted

198 ROME AND CARTHAGE

with so much carelessness and disorder that
the legions and even the maniples or companies
were broken up. It was by the merest chance
that a soldier found himself in his proper place,
or ranged with his proper comrades. Some, it
would seem, were actually without arms, for
these were being carried in waggons, and the
waggons could not be found when they were
wanted. The mist, it must be remembered,
though it had cleared away from the higher
ground, still lay thick upon the lower ground,
which was indeed very little raised above the
level of the lake. So it came to pass that, as
Livy puts it, the ear was of more service than
the eye. The men rushed where they heard the
groans of the wounded, the clash of sword upon
armour, the cry of victory or defeat. The
coward, flying in terror, found himself entangled
in the mass of combatants ; the brave man,
eager to take his part in the struggle, might be
irresistibly carried off by a crowd of fugitives.

After a while something of the habitual
Roman courage reasserted itself. Every one
could see for himself that the army was
hemmed in. The mountains were on one
side, the lake on the other ; at either end of
the road the passage was barred by serried
lines of the enemy. If there was to be any

THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE 199

deliverance it must come from their own
strength and valour. Panic was succeeded by
the courage of despair. Nothing could restore
to the army its lost order, but it was at least
determined to sell its existence dearly. And
here, at least, Flaminius did his duty to the
utmost. Incompetent as he was as a general,
he was the bravest of the brave. "It is not
by prayers to heaven," he cried, " that you will
escape. Strength and courage, and these
alone, will save you. The less your fear, the
smaller the danger." The men answered to
their leader's call. So fierce was the fight that
the combatants were wholly unconscious of an
earthquake which, at the very hour when the
battle raged most fiercely, laid more than one
city in ruins, changed the courses of river, and
brought down huge masses of earth and rock
from the mountains to the plains.

It was round the person of the Consul that
the battle raged most fiercely. He was a con-
spicuous figure in the scarlet cloak which
marked the officer in chief command, and in
arms of unusual splendour. And as long as he
was in the front the legions held their own.
For three hours the issue seemed to be in
suspense. But a general who exposes himself
as recklessly as the Consul felt constrained to

200 ROME AND CARTHAGE

do can hardly hope to escape. And there
were some in the hostile ranks who bore him a
special grudge. Five years before Flaminius
had carried on a campaign against the Insu-
brian Gauls,1 and had treated them, it would
seem, with exceptional severity. An Insubrian
trooper now recognised him. " This is the
man," he cried to his comrades, "who
slaughtered our countrymen, and laid waste
our fields. I will offer him a sacrifice to the
spirits of the dead." So saying, he set spurs
to his horse and charged through the Roman
line. The Consul's armour-bearer threw him-
self in the way, and was struck down. The
Consul himself fell mortally wounded. A
fierce struggle took place over his body, but
the Roman veterans succeeded in rescuing it.
But to an army that is fighting at a disadvan-
tage the fall of its leader is often a disabling
blow. So it was at Lake Trasumennus. The
Roman army no longer held its ground.
Frantic attempts were made to fly. Some
tried to climb the mountain-side ; others
endeavoured to escape by wading out into
the lake. Very few succeeded in either
attempt. In the lake, especially, many
perished. Those who attempted to swim
1 Near Mediolanum (Milan).

THE DISASTER AT THE LAKE 201

were drowned sooner or later ; those who
made their way back to the shore were cut
down by the enemy's horsemen, who rode out
in the shallow and were ready to receive them.
Fifteen thousand in all were slain ; ten thousand
contrived to escape. One body of six thousand,
possibly a complete legion, succeeded in forcing
its way through the defile occupied by Hanni-
bal's troops. But its fate was only delayed for
a time. It was without provisions, and without
guides. When, the next day, Maharbal with the
Carthaginian cavalry appeared, it surrendered.
Hannibal's loss was fifteen hundred slain and a
very considerable number of wounded. Livy
gives these figures on the authority of a con-
temporary writer, Fabius Pictor.

VII

THE OVERTHROW AT CANN.E

THE disastrous defeat at Lake Trasu-
mennus was followed by a change of
policy at Rome. Quintus Fabius, who was ap-
pointed dictator, was as cautious as Flaminius
had been rash. His plan was to watch the
enemy, to use all the opportunities which a
knowledge of the country and the friendly feeling
of the population — for Italy remained firmly
faithful to Rome — put in his way. To a certain
extent he was successful. While he was in com-
mand Rome suffered no disasters. But he was,
probably, nothing more than an able soldier.
He had nothing like the genius of Hannibal,
and when he might have struck a really effec-
tive blow at the enemy, he allowed himself to
be outwitted. And the Romans had not yet
thoroughly learnt their lesson. They wearied
of the cautious strategy of Fabius which
avoided defeat but did not save Italy from

THE OVERTHROW AT CANNJE 203

fire and sword. The first result of this revul-
sion of feeling was putting the dictator's
second-in-command — " Master of the Horse
was his official title — on an equality with him.
Minucius — for this was his name — was an
adventurous soldier of the Flaminius type.
He had won some slight successes when
Fabius had been absent on official business
in Rome, and he now hoped to distinguish
himself still more. He took charge of half
the army, and pitched a camp for himself. It
was not long, however, before he was out-
manoeuvred by the enemy, and reduced to
extremities, from which he was saved by the
timely arrival of Fabius. But different views
of these events prevailed at Rome — and we
must remember that we have one side only of
the case. It was affirmed that Minucius had
been purposely deserted, and that his reverse
was due to the intrigues of the aristocrats.
Great popular excitement followed, and the
result was that when the Consuls of the new
year were elected a violent partisan, Terentius
Varro by name, was put in office. Varro,
though he could scarcely have been as incom-
petent as we should suppose from Livy's
account,1 had had no military experience. The
1 He held important commands in subsequent years.

204

ROME AND CARTHAGE

aristocrats succeeded in giving him as a
colleague L. v'Emilius Paullus, a soldier of
some reputation, but unfortunately much dis-
liked by the commons.

Hannibal was now in Apulia, in Southern
Italy, where he probably found the population
more sympathetic than in the north, the
larger Greek element being not yet recon-
ciled to Roman rule. His headquarters were
at Cannae, a town on the right or southern
bank of the Aufidus. The Roman army,
which was under peremptory instructions from
home to fight, had probably followed the Via
Appia as far as Venusia, and had then marched
eastward. A garrison was probably left at
Canusium, a strongly fortified town, about six
miles to the west of Cannae. An hour's march
from Canusium must have brought them within
sight of Hannibal. He was encamped outside
Cannae, the country round him being level and
so well adapted for the operations of cavalry, an
arm in which he was particularly strong. A
difference of opinion now developed itself
between the two Consuls. vEmilius Paullus
was for drawing the enemy into a country less
suited to him ; Varro, on the other hand, was
impatient to fight at once. He ordered an
advance, which resulted in a partial engage-

THE OVERTHROW AT CANNM 205

ment, terminating, on the whole, not unfavour-
ably to the Romans.

The final position taken up by the Consuls
was this. Two-thirds of the army was located
on the north or left bank of the river, the
remainder was left on the south, being very
nearly in touch with the Carthaginian outposts.
It must be remembered that the Aufidus, a
shallow and rapid stream, dwindled in summer
to a very inconsiderable river which might be
forded anywhere without difficulty, at least in
this part of its course. The battle was fought
on August 2nd, according to the Roman
calendar, but as this was very much in advance
of the true time, really in the middle of June,
Paullus was for a policy of inactivity. He
believed that Hannibal would have to shift his
ground for want of supplies, and he hoped that
he might find a favourable opportunity for
delivering an attack. His colleague, however,
had a very different view of the situation.
Naturally rash and eager, he was irritated by
the aggressive movements of the enemy, who
did all that was possible to provoke him. The
Roman troops, too, were eager to fight, and
they soon had their wish.

It was the custom that when the two Consuls
were with the army they should exercise the

206 ROME AND CARTHAGE

command on alternate days. At early dawn on
his day of command Varro gave orders to the
force encamped on the north bank of the
Aufidus to cross the stream. This done he
drew out his whole force in a long line fronting
the south. He had in all about 80,000 infantry
and 6,000 horse. The Roman cavalry he
posted on the right wing along the river bank ;
the right centre consisted of the Roman foot,
which was drawn up in deeper and closer for-
mation than usual ; the left centre and the left
wing were made up of the horse and foot of the
allies. The archers and light-armed generally
were in advance of the main line. Hannibal
posted his Gallic and Spanish cavalry on his
left wing, i.e., opposite the Roman horse, and
his African horse on the right. Next the
mounted troops on either side was a body of
African infantry, equipped with armour and
weapons collected from the spoils of Trebia and
Trasumennus. The centre consisted of Gauls
and Spaniards. Livy speaks of the imposing
effect of their stature, for physically these Celtic
warriors were greatly superior to their Italian
antagonists, and of their general appearance.
The Gauls were naked to the waist, the
Spaniards clad in linen vests, of dazzling
whiteness, edged with purple. In numbers

THE OVERTHROW AT CANNM 207

Hannibal was greatly inferior, having only
40,000 infantry. For this disadvantage he
was partly compensated by the superiority of
his cavalry, both in numbers and efficiency.
Of this arm he had no less than 10,000. Livy
tells us, though Polybius does not mention the
circumstance, that a strong wind from the S.E.,
locally known as the Volturnus, carrying with
it clouds of sand, blew into the faces of the
Romans, and greatly incommoded them.

The battle began, as usual, with some inde-
cisive skirmishing between the light-armed
troops on either side. The Gallic and Spanish
cavalry, on the contrary, soon achieved a very
decided success. There was little room for the
display of tactics or even for a charge. The
combatants came to close quarters, and here
the great personal strength of the Celts gave
them an advantage. They dismounted and
dragged their antagonists from their horses.
A valiant resistance was made ; it was not till
many had been slain in this fierce struggle that
any sought safety in flight.

The legionary infantry did not fail to assert
its superiority in discipline and effective equip-
ment over the Gallic and Spanish foot opposed
to it. The latter fought with conspicuous
courage, but failed to bear up against the

208 ROME AND CARTHAGE

weight and the orderly advance of the heavy-
armed Romans. Had there been a cool-
headed soldier in command at this point the
success of the legions might have been turned
to excellent advantage. Wanting capable
leadership it ended in disaster. The pursuit
was carried far beyond the point at which, in
view of the fact that the cavalry had been
driven off the field, prudence would have
stopped it. The legions, while they followed
the flying Celts, were themselves assailed on
either flank by the African contingents, made
on this occasion more formidable by the fact
that they had a Roman equipment of armour
and weapons. Already disordered by their
hasty advance, they were still further broken
by this attack. But though the line ceased to
exist, many of the companies preserved their
formation, and, for a time, the conflict was
carried on under fairly equal conditions. A
brilliant charge by the Carthaginian cavalry
under Hasdrubal l decided the day. He had
led his Celtic host in the fierce conflict with the
Romans, had afterwards helped the Numidians
to beat the allies, and he now threw himself

1 Not to be identified with any other officer of the same
name, for, strangely enough, he is not mentioned on any
other occasion.

THE OVERTHROW AT CANNM 209

with his victorious squadrons on the rear of the
Roman legions. After this there was but little
more resistance offered, and the battle became
a massacre. Rome never suffered a more
frightful loss than she did on the fatal day of
Cannae. Of the 80,000 men whom she brought
into the field only three or four thousand
escaped. The number of the slain is put by
Polybius at 70,000 ; Livy gives a much smaller
figure (40,000), but Polybius is the most trust-
worthy authority. Many prisoners were taken,
some in the camps which they had been left to
guard, some at Cannae, where they vainly
sought refuge. Only those who had the
wisdom or good fortune to make their way to
Canusium found themselves in safety. Varro,
with some seventy troopers, escaped to Venusia.
/Emilius Paullus died upon the field. Livy tells
a pathetic story of his end, which may well be
true, though Polybius does not mention it.1 It
runs thus : —

One Lentulus, a military tribune, found the
Consul sitting on a stone, covered with blood.

x.His silence is certainly remarkable because he was
certainly acquainted with Paullus' son, and was on terms of
intimate friendship with his grandson. (The younger
Scipio was a son of the iEmilius Paullus who conquered
Macedonia, and was adopted by a son of the elder Scipio.)

15

2io ROME AND CARTHAGE

He offered him his horse. They might both
escape. He was himself un wounded and
could help his chief. " Do not add," he went
on, " to the other disasters of the day the
death of a Consul. There will be tears and
mourning enough without that." Paullus re-
fused the offer. " Do not waste," he said, " in
useless pity your own opportunity of escape.
Go and tell the Senate from me to make Rome
as strong as possible against the arrival of the
victorious enemy. As to me, let me die here
in the midst of my slaughtered soldiers. I do
not wish again to be brought to trial or to
prove my own innocence by accusing my
colleague." Here a crowd of fugitives, fol-
lowed close by the enemy, swept over them.
Lentulus escaped, thanks to the swiftness of
his horse. The Consul, whom the pursuers
did not recognise, was slain.

Paullus, it will have been seen, is represented
as anticipating the immediate advance of
Hannibal against Rome. The question whether
that advance should have been made has, we
might say, been discussed ever since ; Livy
tells us that Hannibal was strongly urged by
his own lieutenants to take this step. Maharbal,
who was one of the ablest among them,
declared that if he would but start at once he

o

THE OVERTHROW AT CANNAE 211

should be feasting in the Capitol in four days'
time ; and when Hannibal refused to follow
his advice, added, " I see that the gods do not
give all things to one man. You know how to
win a victory, but you do not know how to use
it."

It is impossible, of course, to speak with
confidence on such a subject. That Hannibal
was thoroughly competent to judge of the
situation from a soldier's point of view must be
conceded. Nor is it difficult to see that,
victorious as he had been, his available force
must have been greatly reduced. His loss in
killed is said to have been 6,000. The pro-
portion of wounded in ancient warfare was far
smaller than that which prevails under modern
conditions. Still we must make a considerable
addition if we would reckon the total of the
disabled. He had about 55,000 on the
morning of the battle, and could hardly have
been able to put more than 30,000 in the
fighting line at its close. He thought it better,
under the circumstances, to wait for the results
of his victory on those who both within and
without Italy were watching the course of the
war. These were not inconsiderable, but they
were not as decisive as might have been
expected. And Hannibal seems to have con-

212 ROME AND CARTHAGE

tinued to hope for developments which never
occurred. Perhaps we may say that it would
have been wise to have abandoned the Italian
campaign, if, six months after Cannae, he still
felt himself unable to march on Rome. This is
one of the questions upon which the most saga-
cious of men and the ablest of generals may be
mistaken. To abandon Italy would have been
to give up the dream of his life, and to this
Hannibal could not bring himself, even after it
must have become evident to his cooler judg-
ment that Rome was not to be vanquished.

VIII

THE SECRET MARCH

THE result of the victory of Cannae, stated
broadly, was that the southern half of
Italy threw in its lot with Hannibal. The
Samnites, in former days the fiercest and most
dangerous enemies of Rome ; the Campanians,
a warlike race whose name has occurred more
than once in my story, and who possessed in
Capua the second city of Italy ; the Greek
region, far less populous and wealthy than it
had once been, but still formidable, and the
aboriginal mountain tribes of Bruttium declared
against Rome. Northern Italy, however,
remained faithful, and even the disaffected
territories were more or less held in check by
the colonies, Latin as well as Roman, for the
Latins were firm in their allegiance.1 On the

1 A colony, I may remind my readers, was practically a

military outpost. It was inhabited by old soldiers to whom

213

214 ROME AND CARTHAGE

whole the effect of the disaster was not so
absolutely crushing as might have been
expected. Hannibal's most noteworthy gain
during the remainder of the year was the
accession of Capua. Rome had the profound
relief of feeling that the worst was over, and
that she still existed. This relief was expressed
in a truly characteristic way when the Senate
voted thanks to Varro "because he had not
despaired of the Republic." To Varro, indeed,
no thanks were due ; he had done nothing
more than save his own life ; what the reso-
lution really expressed was that Rome had
survived what might well have been an
annihilating blow.

land had been granted. There were two classes of colonies,
Roman and Latin, as there were two kinds of citizenship,
Roman and Latin. Livy has an interesting passage about
the behaviour of the Latin colonies in the year 209.
There were thirty in all. Twelve of these declared them-
selves to be unable to comply with the requisitions for men
and money made upon them. The other eighteen ex-
pressed themselves in an opposite sense, as willing to do
even more than was asked of them. Among these we find
Brundisium, Luceria, Venusium, Paestum, and Beneventum,
all important places in the region generally occupied by
Hannibal. Livy goes so far as to say that it was their
support that was the salvation of Rome. " After all these
years they must not be forgotten or deprived of the praise
which they so well deserved."

THE SECRET MARCH 215

The next two years (215-214) passed with-
out any event of great importance. One
serious danger, indeed, threatened Rome, but
it passed away. At Syracuse, Hiero, who had
been a steady friend for nearly fifty years, had
been succeeded by his grandson, Hieronymus,
a foolish lad, who was under Carthaginian
influence. In Macedonia Philip V. made up
his mind to give active help to Hannibal.
But Hieronymus was assassinated before he
could do anything, and Philip, for reasons
which we do not know, let the opportunity
pass. In 213 Tarentum fell into the hands
of Hannibal, though the citadel was held by
a Roman garrison. In 212 the Carthaginians
won a great victory at Herdonia in Apulia,
wholly destroying a Roman army, and got
possession of some important towns in Southern
Italy. They had also a great success in Spain,
where two Roman armies were defeated with
the loss of their commanders, Cnseus and
Publius Scipio. On the other hand, Rome
recovered Syracuse, which was taken by
Marcellus after a siege of nearly two years'
duration. Hard pressed as she was in other
directions she thus accomplished what Athens
and Carthage, both at the height of their
power, had failed to do. And Capua was

216 ROME AND CARTHAGE

invested ; nor could Hannibal, victorious as
he was in the field, relieve it. Much, it is
evident, turned on the fate of Capua. No
Italian city would venture to take up the
Carthaginian cause if this important place
could not be protected. In 210, accordingly,
Hannibal made a vigorous effort to relieve it.
In the hope of compelling the Consuls to raise
the siege, he threatened Rome itself, and
advanced to within ' three miles of the city.
He even rode up with a body of cavalry to
the walls. But he failed to achieve his pur-
pose. One of the Consuls led his army from
before Capua to the relief of the capital, but
the other still pressed the siege. Hannibal
retreated, and though he turned upon the
Consul, who was following him somewhat
carelessly, and defeated him with very heavy
loss, he could not relieve Capua. This city
capitulated before the end of the year. In
209 Hannibal won another great battle on
the same spot, Herdonia, where he had
triumphed two years before. In the field,
it will be seen, he was always successful, but
he could not be everywhere, nor could he
protect all his Italian allies. In this year
the two important regions of Samnium and
Lucania gave in their submission to Rome,

THE SECRET MARCH 217

which had the wisdom to grant them favour-
able terms. And Tarentum was lost, betrayed
to the Romans, as it had been betrayed a
few years before to Hannibal. The next year
(208) was marked by the death of the consul
Marcellus, and by other Carthaginian successes.
In 207 we came to another great crisis of the
war, the attempt of Hasdrubal to join his
brother, ending in the decisive battle of the
Metaurus.

We last heard of Hasdrubal as defeating
the two Scipios in 212. What hindered him
from following up this success by an immediate
march into Italy it is impossible to say.
Livy's account of the transactions of the next
five years is wholly incredible, and Polybius'
narrative is lost. It is rash to pronounce a
judgment where we know so little of the
facts. Still it is generally true that few
commanders have the same power of per-
spective which Hannibal seems to have
possessed. It is at least possible that Has-
drubal may have overrated the importance of
what he might be able to do in Spain, and
have forgotten that the war had really to be
decided in Italy. It is a fact that he put
off his advance in Italy for four years, and
that when he made it his general prospects

2lS

ROME AND CARTHAGE

had not improved. A very able young com-
mander, afterwards known as Scipio Africanus,
had appeared upon the scene, and had achieved
the great success of capturing New Carthage.
This he followed up in 209 by defeating
Hasdrubal himself. This defeat, however, did
not prevent the Carthaginian general from
carrying out his original plan. Either in this
year or in the next he crossed the Pyrenees.
He spent a considerable time in Gaul, where
he was able to enlist a large number of
recruits, and, after an easy passage of the
Alps, descended into Italy early in the year
207. And here, again, we find him neglecting,
as far as we can see, the main issue, and
wasting strength and time on a quite sub-
ordinate matter. He besieged Placentia, a
strongly fortified colony, and so gave the
Romans time to recover from the surprise of
his unexpectedly early arrival. By the time
he had made up his mind to raise the siege
of Placentia, one of the Consuls, Livius by
name, had advanced to bar his way.

The Roman generals must have been aware
that the main object of Hasdrubal's descent
into Italy was to effect a junction with his
brother. And now, by a lucky chance, they
found out how this was to be done. Has-

THE SECRET MARCH 219

drubal sent a party of six horsemen charged
with a letter to his brother, in which he
announced his arrival in Italy, and suggested
that they should meet in Umbria. These
messengers traversed nearly the whole of Italy
in safety, only to fail at the last. When they were
some thirty or forty miles from Metapontum,
where Hannibal was encamped, they took the
wrong road, and made for Tarentum. They
fell into the hands of a foraging party, and
were brought before the officer who was in
local command. To him they confessed, under
threats of torture, that they carried despatches
to Hannibal. The officer sent them on to
the Consul Nero, who was watching Hannibal.
Nero at once conceived a bold design. The
junction of the two Carthaginian armies must
be prevented at any cost, and the best means
of doing this would be to strengthen the
army of the north, and crush Hasdrubal
before he could unite his forces with his
brother's. But there was no time to be lost.
Nero picked seven thousand men out of his
army, the very best troops that he had, and
hurried northwards. No one knew of his
plan ; even the authorities at Rome were hood-
winked. Nor did he hamper himself with
transport. He would be passing through a

220 ROME AND CARTHAGE

friendly population, and he judged it sufficient
to send messengers before him with directions
that ready-cooked provisions should be brought
down for the use of the army, with such horses
as would suffice to carry what was absolutely
necessary. Everything turned out well. The
soldiers made forced marches of extraordinary
length, and reached their journey's end without
mishap, entering the camp at night, as it was
desirable to keep their coming a secret. This,
however, was not effectually done. Hasdrubal
had at least some suspicion of what had
happened. Riding up to the Roman camp, he
observed some shields of unfamiliar pattern.
Some of the horses were leaner than those he
had seen before, and there were, as he thought,
more of them. Another suspicious circumstance
was one for which he had been on the look-
out. There were, it should be explained, two
Roman camps, one in charge of the Consul
Livius, the other commanded by the praetor
Porcius. In the Consul's camp the signal was
sounded twice, indicating that both consuls
were there. On the other hand there was the
perplexing circumstance that the limits of the
camps had not been extended. If a large
reinforcement had arrived, where could they
have been put away ? Above all, was it

THE SECRET MARCH 221

possible that a general so consummately skilful
as Hannibal had allowed such a manoeuvre
to be made ? Or was it possible that Hannibal
had been destroyed ? The general result of
these questionings was great discouragement.
He declined the battle which the Consuls, who
had made up their minds to fight without delay,
offered him as soon as possible after Nero's
arrival, and in the course of the following
night struck his camp and moved away. It
is not easy to say what was his object in thus
retreating, for a northward movement was a
retreat, the Metaurus river, which he wished
to cross, being some miles to the north of his
camp. Possibly he wished to get to a region
where the population would be friendly. Any-
how, the movement ended in disaster. Two
guides whom he had pressed into his service
contrived to disappear in the night-march, and
the ford of the Metaurus could not be dis-
covered. The army proceeded slowly up the
right bank of the river. It was a fatiguing
march ; many men fell out, and all were wearied
and dispirited. Early in the next day the
Roman army came up, and Hasdrubal saw
that he must fight. He posted his elephants
as usual in front of the centre, with the
Ligurians behind them. On the right were

222 ROME AND CARTHAGE

his Spanish troops, veteran soldiers of his
own, and of the very best quality. These
were under his personal command. The Gauls
were on the left, but seem to have taken but
little part in the battle that followed. The
Spaniards acquitted themselves in a way
worthy of their military reputation, and main-
tained the struggle for some time on equal
terms. The result of the day was in a great
measure decided by a bold movement of Nero.
He judged that he might safely neglect the
Gauls, who were his special antagonists, and
wheeling rapidly from the left, fell upon the
enemy with crushing effect. The elephants
behaved as usual. Formidable at first, they
threw the lines of the enemy into disorder ;
then becoming unmanageable did not less
damage to their friends. Livy says that more
were killed by their drivers than by the enemy.
The battle was long and fierce. So much is
amply testified by the amount of the Roman
loss. No less than eight thousand men were
slain, a very large proportion, it is certain, of
the number engaged. The Carthaginian army,
of course, suffered more. Probably few of the
Spanish troops survived. Some of the Ligurians
escaped, and many of the Gauls. They were
not far from their own country, and the Romans

THE SECRET MARCH 223

were probably too much exhausted to make an
energetic pursuit. " Let some be left alive,"
said the Consul Livius, when he was urged to
follow the Gauls, " to carry home accounts of
the enemy's losses, and of our valour." These
could hardly have been his real reasons. But
the total loss in killed and prisoners is put at
sixty thousand. Hasdrubal fell in the battle.
As long as there was any hope of victory he
had done his best, reforming the line again
and again, encouraging the wearied, and
putting fresh spirit into the discouraged.
When all was lost, he set spurs to his horse
and charged the enemy's line. Seven days
afterwards his head was thrown among the
advanced guards of Hannibal's camp.

IX

HANNIBAL S LAST BATTLE

WHAT Hannibal proposed to himself by
remaining in Italy after the disastrously
decisive day of the Metaurus it is not easy to
say. Perhaps he continued to hope against
hope that the great anti- Roman combination,
for which he had been working for more than
ten years, might yet come into being. To us,
who know what Rome became in after days,
it seems strange indeed that the kingdoms
which she was destined to crush one after
another should not have joined with Carthage
in the attempt to destroy her. If Macedonia,
Syria, and Egypt could have combined while
Hannibal had still a footing in Italy, she could
hardly have survived. But they were too
jealous of each other, or too short-sighted.
Possibly they were unwilling to make Carthage,

which the Greeks had no reason to love, too

224

HANNIBAL'S LAST BATTLE 225

powerful. And what was not clone after
Cannae would hardly be attempted after the
Metaurus. Anyhow, Hannibal remained in
Italy for four years after Hasdrubal's death.
He now held only the extreme south of the
Peninsula, and the limits of the region which
he occupied were slowly contracted by the
loss of town after town. Still he clung to his
position ; he could have gone at any time ; but
he could not bear to give up the dominating
hope of his life, and he lingered on. At last,
late in the year 203, in obedience to an urgent
summons from home, he embarked his army.
No attempt was made to hinder him. The
Romans indeed were unfeignedly glad to see
his departure. They had lost three hundred
thousand men during the fifteen years of his
stay. The huge dragon of his dream had
indeed desolated Italy. It is said that when
he took his last look of the land where he
had met with such successes and such disap-
pointments, he bitterly reproached his country-
men for the grudging support which they had
given him. "It is not the Roman people, so
often routed in the field, it is Hanno " — the
leader of the Peace party in Carthage — "that
has vanquished me." The charge can hardly
have been true ; but it is natural to one who

16

226 ROME AND CARTHAGE

had finally to abandon one of the most
splendid schemes that man ever devised. Livy
adds that Hannibal now bitterly regretted
that he had not led his troops against
Rome immediately after the great victory of
Cannae.

It is needless to dwell on the events that
followed Hannibal's return to Africa. We have
not, indeed, the means of drawing out a quite
clear and consistent narrative of them. The
romantic story in which Syphax, Masinissa,
and Sophonisba (daughter of Hasdrubal, son
of Gisco) play the chief parts, does not belong
to my subject, and I pass on at once to the
battle of Zama.

Hannibal ranged his elephants, as usual, in
front of his line. Immediately behind them
were the mercenaries, a mixed multitude, to
whom Polybius applies the famous verse in
which Homer describes the many-tongued
battle-cry of the Trojans and their allies. Be-
hind these mercenaries were the native Cartha-
ginians, brought once more into the field by the
extremity of their country, and in the rear of
all, as a reserve which in the last resort might
restore the fortunes of the day, the veterans
whom Hannibal had brought with him from
Italy. Scipio departed in one particular from

HANNIBAL'S LAST BATTLE 227

the usual rules of Roman tactics. Usually the
intervals in the front line were filled up in the
second, and the intervals in the second filled
up in the third. On the present occasion the
intervals were continuous, giving a free passage
from the front of the army to the rear. This
was done with a view to lessening the danger
from the elephants. For the same reason the
space between the lines was made greater
than usual. The more space these animals
were allowed in which they might move, the
less likely, Scipio thought, they would be to
trample down the ranks of his men. Laelius with
the Roman cavalry occupied the left wing, with
the native Carthaginian horse opposed to him ;
Masinissa on the right had a body of African
horse fronting men of the same or kindred
nationalities in the service of Carthage. The
elephants were of even less use and did even
more damage to their friends than usual. The
stock of trained animals had been long since
exhausted, and the untaught creatures now
brought into the field were unmanageable. In
this instance they turned against the Cartha-
ginian cavalry, and put them into such dis-
order that Lselius won an easy victory over
them. On the Roman right Masinissa, one
of the best cavalry officers that the world has

228 ROME AND CARTHAGE

ever seen, defeated his antagonists. But in
the centre the victory was less easily won.
The mercenaries were veteran soldiers skilled
in all the arts of war, and they more than held
their own against the Roman infantry, largely
consisting of recruits. If they had been pro-
perly backed up by the Carthaginians behind
them, they might have changed the fortunes of
the day. But the citizen soldiers remained
stolidly in their places. It was only when they
were themselves attacked — the mercenaries, we
are told, enraged at being thus deserted, turned
against them — that they drew their swords.
The line of veterans, under Hannibal's personal
command, made a fierce and obstinate resist-
ance. It was only when they were charged on
both flanks by the victorious cavalry that they
gave way. After this the rout was general.
Twenty thousand men were left dead on, the
field of battle, and as many more were taken
prisoners. Of the conquerors fifteen hundred
fell. It was not a high price to pay for the
victory that, as Polybius puts it, " gave to Rome
the sovereignty of the world." Hannibal
made his way to Adrumetum, and from
thence to Carthage with a body of six thousand
troops.

The terms of peace were unexpectedly

HANNIBAL'S LAST BATTLE 229

lenient. Carthage was to retain its inde-
pendence, and its African possessions. But it
was to pay an annual tribute of two hundred
talents and an indemnity of ten thousand,
and it was to retain only ten ships of war.
Hannibal was so strongly impressed with the
necessity of accepting these terms that he
forcibly pulled back into his seat a senator who
had risen to speak against them.

A few lines may be given to the after history
of this remarkable man, the most formidable
enemy that Rome ever had, equally great as
statesman and as general.

Not long after the conclusion of peace he
left Carthage, avoiding by his voluntary depar-
ture a demand that Rome was preparing to
make for his extradition. He was suspected,
and probably with justice, of still cherishing
hostile designs. He took refuge with Antiochus,
of Syria, surnamed, but not for very convincing
reasons, the Great. Antiochus was flattered
by his presence, but showed a ridiculous
jealousy of his genius. He would not employ
him or even take his advice. A combination
against Rome among the Eastern powers was
still possible, and Hannibal strongly urged that
it should be made, but he urged it in vain. In
192 he was indeed put in command of the

230 ROME AND CARTHAGE

Syrian fleet, largely consisting, it may be pre-
sumed, of Phoenician ships. He was attacked
by a superior force from Rhodes, then the
greatest naval power in the world, and was
defeated. Two years afterwards the great
battle of Magnesia was fought. Whether
Hannibal was present we do not know, but he
was certainly not in command. Possibly an
anecdote that is told of him belongs to this
time. King Antiochus showed him his army,
splendid with gold and silver. " Will not this
be enough for the Romans ? " asked the king.
"Yes, indeed," answered the veteran, "though
they are the greediest people upon earth." But
it was of the value of their spoils, not of the
efficiency of their weapons, that he was think-
ing. The battle ended in the total defeat of
Antiochus and his splendid army. Two years
later he made peace with Rome, one of the
conditions being that he should banish from his
dominions all the enemies of Rome. Hannibal
had anticipated the decree. He visited various
places, and found at last what promised to be
a final refuge with Prusias, King of Bithynia.
But Prusias quarrelled with a neighbour,
Eumenes, King of Pergamum, and Eumenes
was a friend of Rome. Rome sent to Prusias
to demand the person of his guest, and the

HANNIBAL'S LAST BATTLE 231

veteran — he was now in his sixty-fifth year —
took poison. He carried the drug about with
him in a ring, so the story runs, to be used in
such an emergency.

X

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE

FOR fifty years after the conclusion of the
Peace of Hannibal, as the treaty described
in my last chapter came to be called, Carthage
and Rome continued to live on uneasy terms of
mutual suspicion. Rome dreaded the rapid
recovery in power and wealth of her old enemy ;
Carthage feared, and doubtless with more
reason, the inextinguishable hatred of the State
which she had once brought so near to destruc-
tion. The conditions imposed after Zama had
not prevented the accumulation of wealth in
the vanquished city. Her commerce had been
left her untouched ; commerce meant a full
treasury, and it was with her treasury that
Carthage had always made war. There were
two men who had much to do with embittering
this quarrel, though neither of them lived to

see the end which they desired.

232

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE 233

Of one of these two, Masinissa, I have
already had occasion to speak. He was the
son of a Numidian king, and in early life
had been an energetic ally of Carthage. He
served in the Spanish campaigns of Hasdrubal
(brother of Hannibal) with a strong contingent
of Numidian horsemen. Even the defeat of
the Metaurus did not shake his loyalty. In
the following year, however, he began to think
of changing sides, and he finally came to an
agreement with Scipio that he would do his
best to help the Roman cause, when the war
should have been transferred to Africa. He
had strong personal motives for this change.
He had been deprived of the succession to his
father's kingdom by the action of Syphax, a
neighbouring potentate who was in close
alliance with Carthage, and he had also seen
his promised wife, Sophonisba (daughter of
Hasdrubal Gisco), given to the same rival.
Such then were the causes which made him a
prominent actor in the battle of Zama. The
Peace of Hannibal left Masinissa in undis-
puted possession of his hereditary dominions,
increased by the kingdom of Syphax. For the
next fifty years he was perpetually on the watch
to aggrandise himself at the expense of
Carthage. Again and again he seized some

234 ROME AND CARTHAGE

desirable region belonging to that State, was
met with protests which he uniformly dis-
regarded, and was sustained in his usurpation
by Rome, whose commissioners were secretly
instructed, we are told, to favour so useful an
ally. In 150 b.c. these continual feuds ended
in open war. Masinissa, who was still
vigorous and active, though he had reached his
eighty-eighth year, defeated the Carthaginians
in a pitched battle. Two years afterwards he
died.

The other persistent enemy of Carthage was
M. Porcius Cato, commonly known as Cato the
Censor or Cato the Elder. Born in 234 b.c,
Cato was just of an age to serve in the army
when Hannibal invaded Italy. We do not
know whether he was present at any of the
great battles, but he was certainly aide-de-camp
to Fabius at the siege of Tarentum in 209. He
never forgot the scenes which he witnessed
when Hannibal was ravaging Italy ; and when
he had risen to a high place in the State, he
devoted himself to obtaining what he con-
sidered a satisfactory vengeance. He lost no
opportunity of impressing upon his countrymen
his conviction that Carthage should not be
permitted to exist. It is related of him that
whatever the question before the Senate might

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE 235

be, he would add to his opinion,1 "and I also
think that Carthage ought to be blotted out."
He died in 149 B.C., in his eighty-fifth year.
It was in this year that the Third Punic War
commenced. Cato had succeeded, it would
seem, in the great object of his life. Rome
was determined that Carthage should be
blotted out. It is probable, indeed, that other
motives besides the national and political were
at work. The commercial interest was very
powerful in Rome, and to this interest the
destruction of a successful rival, which had long
commanded most of the markets of the Medi-
terranean coast, seemed most desirable.2 Any-
how, the terms proposed when the Carthaginian
envoys were introduced into the Senate at
Rome were such that it was manifest that war
was determined upon. When the first con-
ditions, onerous as they were, were accepted,
then fresh severities were added. The ultima-

1 The presiding magistrate put the question to every
senator in turn.

2 The influence of the commercial party may be seen in
the destruction of Corinth in the same year that saw the
fall of Carthage 3 for the policy followed in the case of
Carthage many reasons could be given, but the destruction
of Corinth was certainly indefensible. No one could
pretend that it would ever be dangerous to Rome. The
act was one of commercial jealousy pure and simple.

236 ROME AND CARTHAG

turn was that the Carthaginians must give up
their city to be destroyed. They would them-
selves be spared, and might retain a portion of
their property, but their new habitation must not
be within ten miles of the sea. This was meant
to be impossible, and it had the effect which
was desired. When the envoys returned and
related the terms which had been finally imposed,
the popular fury burst out. Those who had
been prominent in advising the negotiations for
peace were massacred, and the envoys them-
selves shared their fate. The Senate, in the
face of such a demonstration, could but come to
one decision. It declared war against Carthage.
It is needless to tell in detail the events of the
two first two campaigns. The Romans led, it
would seem, by incompetent generals, were not
so successful as had been expected, and by the
close of the summer of 147 little or no pro-
gress had been made. In fact, the Romans
were rather worse off than when they began.
Their African allies began to doubt whether
they had chosen the right side. Masinissa's
sons in particular were wavering. They hardly
knew, indeed, what to wish. If Carthage were
to fall into the hands of Rome, -their own turn
would soon come. Probably the best thing
that could happen would be to have a feeble

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE 237

Carthage, not able to oppress its neighbours,
but still preserving an independent existence as
a " buffer-state " between themselves and Rome.
Then with the appointment of the younger
Scipio1 to the supreme command of the armies
in Africa a great change came over the scene.
He had been serving as a Military Tribune
(about equivalent in rank to a Brigadier-
General), and had distinguished himself by his
courage and intelligence. When the elections
in Rome came on he went home, nominally to
stand for the ./Edileship, but probably with
higher views. He was thirty-seven years of
age, and so five years under the legal age for
the Consulship. But to the Consulship he
was elected. The presiding officer protested in
vain. The people would have it so, and the
president yielded. And when the ballot for
provinces took place, Scipio's colleague yielded
again, and Africa, to which indeed he seemed
to have an hereditary right, was assigned to
him.

1 The younger Scipio was the grandson by adoption, and
the nephew by marriage, of the Elder Scipio. He was the
son of L. iEmilius Paullus, and was adopted by the Elder
Scipio's son Publius, whose feeble health had prevented
him from taking any part in public life. Publius's mother
was a sister of ^Emilius Paullus, and therefore aunt of the
younger Scipio by blood and grandmother by adoption.

238 ROME AND CARTHAGE

He sailed at once for Carthage, and began
by rescuing one of the generals who were about
to be superseded from a dangerous position
into which his imprudence had led him. Then
he set the affairs of the army in order. The
camp was cleared of a crowd of idlers, soldiers'
servants, sutlers, and dealers. Then active
operations were begun. A suburb of the city,
called Megara, where the wealthier citizens had
their homes, was taken. It was soon relin-
quished, indeed, for it was found too costly to
keep, but this success led to the abandonment
of the camp which had been fortified outside
the walls, and which was the first line of
defence. The city was now almost invested.
On the land side the blockade was complete,
and no more supplies could be introduced ; and
now Scipio began to block up the mouth of the
harbour. But here the besieged foiled him.
They built a fleet of fifty ships, and they dug a
new channel from the inner harbour to the open
sea. The Romans were taken by surprise.
They had no idea that a fleet was being built,
and they saw it for the first time when it issued
from a harbour which was also a new creation.
If the Carthaginians had acted at once, for they
found the Roman fleet wholly unprepared for
action, they might at least postponed the end.

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE 239

But they contented themselves with a demon-
stration. A day or two after there was a drawn
battle between the two fleets, but when the
conflict was renewed on the morrow, the
advantage rested with Rome. But the
resources of the besieged were not exhausted.
An attack was made on the city on the land-
side, and battering-rams were brought up to
the walls. But the besieged made a determined
sally, drove back the assailants, and burnt their
engines. During the winter Scipio busied
himself with cutting off the supplies that the
city still received from the interior. He also
routed an army of native allies which had been
gathered for its relief.

In 146 the siege was pressed with renewed
vigour. The harbour of the warships and
the Lower City were occupied after a feeble
resistance. Then the Upper City was attacked.
The struggle here was long and fierce ; the
houses had to be taken one by one. Each was
obstinately defended, in each many non-com-
batants perished. This was kept on for seven
days and nights. The Romans fought in
relief parties ; but Scipio never rested. He
snatched such food and sleep as chance threw
in his way, and was never absent from his post
of leader. At last nothing but the citadel was

240 ROME AND CARTHAGE

left. A deputation was sent to Scipio offering
to surrender on the single condition that the
lives of the prisoners should be spared. Scipio
granted this prayer, but excepted the deserters.
Fifty thousand men, women, and children
availed themselves of the conqueror's mercy,
and gave themselves up. Only Hasdrubal and
his family, his chief officers, and the deserters
were left. The citadel was impregnable, but
it could be reduced by hunger. Then Has-
drubal contrived to escape from his companions,
and creeping into the presence of Scipio,
begged for his life. This was granted, not
because the suppliant deserved any mercy, but
because he could make himself useful to the con-
queror. A tragic scene followed. Hasdrubal's
wife had observed with disgust her husband's
pusillanimity. Leading her two children by
the hand, she advanced to the front of the wall.
For Scipio she had no reproaches, but on her
husband she invoked every curse that she had
at her command. Then she stabbed her
children, threw them into the flames, for the
deserters, resolved not to fall into Roman
hands, had set fire to the citadel, and followed
them herself. By the express orders of the
Senate, but against the wishes of Scipio, the
whole city was burnt. He is said to have burst

THE BLOTTING OUT OF CARTHAGE 241

into tears as he looked on the conflagration,
after repeating the well-known lines from the
Iliad (vi. 417-8), in which the great champion
of Troy foretells the doom of the city.

" The day wherein Ilium the holy shall perish, will come ;
it is near
Unto Priam withal, and the folk of the king of the ashen
spear."

17

BOOK V

ROME AND THE BARBARIANS.
THE RISE

I. THE DAY OF ALLIA

ONE Roman historian tells us that his
countrymen believed that while their
valour could easily overcome all other dangers,
a contest with the Gauls must be for existence
and not for fame ; another remarks that the
Senate never neglected any tidings that might
reach it of a movement among this people.
For such movements there was a special name,1
and a special reserve of treasure was laid up in
the Capitol to be employed when this particular
danger threatened the State. There were
Gauls, as the classical atlas tells us, on either
side of the Alps. The tribes that dwelt south
of the Alps were unquiet neighbours to the

1 Tumultus.
242

THE DAY OF ALU A 243

Latin nations, but the real danger arose when
a swarm of invaders from beyond the mountains,
moved by the love of adventure, or driven by
famine, descended on the fertile plains of
Northern Italy. The first invasion of which
we have any detailed account took place in
the early part of the fourth century B.C.

The true story of this event has, as usual,
been not a little overgrown with legend. It
was said that the Gauls, under their king
Brennus, were induced to attack the Etrurian
town of Clusium by one of its citizens, who
hoped thus to avenge a private injury in-
flicted by a powerful noble who could not
be reached by the law.1 The inhabitants,
alarmed by the formidable appearance of the
invading host, sent envoys to Rome begging
for help. Livy tells us that there was no
alliance between the two towns. All that the
Clusines could plead was that they had remained
neutral in the long war between Rome and
Veii, an Etrurian town, which it would have
been natural to help. The Romans sent

1 A very similar story is told of the coming of the Moors
into Spain. It is quite possible that in both cases the
invaders may have received help, in the way of guidance or
information, from some one who had an injury to avenge ;
but the national movement itself must have had some
deeper and more powerful cause,

244 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

envoys to the Gauls, three brothers belonging
to the Fabian house (not a very likely thing, one
would imagine), with a message to this effect :
" Clusium is a friendly State ; we must help
it even by force of arms, if that should be
necessary, when it is wantonly attacked. But
we wish to avoid war if it is possible. Let the
Gauls explain what they want." The Gallic
leaders replied that they too preferred to be on
good terms with the Romans, who, from the
fact that their help had thus been asked, were
evidently brave men. What they wanted from
the Clusines was a portion of land. They had
more than they could use, whereas the Gauls
had none. The Roman envoys made an in-
dignant reply. " By what right do you demand
land from its lawful possessors ; what have you
Gauls to do with an Etrurian town ?" " Our
rights," said the Gauls, "is in the point of our
swords ; as for property, all things belong to
the brave." The conference broke up, and
both parties prepared for battle. In the conflict
that ensued the brothers Fabii took a prominent
part. So conspicuous was their valour that it
could not but be noticed both by friend and
foe ; one of them in particular was recognised
as he was stripping the arms from a Gallic
chieftain whom he had slain in single combat.

The day of alliA 245

The Gauls now suspended all hostilities against
Clusium. They were bent on demanding
satisfaction from Rome for this gross offence
against the law of nations. The more
impetuous spirits were for marching against
the offending city, but the older and more
prudent counsellors prevailed when they sug-
gested that envoys should be sent to represent
their wrongs, and to claim redress. The envoys
came, and were heard by the Senate, which
acknowledged the transgression of the Fabii,
but hesitated to accede to the demand that the
guilty should be given up. Unable or unwill-
ing to come to a decision, they referred the
matter to the General Assembly of the People.
Here there was little chance of justice being
done. The proposition that these brave nobles
should be given up was at once scouted. The
Fabii's were not only not punished, but were
actually elected Military Tribunes I for the

1 These officers, "Military Tribunes with Consular power/'
to give their full title, were sometimes elected in place of
the two Consuls. According to Livy this was done nearly
fifty times between the years 445-367 B.C. The arrange-
ment had its origin in the difficulty between the patricians
and the plebeians. The former could not reconcile them-
selves to the ideas of a plebeian consul. After the recon-
ciliation of the two orders by the compromise known as the
Licinian Rogations, it was not done again.

246 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

ensuing year. No one thought of the step
usually taken in an emergency, the appoint-
ment of the ablest soldier available as
dictator. Even the ordinary preparations
for meeting a formidable enemy were
neglected.

Meanwhile the Gauls were advancing on
Rome, thinking of nothing but vengeance on
this insolent city. The appearance of their
host terrified the inhabitants of the country
through which they passed, but they did not
turn aside to attack or plunder any of the
towns on their route. They gave it to be
understood that all their quarrel was with
Rome.

Roused at length to a sense of their danger
by the frequent messengers who came hurrying
in from the north the Romans hastily got
together such troops as they could find, and
marched out to meet the enemy, who had now
advanced as far as the river Allia, little more
than eleven miles from the city. Livy tells us
that the generals formed no camp, constructed
no rampart to protect them in case of a reverse,
and offered no sacrifice. The battle-line had
to be widely extended if they were to be pro-
tected against a flanking movement ; but this
could not be done without perilously weakening

THE DAY OF ALU A 2tf

the centre. It mattered, however, little or
nothing what arrangements were or were not
made. There was nothing like a battle ; only
a blind* panic and headlong flight. " No
lives," says Livy, "were lost in battle." But
thousands were cut down in the pursuit, while
the fugitives, so densely packed was the
throng, hindered each other from escaping ;
many perished on the Tiber bank, where they
stood helpless, the enemy behind, the im-
passable stream in front ; not a few were
drowned, some who, unable to swim, yet threw
themselves into the stream, in the wild hope
of somehow struggling through, or, being
swimmers, were weighed down by their heavy
armour. Of those who escaped the greater
part made their way to Veii. These neglected
to send any tidings of their safety to Rome.
Those who reached Rome did not even stop to
shut the gates of the city, but hurried to take
possession of the Capitol.

All this sounds very romantic, not to say
improbable. It is strange to find these
barbarous Gauls so strict in demanding an
observance of international laws. And then
the battle — there was, indeed, nothing Roman
about it. Where were the three Fabii, all
in high command, whose valour had been so

248 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

conspicuous at Clusium, but on the Allia are
unable either to rally their soldiers or to strike
a blow for themselves ? And the sacrifices —
is it credible that so regular a custom, observed
almost mechanically, was for this one occasion
omitted ? And the behaviour of the fugitives
— what could be more unlikely? If they were
in too great a hurry to shut the city gates,
were there no old men or boys to do it ? Livy
manifestly piles up every possible neglect or
misdoing to heighten the dramatic contrast
between reckless pride and humiliating defeat.
But that a great disaster occurred at the Allia,
it is impossible to doubt. Allia was, indeed,
as Virgil calls it, infaustum nomen, an ill-starred
name. For centuries afterwards its anni-
versary, the 15th of July, Dies Alliensis, was
marked as one on which no public business
could be transacted. When Tacitus wishes to
describe the height of reckless impiety in
Vitellius, one of the short-lived Emperors who
succeeded one another after the fall of the
Julian Caesars, he says that he was so regard-
less of all law, human or divine, that he
actually published an edict on the fatal Day of
Allia.

The story goes on in the same romantic
style. But a sudden change comes over the

THE DAY OF ALU A 249

whole temper of the nation, from the highest
to the lowest. Impiety, recklessness, and
cowardice give place to reverence, prudence,
and constancy. The Capitol, the last hope of
Rome, is to be held by its picked warriors.
No one is to consume its scanty stores who
cannot contribute his full share to its defence.
The populace obey without a murmur, and
flock out of the city, seeking a refuge where
they may, or remain to await their doom.
The old nobles who have borne high office,
consuls, praetors, and senators, will not leave
the city but will abide, each in his robes of
office and chair of state, the coming of the foe ;
the holy things from temple and shrine are
either buried or conveyed to some place of
safety. Now all is dignity as before all was
disgrace.

The story goes on in the same romantic
style — the venerable old men, treated at first
with reverence, are slaughtered when one of
them resents with a blow of his ivory sceptre
a barbarian's too familiar touch. The Capitol
is closely invested, resolutely defended, but
almost lost by the carelessness of the sentries.
The besiegfers had either observed the track of
one of the messengers who had carried some
communication from the garrison to the outer

250 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

world, or had discovered the place where the
ascent was not too difficult to attempt. They
make the venture one moonlight night — one
would think that the moonlight would be more
of a hindrance than a help — and almost suc-
ceed. The watch has neglected its duty ; the
very dogs are asleep. But Roman piety saves
the last refuge of Rome. There was a flock
of sacred geese in the temple of Juno, and
these had been not only spared but fed, hard
pressed as the garrison had been for food.
And now they give warning of the enemy's
approach. Manlius, one of the most dis-
tinguished veterans in the garrison, for he had
been Consul, is roused by their clamour, hurries
to the edge of the height, hurls one man down
by driving his shield into his face, slays others,
and gives the garrison time to assemble.

But though the Capitol is not to be taken by
force, it cannot stand out against hunger.
Negotiations are opened, for the Gauls have
somehow given it to be understood that they
are ready to depart if a sufficient price can be
paid. A thousand pounds weight of gold is
agreed upon for the ransom. As the weighing
is going on one of the Romans complains that
the weights are unfair. Thereupon the in-
solent Gaul throws his sword into the scale,

THE DAY OF ALU A 251

uttering words that were beyond all bearing
to a Roman ear, "Woe to the vanquished!"

But the gods will not allow the most pious
of nations to suffer this last humiliation.
Before the price can be handed over to these
insulting barbarians, the greatest of Roman
soldiers appears upon the scene, orders scales
and gold to be removed, bids the Gauls
prepare for conflict, and defeats them, first in
the Forum itself, and afterwards at the eighth
milestone from Rome, as completely as they
had themselves routed the Romans at Allia.

We need not endeavour to disentangle the
true from the false in this story. That Roman
pride covered a humiliating fall is plain enough,
and we may well doubt the too opportune
arrival of the victorious Camillus. But it is
certainly true that Rome recovered with
amazing rapidity from what might well have
been an overwhelming blow. In the first three
centuries and a half of her existence Rome has
made so little progress that she has still a rival
city not more than ten miles from her gates.
She is reduced to her last stronghold, and has
to ransom even that. Nevertheless in the
course of another century and a half she is in
undisputed possession of the whole of Italy.
It has been suggested, not without proba-

252 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

bility, that the other Italian peoples suffered
even more from this barbarian deluge, and that
the Roman arms when once the acute crisis
had passed encountered a less formidable
resistance.

II

APOLLO THE DEFENDER

WE need not follow the story of Rome
and the Gauls through its details.
Time after time we find them leagued with the
nations of Italy, when these were at war with
the great power which was slowly compelling
them either to subjection or to alliance. We
find them, for instance, fighting side by side
with the Samnites at Sentinum (295 B.C.), and
with the Etrurians at the Vadimonian Lake
(283 B.C.). But they made no really formidable
attack on Rome for a long period after 390.
The early part of the third century b.c. was a
period of great unrest among the tribes on
both sides of the Alps. In 279 this culminated
in an invasion of Southern Europe so formidable
that though Rome was not immediately con-
cerned with it, some account of it must be
given.

According to the narrative of Pausanias,
who introduces the story as a digression in

253

254 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

his description of Delphi, the Gauls invaded
Greece under the leadership of a certain
Brennus, the same name, it will be observed,
as that borne by the conqueror of Rome (the
word Brennus has been said to mean "king" ;
but Celtic scholars are not agreed upon the
point). His forces are said to have amounted
to 150,000 infantry, a figure on which the
authorities are fairly unanimous, and cavalry
variously estimated at from 60,000 to io.ooo.1
The Greeks, though in a very depressed con-
dition, roused themselves to resist. It was not
a choice, as it had been two centuries before,
between freedom and servitude ; it was a
question of life or death. The barbarians
spared no one, and if they could not be
checked in their advance, Greece would be
turned into a desert. The stand was to be
made, as of old, at Thermopylae. The com-
parison between the forces led by Leonidas
and those now assembled is interesting. The
most numerous contingent was from a nation
which scarcely appears in the history of Greece
at its best days, the ^tolians. " Very

1 Pausanias says that every trooper had two mounted
attendants, themselves practised warriors and ready to
supply him with a fresh horse, or even to take his place in
the ranks. They must have had therefore much mobility,
a phrase with which we have lately become very familiar.

APOLLO THE DEFENDER 255

numerous and including every arm," says
Pausanias. Their heavy-armed infantry num-
bered 9,000. The other figures he does not
give, or they have disappeared from his text.
The whole force may have amounted to
between thirty and forty thousand.

A battle that was fought in the Pass ended
greatly to the advantage of the Greeks. The
Gauls with their long and unwieldy swords
and cumbrous shields were no match for their
antagonists, though they fought with desperate
valour. Their cavalry, the strongest arm they
possessed, could not act on account of the
nature of the ground. The result was that
they were driven back with very heavy loss,
while the Greeks had but forty killed.

Brennus, who seems to have had some
military ability, seems to have become aware
that the yfLtolians made up the most numerous
and effective part of the Greek army. He
conceived the idea of detaching them by
sending a force under his second-in-command
to ravage ^Etolia. The stratagem succeeded.
The ./Etolians, on hearing of the movement,
hastened to march to the defence of their
country. They were too late to save two of
their frontier towns, which were stormed and
sacked in the most brutal manner. But they

256 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

were in time to exact a heavy vengeance from
the barbarians. Of the fifty thousand who
had been detached on this expedition, less
than half returned to the camp at Thermopylae.

The incidents that followed bear a curious
resemblance to the history of the first defence
of Thermopylae. The path by which the
Persians, through the treachery of Ephialtes,
were able to take the defenders of the pass
in the rear was again used for the same
purpose. The Phocian pickets were surprised
as before, being hindered by the mist from
seeing the Gauls till these were close upon
them. But there was no obstinate deter-
mination among the Greeks to die upon
the ground. They were carried off by the
Athenian fleet, which from the first had been
in attendance, keeping as close as possible to
the shore.

The object which now roused the cupidity
of the barbarians was the shrine of Delphi
with its treasury, still rich in the offerings of
many generations of worshippers and inquirers,
though it had not altogether escaped the hand
of the spoiler.1 As in the Persian war,

1 The treasury was robbed by the Phocians in 346, in
what was called the Second Sacred War. The Phocians
were condemned to make restitution by paying a fine of

APOLLO THE DEFENDER 257

the terrified inhabitants inquired of the god
whether they should remove or conceal the
sacred treasure. Again, as before, the answer
was that the god would take care of his own.
" I will provide, and with me the Maidens
veiled in white," were the words of the oracle.
The greater part of the army mustered at
Thermopylae had gone home ; but there were
some thousands who remained to protect
Delphi. The god did not disdain to use their
services, though the most effective protection
came — so runs the story — from his own inter-
ference. The ground on which the Gauls had
pitched their camp was shaken throughout the
day by repeated shocks of earthquake, while
overhead the thunder rolled and the lightning
flashed incessantly. Through the darkened
atmosphere might be seen the flashing arms
of warriors who were more than mortal — one
of them, it was said, the hero Pyrrhus, son
of Achilles, who had met his death at Delphi
many centuries before, and had ever since
been worshipped as a local hero. That day,

10,000 talents (^2, 500,000), but it is certain that they were
never able to pay this amount. We may be sure, on the
other hand, that many offerings had been made in the
intervening time, and that as the treasury had remained
intact for twenty years, it probably contained considerable
wealth.

18

258 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

however, the Gauls held their own ; many of
the Phocians, in particular, were slain. But
the night that followed was one of terrible
suffering. A sharp frost set in, and following
the frost came a heavy fall of snow. The
snow symbolised "the maidens vested in
white " — such, at least, was the rationalistic
explanation given in after years. Nor was
this all : great masses of stone from Parnassus,
and rolling into the camp of the barbarians
crushed as many as twenty or thirty by a
single blow. The next day the Greek garrison
at Delphi advanced against the invaders, the
main body making a front attack, the Phocians,
who were well acquainted with the country,
assailing the rear. The Gauls did not lack
in courage or firmness. Suffering though they
did intensely from the cold, they made a
resolute stand, and did not retreat till their
leader was severely wounded and carried
fainting off the field. Again the night was
more fatal than the day. After dark a panic
fear fell upon the camp. The barbarians
seemed to see and hear enemies everywhere,
and turned their arms upon each other. After
this their destruction was certain. To a host
without discipline a retreat is fatal. The Gauls
were without stores, for they reckoned to be

APOLLO THE DEFENDER 259

supported by the countries through which they
passed. But now the victorious enemy hung
upon their rear, and cut off any stragglers that
ventured to leave the main army. Famine
and the incessant attacks of the pursuers
reduced their numbers till there was but a
scanty remnant of the great host that a few
weeks before had descended on Northern
Greece. Brennus, it is said, poisoned himself,
unable to face his people at home after so
disastrous a campaign.

Pausanias tells us that not one of the in-
vading Gauls quitted Greece alive. It is
hardly probable that this is true ; and other
writers gave a different account. What is
certain is that one great division of the swarm
that had descended from Northern into Southern
Europe met with a very different fortune from
that which overtook Brennus. This took a
more easterly route, and plundering and de-
stroying as it went reached the shores of the
Hellespont. (This seems to have happened
in 278 B.C., the year after that in which Delphi
had been attacked.) The Gauls cast covetous
glances on the rich territories of Asia, now
separated from them by only a narrow stretch
of water, and in one or another contrived
to reach them. One division seized a few

260 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

small vessels and boats, and, as no sort of
opposition was attempted, ferried themselves
across ; the other was actually transported by
an Asiatic Greek prince, who was contending
with his brother for the kingdom of Bithynia.
They secured the victory for him, but Bithynia,
and indeed the whole of Western Asia Minor,
paid a heavy price for their help. Their
history during the next few years is very
obscure, but we may gather that they roamed
from province to province, laying waste all the
countries which they traversed. The unwar-
like inhabitants of Asia Minor were quite
powerless to check them. After some twelve
years Antiochus, King of Syria, son of one
of the great generals trained by Alexander,
undertook the task, and accomplished it with
such success that he earned the surname of
Soter, "the Saviour." He could not indeed
expel them ; in fact, so far was their power
from being broken that in 261 Antiochus lost
his life in a battle with them. But the general
result of the war was that the invaders were
glad to settle down in a definite region which
was ceded to them, and which was known by
the name of Galatia, or Gallo-paecia. The
Galatians afterwards played an important part
in history. But with this we are not now
concerned.

II.

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH

FOR a century and a half after the events
recorded in my last chapter, no important
southward movement of the northern nations
took place. The destruction of one great host
of Gaul and the permanent settlement of
another in Western Asia must have diminished
the population of the region beyond the Alps,
and lightened the pressure on the means of
living. Rome was not called upon to meet
any powerful army of invaders ; a fortunate
circumstance, when we consider the exhaustion
that must have followed the terrible struggle
of the Second Punic War. After the wars
of the first half of the second century B.C.,
which practically reduced the successors of
Alexander to insignificance, Rome even began
to advance her frontiers northward.

Curiously enough these successes had the
effect of bringing down on the Republic a

262 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

more formidable attack, the invasion led by
Brennus not excepted, than she ever had had
to meet before. For some years previous to
the year 113 B.C., a homeless people called
Cimbri, a word variously translated by friends
and enemies as "champions" or "robbers,"
had been wandering about in the regions
north of the Danube. The word suggests the
well-known name of Cymri, but the resem-
blance of sound is deceptive. The Cimbri
were really of the Germanic stock. In fact a
remnant of the tribe preserved the name for
many years afterwards in what seems to have
been its original habitation, the peninsula of
Denmark. What cause drove them southward
cannot be stated with certainty. An ancient
writer records one account that had come to
his ears, that large tracts of land occupied by
the tribe on the shores of the Baltic had
been overflowed by the sea, and that its in-
habitants were compelled to migrate or to
starve. The story seemed incredible to the
writer who preserved it. To us, who can
easily find a parallel in the history of the
great migrations of mankind, it appears not
improbable. And this, in the absence of
evidence, which indeed is not likely to be
forthcoming, is all that we can say. For

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 263

some time the Celtic tribes that occupied the
banks of the Danube had kept the Cimbri
from reaching that river. But when the Celts
had been seriously weakened by the armies
of Rome, they were no longer able, or, it may
be, no longer willing to continue this resis-
tance. It is quite likely indeed that they
welcomed as allies the people which they had
been accustomed to regard as enemies. One
thing is certain, that either then, or during
their previous wanderings, the Cimbri had
added to their hosts many Celtic comrades.
The Celts were better armed, more advanced
in the military art, and — a most important
consideration — more familiar with the Roman
methods of warfare. Hence we are not
surprised to find among the leaders of the
invading host, Germanic as it was in the
main, some unquestionably Celtic names.

The movement was on a scale and of a kind
new to Roman experience. It was no expedi-
tion of warriors. The whole nation had come.
The Cimbri had a vast array of waggons with
them, containing their wives, their children, and
all that belonged to them. There was a curious
resemblance between them — something of the
same kind may be seen to-day in a shipload of
Scandinavian emigrants — for all were huge of

264 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

stature, the women falling little short of the
men, and all fair-haired. For weapons they
had a javelin and a long sword ; every man
carried a long narrow shield, and the chiefs
among them were also protected by coats of
mail.

The first relation between the Romans and
the Cimbri was not other than friendly.
Papirius Carbo, the Consul in command of the
Roman army, required them to abstain from
interfering with the Taurisci, a Celtic tribe
inhabiting the northern bank of the Danube, on
the ground of being in alliance with Rome.
The Cimbri did not refuse obedience. Then
Carbo was guilty of a shameful act of treachery,
which, as we shall see, met with its due reward.
He offered the strangers guides, who were to
lead them to a region which they might occupy
without hindrance. These guides had in fact
instructions to lead the Cimbri into an ambush
which had been carefully prepared for them.
The plot succeeded in a way, but the result was
very different from what Carbo had expected.
The Cimbri turned upon their betrayers, in-
flicted upon them a heavy loss, and, but for the
opportune breaking of a great storm over the
battlefield, would have entirely destroyed them.

The conquerors did not move southwards, as

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 265

might have been expected, but marching west
through Northern Switzerland and South-eastern
Gaul, remained quiet for a while. They were,
however, still in need of land which they could
call their own, and they asked the help of the
Roman general who was in command at the
frontier to help them in obtaining it. His own
reply was to attack them, with no better result
than a terrible slaughter among his troops and
the loss of his camp. The Cimbri sent an
embassy to Rome, repeating the request that
they made to the Consul, and while they waited
for the reply employed themselves in subju-
gating their Celtic neighbours.

Eight years had now passed since the defeat
of Carbo, and the unexpected reprieve which
Rome had enjoyed was at an end. The
Cimbri, disappointed at receiving no reply to
their demands from Rome, and recognising that
it would be more profitable to invade Italy than
to fight for less desirable regions in Gaul,
marched to the Rhone under the command of
their king Boiorix. The Romans had no less
than three armies on the spot. The weakest
of the three, commanded by the ex-Consul
yEmilius Scaurus, was the first to be attacked.
It was routed, and its commander taken
prisoner. Brought before King Boiorix,

266 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Scaurus warned the invader not to venture on
invading Italy, and was put to death for what
was judged to be presumption. The two
remaining armies were concentrated at Arausio,
on the left bank of the Rhone. Unhappily the
two officers in command were enemies. They
would not occupy a common camp, nor would
they deliberate on the plan of campaign that
was to be followed. The result was a frightful
disaster. It is possible that a conflict might
have been avoided altogether. Even after the
defeat of Scaurus the two consular armies pre-
sented so formidable an appearance that Boiorix
expressed himself willing to treat. Negotiations
were actually in progress when Caepio, an ex-
Consul, who was inferior in rank to the Consul
Maximus, committed an act of surprising folly.
Fearing that his colleague might gain all the
credit if the negotiations with the Cimbri were
successful, he attacked the enemy with the force
under his immediate command. The battle of
Arausio, fought on October 6, 105, was not less
fatal than Allia and Cannae, followed as it was
by the defeat of the other army. Eighty thou-
sand soldiers are said to have been slain on the
field, or to have perished in the retreat.

At Rome the result was something like a
revolution. The political history of the time is

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 267

outside my province. It will be enough, there-
fore, to say that the most renowned general
of the time, C. Marius, was put in supreme
command. He was made Consul, in spite of
the law that forbade especial election to this
office, and he was continued in command for
five years in succession.

The Cimbri had not actually carried out their
intention of invading Italy. They had turned
aside to plunder South-western Gaul, and even
to cross the Pyrenees into Spain. Marius made
use of the delay, which it is scarcely too much
to say was the salvation of Rome, to strengthen
the defences of Northern Italy, to recall the
wavering tribes of Cisalpine Gaul to their
allegiances, and to find auxiliaries among the
peoples which had as much reason as had Rome
herself to dread the success of the Cimbri.

This people had now received considerable
reinforcements. They had been joined by some
Helvetian tribes, and by the Teutones, old
neighbours in Northern Europe, and now, by a
curious chance, associated with them in their
invasion of the south. The first intention of
the allies was to force their way into Italy in
one vast army. This was given up, probably
on account of the mechanical difficulty connected
with transport. It was finally arranged that

268 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

the Teutones, with the Helvetian tribe of the
Amburones and a Cimbrian contingent, were to
invade Italy by the western passes of the Alps,
and that the Cimbri, also reinforced by some
Helvetians, should try the passes to the east.
It is with the former of these two divisions that
I am first concerned.

Marius had taken up his position in a strongly
fortified camp at the junction of the Rhone
and the I sere. Here he resolutely refused to
risk the chances of a battle. It was no ques-
tion, he represented to the impatient spirits
in his army, of victories and of triumphs, but
of the safety of Rome, which would be lost
if her last army were defeated. To the soldiers,
who were not less impatient, he used different
arguments, appealing, for instance, to their
superstition. He affirmed that he was in
possession of oracles which promised Rome
a decisive victory, which was to be won, how-
ever, at a certain place and time. There was
a prophetess in his camp, a Syrian, very possibly
a Jewess by birth, whom he professed to consult,
and who, we may reasonably suppose, accom-
modated her answers to his ideas of the military
necessities of the time. The barbarians were
encouraged by the inaction of the Romans to
make an attack on the camp. They were

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 269

easily repulsed, and speedily abandoned the
attempt, marching forward as if the Roman
force might safely be neglected. For six days,
so vast was their array of fighting-men and
baggage, they filed past the camp, uttering
insulting cries as they went. When they had
passed, Marius broke up his camp and followed
them. He never relaxed, however, his pre-
cautions. He chose every night a strong
position for his camp, and fortified it to resist
an attack. At Aquae Sextise (Aix) l he deter-
mined to bring the enemy to an engagement.

The story ran that he deliberately chose a
position for his camp where the supply of water
was short, and that when the soldiers complained
he pointed to the river that ran close to the
position of the barbarians, saying, " There is
drink, but you must buy it with blood." " Let
us go then," cried the soldiers, " while our blood
still flows in our veins." Marius insisted upon
their first fortifying the camp. The legion was
too well disciplined not to obey him, but there
were others less amenable to discipline, and a
collision with the enemy took place before the
day was out. The camp followers, who had no
water for their beasts, or even for themselves,

1 About 15 miles to the north of Marseilles. It must be
distinguished, of course, from Aix-les-Bains.

270 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

flocked down to the river, having armed them-
selves as well as they could. Here they came
into collision with the Amburones, who, taken
at first by surprise, soon recovered their courage,
and raising their warcry with what is described
as a terrific volume of sound, advanced to repel
the new-comers. The light-armed Ligurians
on the Roman side came to the help of their
comrades, and these again were supported by
some of the regular troops. The affair was a
skirmish on a very large scale rather than a
battle. The Romans had much the best of it,
but they were far from feeling the security of
conquerors. They spent the night under arms,
expecting from hour to hour an assault upon
their camp.

The barbarians, however, were less confident
than Marius supposed. For two days they
remained inactive, and even then it was not
they who challenged the conflict. Marius,
who had great gifts as a general, had observed
a convenient place in the rear of the enemy's
position where an ambush might be con-
veniently laid. Here he posted three thousand
men under the command of Marcellus. In the
battle that followed the unexpected onslaught
of this force on the barbarian rear did much to
decide the issue of the day. Attacked both in

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 271

front and in rear the Teutones gave way. To
give way under such circumstances meant utter
destruction. What the numbers of the slain
and the captured may have been it is impossible
to say. Levy says that 200,000 were slain,
180,000 taken prisoners. Other authorities
reduce the number of the slain by a half.
One thing, however, is certain, that the
Teutones ceased to exist. Those who did not
fall on the field or in the rout put an end to
their own lives. The women also killed them-
selves rather than fall into the hands of the
enemy. It is curious that the name of the
tribe was preserved by the remnant left behind
in its original seat when the great host
migrated southward, and that it is now used
to designate one of the great families of the
human race. Marius was just about to set fire
to a huge pile of the spoils of the dead when
messengers from Rome reached the field,
announcing that he had been elected for the
fifth time to the Consulship.

But Rome was not yet out of danger, for the
Cimbri were yet to be accounted for. They
had forced their way into Italy, Lutatius
Catulus, the colleague of Marius in the Consul-
ship, finding himself unable to stop them. His
original intention had been to defend the passes

272 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

of the Tyrol, but he relinquished the idea and
took up a strong position on the Athesis
(Adige). Even here he did not feel safe. His
troops indeed were so terrified by the report of
the barbarians' advance that they refused to
remain, and Catulus, making a merit of neces-
sity, putting himself at their head, retreated to
the southern side of the Po, leaving the richest
plains of Northern Italy to the mercy of the foe.
When news of the threatening position of
affairs reached Rome Marius was summoned to
the capital to advise on the course to be pur-
sued. As soon as he arrived the people, with
whom he was in the very highest favour,
offered him a triumph for his victory over the
Teutones. He refused to accept the honour
so long as the Cimbri remained on Roman
soil. He at once went northwards, and sum-
moning to him the Uite of his legions, marched
to reinforce Catulus. He effected a junction
with this general near Vercellae ( Vercelli). The
Cimbri had not heard, it seems, of the disaster
which had overtaken the Teutones, and put oft
fighting in the hope of being joined by them.
They even sent envoys to the Roman generals,
demanding an allotment of land for themselves
and their kinsmen. " We have given your
kinsmen their portion, and they are not likely

THE SWARM FROM THE NORTH 273

to be disturbed in it," replied Marius with grim
humour. " You shall pay dearly for your jest,"
they replied and prepared to depart. " Nay,"
said the Roman, " you must not depart without
saluting your relatives," and he ordered the
captive kings of the Teutones who had been
captured in an attempt to cross the Alps to be
produced. After this nothing remained but to
fight with as little delay as possible.

The combined forces of the Romans
numbered between 50,000 and 60,000. We
have no trustworthy account of the battle
which followed, Plutarch's narrative being
borrowed, it would seem, from writers not
favourable to Marius, from Catulus himself,
who left a history of his campaign, and from
the notebook of Sylla, who was serving with
Catulus. His story is that Marius missed his
way in a dust-storm that suddenly swept over
the plain, and that he wandered about vainly
seeking the enemy till the battle had been
practically decided by the courage of the troops
commanded by Catulus and his lieutenant,
Sulla. It is eertain, however, that at Rome
the credit of the victory was, in the main,
assigned to Marius. About one part of the
battle there is, however, no doubt. Never has
there been seen a more tragic spectacle. The

19

274 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

scene that closed the day at Aquce Sextice was
repeated on a larger scale and with added
horrors at the Campi Rauciii. 1 The Cimbrian
women stood on the waggons robed in black.
They slaughtered the fugitives when these
sought temporary shelter behind the barricade,
sparing neither father, brother, or husband.
Then they slaughtered their children, and
finally put an end to their own lives. As many
as sixty thousand prisoners, however, were
taken, while the number that fell on the field of
battle is said to have been twice as great. The
Cimbri perished as utterly as the Teutones.

The triumph which Marius and his colleague
celebrated on their return to Rome was indeed
well deserved if we consider the consequences
of the victory which it was given to reward.
For more than two centuries Rome was not
again called upon to fight for her life against
barbarian foes. Her armies met indeed more
than once with serious disasters, but these
defeats were incurred in campaigns of aggres-
sion. And if, as might easily happen, her
frontiers were sometimes crossed, it was a mere
matter of hordes of casual plunderers, whose
movements did not really affect the general
course of events.

1 The spot cannot be identified, but it must have been
near Vercellse.

IV

BEYOND THE PYRENEES

\ \ TE have seen how Carthage, expelled
V V from the islands that belonged to Italy,
found compensation in Spain. When the issue
of the Second Punic War was decided against
her, and her domains were limited to Africa,
Spain passed into Roman hands. Much of the
country, however, had never acknowledged the
rule of either power, and it required two
centuries of effort before it became what it was
for the first three centuries of our era, the most
completely Latinized of all the Roman pro-
vinces.

The Carthaginians were finally driven from
Spain in 206. We may pass quickly over the
next fifty years. By degrees the Roman power
advanced till the whole peninsula, some moun-
tainous regions in the north and centre excepted,
became subject to it. Rebellions were fre-

275

276 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

quent, for the Roman system was to change
the provincial governors almost from year to
year, and some of these officials were cruel and
extortionate. As I am not writing a history
either of Rome or of Spain, I must limit my-
self to the most important and representative
persons and events.

Viriathus was a native of Lusitania, a region
nearly corresponding to what is now called
Portugal. His hatred of the Romans came
from a shameful act of treachery from which
his countrymen suffered at the hands of one of
the Roman generals. This man had expressed
his pity for the poverty of their country, which
drove them, he said, into robbing their neigh-
bours. He would give them, if they would
trust him, lands better worth cultivating.
What he did was to massacre them in detach-
ments, one detachment being kept in ignorance
of the fate of those who had gone before.
Viriathus was one of the few who escaped.

It was not for some time that he secured the
complete confidence of his countrymen, or was
able to collect an army with which he could
meet his adversaries in the field. His first
great success was won in 147 B.C., when the
proprsetor Vetilius was drawn into an ambush
and defeated. Vetilius was taken prisoner and

BEYOND THE PYRENEES 277

killed by his captors, who, seeing only a "very
fat old man," did not recognise his value. Two-
fifths of the army of ten thousand perished at
the same time. Another disaster happened in
the year following. Plautius, the Roman
general, was deceived by a pretended retreat,
and suffered a heavy loss of men. Affairs
seemed to be in so serious a condition that the
authorities at Rome resolved on sending a large
force and as able a commander as they could
find to the seat of war. The man they chose
was Fabius, the brother of the younger Scipio,
and a son therefore of the famous conqueror of
Macedonia. x Before Fabius could reach the
scene of war another Roman army had been
almost destroyed. Fabius himself for a time
could do but little. He had to content himself
with getting his forces, all of them newly re-
cruited, into order. In his second year of com-
mand, however, he inflicted a severe defeat on
Viriathus and compelled him to evacuate the
Roman territory.

The war was carried on with varying
fortunes for four years. In 141 b.c. it seemed
to have been brought to a conclusion highly
favourable to the Lusitanians and their gallant

1 ^Emilius Paullus. This son had been adopted into the
Fabian family.

278 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

leaders. Viriathus surprised a Roman army
that was investing one of the Lusitanian towns,
and inflicted upon it so heavy a loss that it was
compelled to raise the siege. In their retreat
the Romans became entangled in a narrow
pass, and were compelled to surrender.
Viriathus was moderate in his demands.
Lusitania was to be independent, and its
people recognised as allies and friends of
Rome. This treaty was ratified at Rome.
But the ambition of a Roman general and the
bad faith of the Senate brought this arrange-
ment to an end. Servilius Caepio was disap
pointed to find that the war had been brought
to an end, and obtained permission from the
Senate, which had not the effrontery to cancel
the treaty, to make private war upon Viriathus.
Before long something happened that gave the
desired pretext, and Viriathus was declared a
public enemy. He sent envoys to the Roman
camp to arrange, if it were possible, terms of
peace. Caepio persuaded them by promises of
great rewards to murder their chief. This they
did, stabbing him in the neck as he lay asleep
in his tent fully armed. The blow was so
skilfully given that he died without a groan,
and the murderers were able to escape to the
Roman camp. From Caepio, however, they

BEYOND THE PYRENEES 279

received nothing but the remark that the
Romans did not approve and could not reward
soldiers who slew their own general. One is
glad to record the disappointment of such
villains, but it is not easy to understand the
unblushing assurance with which Roman
historians inveigh against the " Punic faith,"
as they are pleased to call it, of Hannibal.
The war was carried on for a time, but the
Lusitanians could find no competent successor
to Viriathus and were compelled to submit.

But Spain was not yet subdued. The scene
of war was transferred to Numantia (now
Garay on the upper waters of the Douro).
Though not a walled town, it was a very
strong place, environed with woods, situated
on steep cliffs, and protected by two rivers.
The one accessible side was strongly en-
trenched. The fighting- force which it could
muster was small, numbering not more than
eight thousand, but there were no better
fighting-men in all Spain. General succeeded
general in the Roman camp, but no advance
was made. At last the people of Rome waxed
impatient. There had been, they said, the
same disappointment and mismanagement at
Carthage, and they must employ the same man
to put an end to them. Scipio Africanus was

280 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

accordingly elected. He declined to take any
men from the muster roll. There were soldiers
enough, he thought, in Spain. And there was
no lack of volunteers attracted by his remark-
able prestige, among them a company of five
hundred to which he gave the name of the
" Company of Friends." * Even these he left
to follow him while he hurried on to do for the
besieging army at Numantia what he had done
ten years before at Carthage. He cleared
it of an idle and dissolute multitude, among
whom soothsayers are specially mentioned, per-
petually consulted, says the historian, by a
soldiery demoralised by fear. A spit, a brass
pot, and a single drinking-cup were all that
was allowed for mess furniture ; the rations
were cut down to flesh, boiled or roasted (bread,
we may presume, though it is not mentioned).
In short, every luxury was banished, some of
them seeming, certainly, a little strange, bath
attendants, for instance. " Your mules," he
said, " want rubbing down, for they have no
hands, but you have." This purification
effected, he proceeded to harden his men by
exercise, avoiding battle till he thought they
were fit for it. It is interesting to find that in

1 Possibly in recollection of the Royal Companions in the
army of Alexander the Great, vide p. 130.

BEYOND THE PYRENEES 281

the winter of this year he was joined by a
contingent of African troops under the com-
mand of Jugurtha, a grandson of the old king
Masinissa.

The Romans had an overwhelming superiority
in numbers, and it was only a matter of time
for a patient and skilful commander such as
was Scipio to make resistance impossible. The
river, which the besieged had found very useful
as a method of communicating with the outer
world and replenishing their supplies, was
closed against them by elaborate contrivances.
The whole town, which had a compass of
fifteen miles, was closely invested, while a
system of signals for the protection of the
siege works from sudden attack was organised.
Thirty thousand men were on constant duty
in guarding the turrets and ramparts ; twenty
thousand more were held in readiness to de-
liver an assault wherever and whenever Scipio
might see fit, and there was a further reserve
of ten thousand. Every man of the whole
number had his place, which he was not per-
mitted to leave except under express orders.
The besieged did not give up the hope of
damaging the siege works, and made frequent
attacks, but they contended in vain against a
system so elaborately complete, one, too, which

282 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

received the unwearying attention of the man
who had contrived it. Not a day or a night
passed, we are told, without Scipio visiting the
whole circle of the investment. After all, it
was by the pressure of famine not by superior
strength that Numantia fell. An embassy was
sent to ask for terms. Scipio, who knew from
the deserters how desperate was the condition
of the city, demanded an unconditional sur-
render. The unhappy men who carried back
this unwelcome reply were slain by their
infuriated countrymen. But there was no
other alternative, except death. That was the
choice of the great majority ; a few hundreds
came out to the conqueror, such a miserable
spectacle, so squalid, so emaciated, and withal
so savage as none had ever seen before.
Scipio chose fifty of the poor wretches to adorn
his triumph ; the rest he sold as slaves. It
must be admitted that the Romans were not
generous enemies, for Scipio was conspicuous
among his countrymen for humanity and
culture. Yet this was the best treatment he
could bring himself to accord to foes so brave
that he had never ventured an assault on their
city.

Sertorius is a remarkable, one might say, an
admirable figure, but the story of the long

BEYOND THE PYRENEES 283

struggle between him and the generals of
Rome scarcely belongs to my subject. Yet it
is not wholly unconnected with it. Political
life at Rome did not habitually run into the
excesses which were so lamentably common in
the Greek states. When the aristocrat Corio-
lanus led the Volscian armies against his own
country the act was exceptional. Sertorius
was a democratic Coriolanus.

Sertorius won considerable distinction as a
soldier in the campaigns against the Cimbri
and Teutones. When the Consul Caepio was
defeated he narrowly escaped with his life,
swimming across the Rhone in full armour ;
he fought at Aquae Sextiae, having done good
service by entering the camp of the Teutones
as a spy. When the Civil War broke out he
declared for the democratic party. After
various changes of fortune the aristocrats were
victorious, and then Sertorius found himself
in a most difficult position. The democratic
leaders had given him a command in Spain,
as much to get rid of him, for he was too
honourable to suit them, as for any other
reason. By degrees he drifted into the position
of an enemy. He opposed the march of a
Consular army sent across the Pyrenees by the
Roman government, crossed to Africa when he

284 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

could no longer remain in Spain, and came
back again to take command of the Lusitanians
when this tribe rebelled against Rome. Here
he was joined by other adherents of the demo-
cratic party, the most important of whom was
a certain Perpenna, who brought with him a
considerable force, and became his second-in-
command. All this time, though waging war
with Roman consuls and proconsuls, he claimed
to be the Roman governor of Spain, establishing,
for instance, a Senate into which no one but
Roman citizens were admitted. In JJ b.c.
Pompey, who was already famous as a soldier
— he had enjoyed the honour of a triumph at
the age of twenty-five — was sent into Spain.
But Pompey found his task more than he could
perform. He won, it is true, victories over
Sertorius' lieutenants, but he could not claim
any decided success over the great man himself.
In a great battle fought on the banks of the
Sucro he was routed with the loss of six
thousand men. Nor during the three years
that followed did he make much way. What
really happened during this time it is not easy
to say. By some accounts Sertorius became
self-indulgent and arbitrary ; according to others,
his Roman colleagues in command, many of
them of better birth than their superior, were

BEYOND THE PYRENEES 285

jealous of him. What is certain is that it was
by a Roman hand that he fell. In 72 B.C. he
was assassinated by the orders of Perpenna.
Perpenna was wholly unequal to the position
which he hoped to attain by the death of his
chief. He was defeated in the first battle
which he fought with the Roman armies, and
was taken prisoner. To save his life he
offered to put into Pompey's hands the private
letters of Sertorius. Many of them had been
sent from Rome, and would probably have
compromised various persons of distinction.
Pompey ordered the letters to be burnt and
Perpenna to be executed.

One Spanish people, the Cantabri, represented
by the modern Basques, still retained their
independence. They were not finally subdued
till fifty years after the death of Sertorius, and
even then they had to be watched and kept in
order. Spain, however, as a whole became the
most thoroughly Italian in manners and speech
of all the provinces of Rome.

V

ACROSS EUPHRATES

IT would be impossible to pass over without
notice one of the most formidable enemies
that Rome ever encountered — Mithradates,
King of Pontus. Mithradates was, indeed,
hardly to be called a barbarian. He had a
taste for art and letters, had a museum of
Greek and Persian antiquities, and played the
part of a generous patron to poets and philo-
sophers. But he was a barbarian at heart,
savage and cruel in his dealings with his kins-
folk and his servants, and with no conception
of enlightened rule. Rome, however oppressive
and short-sighted her individual citizens might
be, was an agent of civilisation, and her final
triumph over the King of Pontus, the ablest, it
may be said, of the Eastern potentates with
whom she came into connection, was for the
general good of mankind.

Mithradates came to the throne of Pontus

ACROSS EUPHRATES 287

in early youth. He cherished from the first
ambitious schemes of extending his dominions.
At first his efforts were directed against his
neighbours on the north and east ; when he
attempted to extend his frontiers westward he
naturally came into collision with the Romans.
It is needless to go into details ; it will suffice
to say that war was declared in b.c. 89. The
time suited Mithradates very well, for it found
Rome in a very helpless condition. What is
called the Social War, i.e., the revolt of the
Italian allies against Rome, was still in pro-
gress, and there was positively no army avail-
able to meet the huge host, nearly 300,000 in
all, which the King brought into the field.
All that the Roman officers in Lesser Asia
could do was to shut themselves up in such
fortified towns as they could hope to hold
against the King. Mithradates now gave
orders for an act which was as foolish as it was
wicked. He was at Ephesus — the fact shows
how little remained to Rome — when he directed
that all Italians sojourning in Lesser Asia
should be put to death. Had he said
" Romans," not " Italians," he might have
secured the combination with himself of the
Italian adversaries of Rome. As it was he
hopelessly alienated them.

288 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Nor did he make himself better liked by his
new subjects in Asia. They found that in
exchanging masters they had lost much more
than they had gained. The Romans were
often oppressive, but they had at least some
kind of system, and were, in theory at least,
subject to law ; the King was a capricious
tyrant, whose whims, often as cruel as they
were strange, had to be instantaneously
humoured under pain of death or torture.
The end was that Mithradates was beaten
everywhere. An army which he had sent
into Greece was destroyed. His arms were
equally unsuccessful in Asia. An attempt to
make common cause with Sulla's political
opponents — some of the democratic leaders
were actually in arms — came to nothing.
Finally, in 84 peace was made. The King
had to give up all his conquests, to surrender
for punishments the men who had taken a
leading part in the massacre, and to pay a war
indemnity of 20,000 talents.1

After a somewhat uneasy peace of ten years
war broke out again. Each side was suspicious of
the other. Mithradates had steadily employed
himself in increasing his dominions in every
direction where he did not come into actual
1 Nearly ^5, 000,000, taking the talent at ^240.

ACROSS EUPHRATES 289

collision with Rome. Rome, on the other
hand, had a way of receiving legacies of king-
doms, very much to the annoyance of those
who conceived themselves to have a better
title to the inheritance. In 75 B.C., for
instance, she took possession of Bithynia,
which Mithradates had always coveted, in
accordance with the will of Nicomedes III.
The King naturally took offence at this pro-
ceeding, and as he saw at the same time a
prospect of taking his great enemy at a dis-
advantage, he declared war. He hoped that
Sertorius in Spain would make a diversion in
his favour, and he also looked for help from
the pirates who swarmed in the Mediterranean.

These expectations were but partially ful-
filled. Sertorius was very near the end of his
career, and could be practically ignored.
Mithradates won a few successes here and
there, but he had a very able soldier, Lucullus,
to contend with. After a few months' fighting
he had to fly from his kingdom and take
refuge with his son-in-law, Tigranes, King of
Armenia.

Lucullus now ventured on a very bold
course of action. He sent envoys to Tigranes
demanding the surrender of Mithradates. This
was, of course, refused, as indeed Lucullus

20

290 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

expected and even intended that it should be.
The Roman general then crossed the Euphrates
and marched on Tigranocerta. This was a
new city, and was the creation as it bore the
name of Tigranes. He had peopled it with
inhabitants, taken, after the fashion of Eastern
kings, from conquered or simply subject tribes,
and had supplied it with all the conveniences
and ornaments of Greek civilisation. Its walls,
the historian tells us, were seventy feet high,
and must have been of huge circuit, if there
were parks and lakes within them. Lucullus
laid siege to the city, though he could hardly
have had sufficient force to invest it. It was
not long before Tigranes moved to its relief.
At first, indeed, he had simply refused to believe
that the Romans could have made so audacious
an advance, and with a savagery, in curious
contrast with his veneer of civilisation, ordered
the messenger who brought the unwelcome
news to be crucified. When he learnt the
truth, he raised a huge army — 250,000 infantry
and 50,000 cavalry are the numbers given us
by historians — and marched to attack Lucullus.
Mithradates was with his son-in-law, and
strongly advised him not to risk a battle.
" Use your cavalry to cut off his supplies,"
was his advice, for the old King knew -what

ACROSS EUPHRATES 291

Roman soldiers were when they were led by
such a general as Lucullus. Tigranes laughed
to scorn this prudent counsel. He could not
conceive that the handful of men which were
all that the Romans had to oppose to him,
could possibly stand up against an army which
was nearly twenty times as numerous. For
Lucullus had divided his small force, leaving a
part to carry on the siege of the city while he
went to meet Tigranes with the remainder.1

The battle that followed was one of the
most remarkable in history, worthy to be
ranked with Marathon, for, indeed, the odds
were at least as great as any of which we have
a record. Unfortunately for the fame of
Lucullus there was no one to tell the story as
it ought to have been told. The strategy of
Lucullus was that employed times out of
number with success by the leader of a regular
army acting against an undisciplined host — he
outflanked his opponents. What we can under-
stand from the accounts, not easily reconcilable,
is that a front attack was made, or rather
threatened, by the Roman cavalry. It advanced,

1 "If these men come as ambassadors," Tigranes is
reported to have said, " there are too many of them ; if they
are an army there are certainly too few." But he was not
the first to use the witticism.

292 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

and then retreated, in seeming panic, and the
Asiatics pursued in headlong haste. Mean-
while the outflanking movement had been made
unseen by the infantry. Attacking the rear of
the army they sent the camp-followers flying in
wild confusion ; these broke the lines of the
infantry ; the infantry in turn threw the horse-
men into confusion. The panic once set up,
the huge, unmanageable numbers of the Asiatic
host did nothing but aggravate it. The pursuit
was fierce and pitiless. Lucullus threatened
the severest penalties against any soldier who
should turn aside for a moment to encumber
himself with spoil. For fifteen miles the road
was strewed with costly chains and bracelets
which no one picked up. The pursuit over,
the men were allowed to appropriate all the
treasures they could find. Five Romans, and
five only, are said to have been slain. The
enemy's dead were counted by tens of
thousands.

This great victory had not, it is true, the
permanent result which might have been
expected. This failure was due to the weak-
ness of the Government at home and the
jealousy of parties. Lucullus was hampered
by want of means, and had to share his
authority with incompetent colleagues. It was

ACROSS EUPHRATES 293

not long* before both Tigranes and Mithradates
recovered all that they had lost.

But this was but a temporary falling back of
the Roman power. The people, profoundly
dissatisfied with the policy that had made such
brilliant victories unproductive, put the supreme
power into the hands of a man whom it could
trust. In 6j b.c. Pompey cleared the Medi-
terranean of the pirates, and two years later he
brought to an end the long struggle with
Mithradates. Tigranes had made his sub-
mission to Rome, and, while surrendering all
his conquests, had been permitted to retain his
hereditary kingdom of Armenia. Mithradates
was driven to take refuge in a remote region
at the eastern end of the Black Sea. He had
conceived, it is said, a bold scheme of raising
the tribes to the north of that sea and falling-
upon Italy as the Gauls and as Hannibal had
fallen upon it. But he had not the means of
carrying out so large a project. His subjects,
wearied of perpetual exactions, rebelled, led by
one of his sons, and he saw that nothing
remained but death. His wives and his
daughters were compelled or possibly offered
to drink poison. He drank it himself, but — so
runs the story — had so fortified himself with
antidotes, that the drug did not affect him.

294 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

He then commanded a Celtic mercenary to
render him the last service by a stroke of his
sword. By his death the Roman dominion
was practically established as far as the
Euphrates. That it was not to be extended
beyond it was practically proved by the events
which I have now to relate.

Five years after the fall of Mithradates
there was formed at Rome what is commonly
called the First Triumvirate.1

Of the three men who composed it Pompey
had gained a great reputation as a soldier,
Caesar had acquired almost equal distinction
by his victory in Gaul, while Crassus, though
he had served with credit on more than one
occasion, was distinctly inferior in this respect
to his colleagues. He felt that such an
inferiority would tell greatly against him when-
the spoils came to be divided. It was to the
East that he looked for the opportunity that
he desired. There had been trouble in the
region beyond the Euphrates for some time,
and Rome, accused of having failed to keep

1 Mommsen speaks of it as the Second, the First being a
coalition of the same persons ten years before. It is as
well to remark that the coalition had no legal existence. It
was an informal agreement between the three most powerful
citizens to act together. The Second Triumvirate, in 43 B.C.,
was a regularly constituted body.

ACROSS EUPHRATES 295

her treaty arrangement, was, of course, mixed
up in it. In 55 B.C., the year when Caesar's
command in Gaul had been renewed for a
second period of five years, Crassus was elected
Consul, his colleague being Pompey. The
province allotted to him after his year of
office was Syria, and he left Rome before the
year was out to take up his command. He did
not meet with anything like universal approval.
The decree which gave him the province of
Syria made no mention of Parthia, but every-
one knew that Parthia was to be attacked, and
there was a strong party that, either from
prudence or from a sense of right, was strongly
opposed to what was manifestly a war of
aggression. One of the Tribunes of the People
attempted to stop his departure from Rome,
actually bidding his attendant detain him by
force. This attempt failing, he took his stand
at the gate by which Crassus was to depart,
and on a hastily constructed altar performed
some mysterious rite by which he devoted,
under strange and awful curses, the head of
Crassus to destruction. But Crassus per-
severed ; arrived at Brundisium he would not
wait for favourable weather, but at once crossed
the sea, not without suffering a considerable
loss in ships. The rest of his journey he

296 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

performed by land. When passing through
Galatia he was entertained by the prince of
that country, Deiotarus, then a very old man.
Deiotarus was busy building a city, and Crassus
jestingly marvelled that at such an age he
should engage in such an undertaking. "And
you," replied the old man, " who are on your
way to Parthia, are not quite in your youth."
Crassus was sixty, and looked, we are told,
considerably older.

His first operations, after his arrival, were
fairly successful, but he did not make a favour-
able impression. The Euphrates he crossed
without opposition, and he received the sub-
mission of some important towns in Mesopo-
tamia. He was considered, on the other hand,
to have been wanting in dignity when he
allowed his soldiers to salute him on the field
as Imperator after the capture of a third-rate
fortress — for this was a compliment that was
appropriate only to real achievements. And
in his proceedings generally he seemed to look
to the collection of wealth rather than to
military glory. The tokens of ill-fortune to
come were, of course, not wanting. Crassus
had been joined by his son, who had been
serving as one of Caesar's lieutenants in Gaul,
and both paid a visit to a famous temple at

ACROSS EUPHRATES 297

Hierapolis. As they were leaving it the son
caught his foot and fell, and the elder man
stumbled over him. The enemy were in no
submissive mood. Envoys from the Parthian
king declared that if Crassus was executing
the will of the Roman people the Parthians
would avenge the insult to the utmost, but that
if he was only seeking his own private ends
they would pardon an old man's folly and
restore unharmed the garrisons who were
virtually their prisoners. Crassus replied that
he would give them an answer at Seleucia,
their capital. " Seleucia ! " cried the leader
of the embassy, holding up the palm of his
hand. " Hair will grow on this before you see
Seleucia." The army soon became seriously
discouraged. The Parthians were evidently
a more formidable enemy than they had yet
encountered, very different from the unwarlike
races of Western Asia. The reports of the
soothsayers were of the gloomiest kind, and
omens of coming disasters were frequent.
The spot selected for a camp was twice struck
by lightning ; when the rations were distributed
the articles first given out were lentils and
salt, the two chief articles in the meals served
for the spirits of the dead. Worst of all, the
eagle-standard of the legion that was the first

298 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

to advance was seen to turn away from the
enemy's country.

Crassus had under his command no con-
temptible force — seven legions, 4,000 cavalry,
and an equal number of light-armed troops.
The first reports that reached him represented
the enemy as shrinking from the contest.
This notion was confirmed by an Arab chief,
Abgarus of Edessa, who was believed to be
friendly to Rome. He had certainly done
good service to Pompey, but he was now
acting in the interest of the Parthian king.
He urged on Crassus an immediate advance ;
the enemy, he declared, were already removing
their most valuable property to a place of
safety. This was all false. The Parthian
king with half his army was ravaging Armenia ;
his commander-in-chief had been detached
with the other half to deal with Crassus. The
Romans moved forward with all the haste that
they could compass. Day after day they
advanced, but no enemy could be seen. At
last some horsemen were descried in the dis-
tance, and Abgarus was sent on in advance
to reconnoitre. He did not return, and the
army again moved forwards. Their march
brought them to a river called the Balissen.
Crassus was advised by his staff to halt and

ACROSS EUPHRATES 299

encamp. He was too impatient to listen to
this counsel, and still advanced. It was not
long before he came in sight of the enemy.
At first sight the Parthian host did not seem
very formidable. It did not display any of
the pomp and circumstance of war, and its
numbers had been carefully concealed. Then
by a sudden movement the banners of glisten-
ing silk embroidered with gold were displayed,
and the helmets and coats of mail glittered in
the sun, the drums giving out all the time a
terrific volume of sound. Never before had
the Romans encountered a similar enemy. It
was a host of cavalry which they had to meet,
most of them archers, both man and horse
being protected with armour made sometimes
of iron, sometimes of leather. The Romans
were taken at a terrible disadvantage. All
their tactics, especially the close order in which
they were accustomed to fight, told against
them, whilst their light-armed troops were
hopelessly outnumbered. The younger Crassus
was sent forward by his father with a picked
force, in the hope that he might relieve the
legions of the brunt of the attack. The enemy
retreated before him, but when they had lured
him on out of sight or reach of the main army
they turned upon him. He had no choice, so

300 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

overwhelming were their numbers, but to fall
back before them. He made a stand at a
hill, on the sloping side of which he ranged
what troops remained to him. But the ranks
rising one above another offered a broader
target to the Parthian archers. Nearly the
whole force perished, Crassus and his officers
by their own hands. Five hundred were taken
prisoners ; none escaped. The first knowledge
that the elder Crassus had of his son's fate
was the sight of his head on a pole. The
attack upon the legions was renewed again
and again until darkness brought a temporary
relief. During the night the Romans retreated,
and reached Carrhae in safety. But even then
their troubles were not ended. Crassus either
would not or could not stay at Carrhae, and set
out in the hope of reaching the friendly country
of Armenia. He was overtaken, and consented*
to hold a conference with the Parthian com-
mander to discuss the terms of an armistice.
It is not clear whether the Parthians intended
treachery ; anyhow the Romans suspected it.
A fierce quarrel ensued ; the Roman officers
were killed, and Crassus put an end to his
own life. Of the army many were taken
prisoners, and a few contrived to escape. But
as a force it ceased to exist.

Crass'us defeated by the Parthians.

ACROSS EUPHRATES 301

The battle of Carrhae, as it may be called,
though it happened at some distance from that
town, was one of the worst disasters in Roman
history. What especially touched the pride of
the Empire was the submission of the numerous
prisoners to their fate. Horace inveighs against
the cowardice of the men who were content to
forget all the glorious associations of Rome
and to become the subjects of a barbarian
king. He seeks to console himself by telling
how the standards captured from the army of
Crassus were torn down from the Parthian
temples by the victorious Augustus. What
really happened was that these trophies were
given up under the conditions of a peace made
between Parthia and Rome. There was more
than one struggle between the two powers, and
the superiority of Roman arms was vindicated
more than once. Parthia, also, had its
triumphs. One Roman Emperor, Valerian,
ended his days in Parthian captivity. When
the Empire fell in the third century of our era
it was by a rebellion among its own subjects.

VI

THE CONQUESTS OF C/ESAR

THE second great European conquest
made by Rome outside the borders of
Italy was Gaul. The beginning of this con-
quest, which was spread over about a century,
the last ten years, however, being by far the
most productive of result, belongs to the year
152 B.C. The people of Massilia (Marseilles)
begged the help of the Romans against two
tribes of Gaul who were attacking dependencies
of theirs. Much the same thing happened
again some twenty years later. The end of
this and of other affairs which it is not necessary
to describe in detail was the establishment in
121 B.C. of what was called the Provincia (a
name still preserved in the modern Provence).
Two colonies were founded in this region, one
at Aquse Sextiae (Aix), the other at Narbo

Marcius (Narbonne). The Provincia occupied

302

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 303

the valley of the Rhone, and reached westward
as far as the Garonne.

I pass on at once to the story of how the
whole of the country from the Mediterranean
to the North Sea and from the Atlantic to the
Rhine was incorporated in the Empire of Rome.

In 59 B.C. Julius Caesar was appointed to the
government of Gaul (on both sides of the Alps)
and Illyria. In the April of the next year he
proceeded to take up his command. The first
important operation which he undertook shows
plainly enough how great a change had taken
place in the relation between Rome and his
barbarian neighbours of the north. The
Helvetii, of whom we have heard in connection
with the story of the Cimbri and Teutones,
were in a restless condition. Their land (which
we may roughly describe as the non-mountainous
part of Switzerland and adjacent districts of
France) was too narrow for them, and they
resolved to look for another more fertile and
more spacious. A hundred or even fifty years
before they would certainly have moved south-
ward, as kindred tribes had done under the
First and the Second Brennus. But Italy no
longer tempted them. It was as attractive as
ever, but the way was too perilous. Accord-
ingly, the migration of the Helvetii was

304 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

northward. Caesar saw his opportunity. The
Helvetii would have to pass through a corner
of the Provincia, and they sent envoys asking
his leave. Csesar did not directly refuse their
request, the truth being that he had not troops
enough to stop them, if they were minded to
force a passage. He put them off. He would
give an answer shortly. When they came
again his soldiers were ready and therefore
his answer also. They must not go. The
Helvetii then chose another way, but Csesar
is determined that they shall not go at all.
They went, indeed, burning everything that
they could not carry with them, but Csesar
pursued and overtook them. The battle that
followed was long and fierce. It lasted from
one o'clock in the afternoon to evening, and
for all these hours no Roman saw the back
of a foe. A barricade had been made of the
waggons, and this was obstinately defended.
At last the camp was taken, but as many as
130,000 men made their escape. They had
three days' start, for Caesar had to stay where
he was so long, providing for the treatment
of his wounded, and for the burial of his dead.
But though the fugitives marched without
resting day or night they could not get out
of their enemy's reach. Couriers were sent

THE CONQUESTS OF CjESAR 305

on, warning the tribes through whose territories
they were to pass not to supply the Helvetii
with food. To do so would be to incur the
same penalty. This prompt and stern action
had its immediate effect. The fugitives halted
and sent back envoys begging for peace.
Caesar granted their request, but they were to
give hostages, and to surrender their arms and
all runaways and deserters. The men of one
canton attempted to escape eastward, hoping
that their flight might not be observed till
it was too late to overtake them. But Caesar
observed everything ; the unhappy men — there
were six thousand of them — were brought back
and slaughtered. The rest were admitted to
quarter. They were compelled, however, to
go back to their deserted country. Their
neighbours, the Allobroges, were instructed to
feed them till they could grow food for them-
selves, and they had to build again the houses
which they had destroyed. Caesar tells the
story with a passionless accuracy. He shows
neither anger nor pity. But the bare numbers
which he gives are eloquent enough. There
were 368,000 emigrants; 110,000 returned.
More than two-thirds — men, women, and
children — had perished. Anyhow, they could
no longer complain that the land was too

21

306 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

narrow for them. But the spirit of unrest had
reached to other tribes beside the Helvetii.
The Germans from the eastern side of the
Rhine had made their way into Gaul, under
the command of their King Ariovistus. They
had been invited to come by one tribe of
Gauls to help them against another, but had
soon made themselves odious both to friends
and to foes. The particular tribe which had
called them in had given up to them one-third
of its land, and was now called upon to
surrender another. Caesar was called upon to
help. The invitation was just what he wanted.
To be the champion of Gaul was the first step
towards being its master. Accordingly he
informed the German kino- that he must let
the friends of the Roman people alone.
Ariovistus's answer was a defiance, and Caesar's
rejoinder was a rapid march eastwards. There
was no time to be lost. Other tribes from
beyond the Rhine were said to be on the
move. Were these to join the first-comers, it
would be a very formidable combination.
Seven days' marching brought the Romans
within twenty-four miles' distance of the enemy.
There were negotiations which came to nothing,
various strategic movements, with a cavalry
skirmish now and then. Finally Caesar made

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 307

an attack on the German host, and drove it
before him to the Rhine. It suffered heavily
in the flight. Ariovistus escaped, but he took
very few of his Germans back with him.

In the following year (57 b.c.) Caesar was
engaged with the Belgae in North-eastern Gaul.
(Gaul must always be conceived of as the
whole country to the westward of the Rhine.)
He fought and won a great battle on the
Aisne, falling on the enemy while they were
endeavouring to cross the river, and inflicting
a heavy loss on them. " They tried," says
Caesar, " in the most daring way to pass on
the dead bodies of their own comrades." As
he never puts anything in for the sake of
effect, we may rely on the absolute truth of
this gruesome picture. This victory was not
easily won ; a harder piece of work was the
conflict with the Nervii that shortly followed.
The Nervii occupied the country now known
as Belgium, and had a high reputation for
valour and for simplicity, not to say savagery,
of life. They would not allow the importation
of wine or any other foreign luxuries, and they
were firmly resolved not to have any dealings
with Caesar. Their kinsmen and neighbours
who had consented to treat with the Romans,
had behaved, they considered, with much base-

3o8 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

ness and cowardice. The great battle was
fought on the Sambre, and seems to have
been, at one time, the most critical thing that
Caesar was ever engaged in.

Caesar had been marching with his legions —
he had eight in his force — each followed by
its own baggage, and so far, therefore,
separated from each other. The Nervii had
been informed of this arrangement by some
well-wishers in Caesar's train, and had been
advised to deliver their attack on the foremost
legion as soon as the baggage came in sight.
But the Roman general, who probably knew
this, as great commanders have a way of
knowing everything, altered his order on the
way. First came the cavalry, then six legions
together, all in light marching order, then the
baggage, and bringing up the rear two newly
levied legions. When the baggage came in
sight the Nervii saw, as they thought, their
opportunity. As a matter of fact, they had
been waiting too long. They had to deal
with six legions, not, as they expected, with
one. Even then their onslaught came perilously
near to a success. Emerging unexpectedly
from the woods in which they had been lying
hid, they drove before the Roman cavalry, and
were engaged in hand-to-hand fight with the

THE CONQUESTS OF CJESAR 309

legions almost before these knew what had
happened. It was almost a surprise. " Caesar,"
so he writes of himself, "had everything to
do at once — to hoist the red flag that was
the signal for battle, give the trumpet call,
summon back to their places in the ranks
the men who were collecting materials for the
rampart, draw up the line, and address the
troops." The enemy had been unexpectedly
quick in their attack. On the other hand,
the army was in thoroughly good order ; every
man knew what he had to do. But the time
was very short. The men could not even don
their helmets or get their shields out of their
covers before the enemy was upon them. The
tribesmen in alliance with the Nervii could not
hold their own against the Romans, but the
Nervii themselves for a time carried everything
before them, breaking through the two legions
that confronted them, and actually taking
possession of the Roman camp. The camp
followers fled in dismay, and were followed by
some of the light-armed troops. Even a con-
tingent of cavalry sent by the Treveri rode
off the field, and carried with them the report
that the day was lost. As the Treveri had
a high reputation for courage, their flight was
of the very worst omen.

310 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

At this critical moment Caesar personally
intervened, and restored the fortunes of the
day. He seized a shield, addressed himself to
the centurions, whose names, again after the
fashion of the great general, he knew, and
turned the tide of battle. Caesar did not
show himself so frequently in the front as
was the habit of Alexander, but he could do
it on occasion with the happiest effect. At
the same time the officer in command of the
tenth legion (Caesar's corps d^lite, as we may
call it), who had made a successful attack on
the enemy's position, brought back that force
to the help of his chief. The Nervii still
resisted with the greatest courage. But the
day was lost, and few of the tribe, so far, at
least, as it had taken part in the battle, were
left alive. An episode of the campaign is
worth relating, though it had little or no effect
on the general result. The force left by the
Cimbri and Teutones to guard their spoil had
after various wanderings found their way into
this region. They asked and obtained terms
from Caesar, tried to outwit, and were, by way
of punishment, sold as slaves.

The third campaign was carried on in
Western Gaul, among the Veneti, represented
by the Bretons of to-day. Caesar had made a

THE CONQUESTS OF CMSAR 311

requisition on them for corn, of which, as they
were a seafaring people, they had probably
little to spare. They refused the demand,
which, indeed, he had no right but that of
superior force to make, and even detained
his envoys, whom they probably considered,
and not without good reason, to be spies.
Caesar found that he wanted ships if he
were to deal successfully with the Veneti.
Accordingly he had a fleet built on the
Loire, and manned with a levy raised in the
neighbourhood. It was the First Punic War
over again. The tribes of the western coast
were beaten on their own element. As they
had been guilty of what Caesar chose to con-
sider a great offence, an insult to ambassadors,
he determined to punish them with unusual
severity. Their chiefs were put to death ;
the rest of the population sold into slavery.
A general surrender of the western tribes
took place. Meanwhile one of the great
man's lieutenants subdued the region between
the Pyrenees and the Garonne (to the west,
therefore, of the Provincia), and Caesar him-
self spent what remained of the year in
reducing some tribes in the north-east.

In the following year (b.c. 55) Northern Gaul
was disturbed by another great movement of

312 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

population. Two German tribes, themselves dis-
possessed by the overpowering strength of the
Suebi, a great confederation of kindred tribes
from Eastern Germany, crossed the Rhine,
and quartered themselves on the Menapii, a
people which inhabited the left bank of the
lower Rhine. Caesar was well aware that the
ill-affected Gauls would soon make common
cause with the new-comers, and determined to
be beforehand with his enemies of either race.
He marched with great promptitude against
them, not allowing himself to be put off by the
negotiations which they desired or pretended
to open with him. Before long a treacherous
attack, made by the German horsemen on
Caesar's cavalry — chiefly composed, it would
seem, of native levies — gave him an excellent
justification for acting. He attacked the enemy,
and drove them in headlong flight to the river.
Many were slain in the fight and the pursuit,
more were drowned in the river ; the result was
the almost entire destruction of the invading
host. Nor did this satisfy him. He deter-
mined to make a demonstration of his strength
in Germany itself. To do this he had to
transport his army across the Rhine. To
carry them over in boats did not, as he puts
it, suit the dignity of the Roman people.

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 313

Possibly he thought it unsafe. Accordingly
he built a bridge, a marvel of engineering
skill, when we consider the breadth, depth, and
force of the river to be spanned, and the short
supply of tools and materials at hand. The
work was complete in ten days ; eighteen days
more were spent in Germany. And Caesar
then came back, having certainly impressed the
tribes beyond the Rhine with a great idea of
his resources. Late in this year Caesar made
his first expedition to Britain. Of this and of
the more serious invasion of the following year
I shall have to speak elsewhere.

The year 54 B.C. was a very critical time.
Caesar evidently had overrated the result of
his successes, a pardonable error, so rapid and
apparently so complete had they been. A
feeling of false security had suggested the
somewhat romantic expedition to Britain, an
expedition which he certainly would not have
made if he had been aware of the real state of
affairs in Gaul. He supposed that the country
had been finally subdued—" pacified " or
"quieted" was the Roman euphemism — but
he was rudely undeceived. Fortunately for
him he was in Gaul when the formidable rising,
which he had soon to crush, took place. If he
had been still in Britain, or if, as had been his

314 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

intention, he had started for the south, the
consequences might have been more serious
than they were.

The harvest in Gaul that year (b.c. 54) had
been short. Hence it became necessary to
scatter the legions in arranging for their winter
quarters. There were eight legions, and the
half of another, and they were located in eight
camps. Two of these camps were in Nor-
mandy (Seez and Chartres), two in Picardy
(Amiens and Montdidier), one in Artois (St.
Pol), and three in Belgium (Charleroi, Tongres,
and Lavacherie on the Ourthe). One of the
last three, that at Tongres, which was under
the command of two legates, Sabinus and
Cotta, was attacked by a detachment from one
of the tribes in the neighbourhood. Force not
succeeding, treachery was tried. One of the
local chiefs, Ambiorix by name, proposed a
conference. He was friendly, he said, to the
Romans, Caesar having done him a kindness,
though he had been compelled to pose as an
enemy. His advice to the generals was to
leave the camp, which it would not be possible
to hold. A multitude of Germans had crossed
the Rhine, and were on their way to attack the
camp. If the troops were withdrawn to one of
the other camps in Eastern Gaul, he would

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 315

guarantee them a safe-conduct. The two
officers in command were divided in opinion.
Finally Sabinus, who was in favour of evacuating
the camp, had his way. At dawn next day
they started ; after proceeding two miles they
fell into an ambush. Forming into a circle
they resisted, till the severity of their losses
made them ask for terms. These were granted,
and immediately broken. Sabinus and some
officers laid down their arms and were
massacred ; Cotta died fighting ; the survivors
of the day's battle made their way back into
the camp. Seeing that they could not possibly
hold it against the enemy, they committed
suicide during the night. A few stragglers
escaped to the camp at Lavacherie, where
Labienus was in command.

The camp at Charleroi, in the country of the
Nervii, where Q. Cicero, younger brother of the
great orator, was in command, was next attacked.
The Gauls, now largely increased in number,
assaulted it with the greatest fury, but were
repulsed. Caesar was informed of the position
of affairs, and acted with his usual promptitude.
He was able to concentrate a force of two
legions, and with these he promptly relieved
Cicero, having inflicted a severe defeat on a
force of Gauls which attacked him on the way.

316 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

The next year (53 B.C.) was entirely devoted
to exacting vengeance for the massacre of
Sabinus and Cotta with their men. It is need-
less to follow the operations of Caesar. It
must suffice to say that though one somewhat
serious reverse was sustained, they were success-
ful on the whole. But much yet remained to
be done before Gaul could be said to have
been thoroughly " pacified." Caesar was yet to
be reduced to greater straits than he had yet
experienced.

The year 52 b.c. was one of furious party
strife in Rome, and Caesar gives us clearly to
understand that this state of things had its
effect on the Gauls. Chafing under the newly
imposed yoke, they naturally exaggerated the
troubles of their masters. In one matter in
particular, their " wish was father to their
thought." They dreaded, and with excellent
reason, the commanding personality of Caesar.
He had done in seven years more than his
predecessors had been able to accomplish in
seventy. What an inestimable advantage it
would be if he were to be kept away from the
scene of war by these party quarrels ! The
report that this was the case was spread about
and eagerly believed. In a very short time all
Gaul was in a blaze of revolt, the news spread-

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 317

ing with extraordinary rapidity. What had
happened at Gennabum (Orleans) at sunrise
was known in the country of the Auverni,
nearly 150 miles away, before 9 p.m. It was
shouted from field to field.

Vercingetorix, an Auvernian, was the hero of
the new movement. All the tribes of Western
Gaul joined him immediately. He began his
own operations in the south-west on the borders
of the old Provincia. While occupied with
them, Caesar suddenly appeared on the scene,
bringing with him new levies from the other
side of the Alps. His coming caused an
immediate change in the aspect of affairs.
Moving with his usual speed, he concentrated
his army at Sens (80 miles to the south-east of
Paris). He then proceeded to attack one after
another of the revolting tribes. His successes
were so numerous and so rapid that Vercingetorix
felt that he must change his plan of campaign.
Unable to meet Caesar in the field, he must
starve him out. To do this it was necessary to
lay the whole country waste. Even the towns
would have to be burnt. Only the policy, to be
useful, had to be thorough. This was more
than Vercingetorix could effect. When it came
to the question of destroying Avaricum
(Bourges) he had to give way. Its inhabitants

3i8

ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

pleaded for it too earnestly, for it was the finest
city in Gaul. If it had been burnt with all the
stores that it contained the Roman campaign
must have ended in disaster. As it was, the
town was besieged by Caesar. The Gallic
chief, who had his camp sixteen miles away,
did all he could to annoy and injure the
besiegers. But he could not stop them. He
threw 10,000 men into the city, but though the
defence was prolonged, the skill and determina-
tion of the Romans would not be denied. When
the prospect seemed desperate the garrison
resolved to leave the city, but the shrieks of
the women revealed their intention to the
besiegers. Finally Avaricum was stormed,
and all its inhabitants massacred.

Great as was this disaster, Vercingetorix felt
his position to be strengthened by it. He
could now say to his countrymen, " Avaricum
has perished, after all, but the Romans have
got the stores." Caesar's next proceeding was
to lay siege to Gergovia, a town which cannot
be identified. Here he met with a decided
reverse. One division of his army persisted
in an attack upon the walls after the recall had
been sounded, and were repulsed with heavy
loss, yoo men, of whom nearly fifty were
officers, falling in the action. Caesar himself

THE CONQUESTS OF CAESAR 319

seems to have had a narrow escape. He does
not mention it himself, not thinking, perhaps,
that it was of sufficient importance to be
recorded. But Servius, an ancient commen-
tator on Virgil, relates it on the authority of
a Diary {Ephemeris) which was extant in his
time. In Virgil, Tarchon, an Etrurian chief
and ally of ^Eneas, drags one Venulus, in full
armour, from off his horse. The same thing,
he says, happened to Csesar at Gergovia. One
of the Gauls recognised him as he was being
carried away, and shouted out Ccesar ! The
name was very like the Gallic words for " Let
him go ! " And Csesar's captor relaxing his
hold, the great man escaped. Plutarch tells
another story of how the Auverni had a sword
hanging up in one of their temples which they
declared to be Caesar's, and that when it was
shown to him, he smiled. Nor was the defeat
at Gergovia the last of his troubles. The ^Edui,
who had been loyal to Rome from the be-
ginning, now joined the rebellion. They seized
Csesar's depot at Noviodunum (site unknown),
slaughtered the garrison, and possessed them-
selves of the stores, and with them, of the
hostages, who were pledges of the fidelity of
the other tribes. They then tried to stop him
from crossing the Loire. As usual, he was too

320 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

quick for them. His legions forded the river,
though the river, swollen with the melted snows,
was breast-high.

Labienus, who was operating in the neigh-
bourhood of Paris, had had difficulties of his own,
but had surmounted them with his usual skill.
He was Caesar's ablest lieutenant, as useful to
his chief as Lord Hill was to Wellington in the
Peninsula. He now succeeded in joining the
main army. Notwithstanding this addition of
strength, the Roman commander was compelled
to retreat. He was not far from the Provincia
when he turned upon Vercingetorix and de-
feated him, largely by the help of the German
cavalry. The Romans, among other qualifi-
cations of a ruling race, had the gift of turning
to the best account the qualities of others.
Eight or nine years before there was not a
trooper of German race in the Roman army;
now that nation furnishes it with an efficient
arm.

Vercingetorix now threw himself into Alesia,
a strong place in the hills, probably to be
identified with Alise-Sainte-Reine in Burgundy.
He sent messengers to the various States in
alliance, asking for a lev^e-en-masse. This was
not made, but a huge army was gathered,
250,000 infantry and 8,000 horse. It was the

THE CONQUESTS OF CMSAR 321

last great effort of Gaul for freedom, and it
failed. The Gauls came on, convinced that
they must triumph, but the Romans stood firm
during a struggle that lasted from noon till
sunset, and the enemy were driven back to
their camp. Another attack, made after a brief
rest, failed also. Then came the last desperate
struggle. One of the chiefs of the relieving
army, a kinsman of Vercingetorix, threw him-
self on a weak spot in the lines of investment,
where the Roman camp had been constructed
on ground that sloped towards the town. He
had 60,000 men with him ; the Roman force
consisted of two legions. The besieged made
a simultaneous effort to break out. The
struggle was long and fierce. Caesar directed
the Roman battle from a point of advantage.
When the time came, he himself, conspicuous
in the scarlet cloak of command, took personal
part in the struggle. His trusted lieutenant
Labienus got together forty cohorts from all
parts of the lines of investment, and Caesar put
himself at their head. The Gallic host was
utterly broken. The slaughter on the field was
great, and the survivors dispersed during the
night that followed, every man seeking his
native State. The next day Vercingetorix
surrendered himself to the conqueror. He was

22

322

ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

kept in prison for seven years, was led in the
triumph which Caesar celebrated in 45 B.C. and
put to death afterwards. The war in Gaul
lasted for two years more. One after another
the rebellious States were subdued, and dealt
with mercifully or severely as policy dictated.
Caesar, who recognised the duty, or, any-
how, the policy, of forgiveness where his
countrymen were concerned, was wholly proof
against any emotion of the kind when he had
to do with barbarians. He had no pleasure in
a massacre ; but, on the other hand, it caused
him no compunction or even pain. These eight
years of war must have cost Gaul some two
millions of lives. It was an awful price to pay,
but it completed a great work, which had been
on hand for three centuries and a half. In
390 b.c. Brennus captured Rome ; in 50 b.c.
the Gauls had become the Latin people which
they are to-day.

VII

FURTHEST BRITAIN.

I CAN NOT omit all mention of our own
island, though it can hardly be said that
there was any incident in its history of
really critical importance in the long struggle
between Rome and the barbarian tribes.

The visits of Csesar to Britain, though highly
interesting in more ways than one, may be
briefly passed over. He came for the first
time not long before the end of the cam-
paigning season in 55 B.C. His chief reason,
as he states it himself, was that he found that
the Britons were in the habit of helping their
neighbours of Gaul. (The inhabitants of south-
eastern England were of the same race as the
Belgse.) We do not find, as a matter of fact,
any mention of British auxiliaries in the Gallic
armies, or that in later years Gaul was tempted

into rebellion by the knowledge that Britain

323

324 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

was free. Caesar was of the Alexander type,
strongly moved by the ambition of a conqueror.
The first visit lasted altogether about three
weeks, and the army practically remained where
it landed.

The second visit took place in the following
year (54 B.C.) and was a far more important
affair. Caesar's intention was, we may be sure,
to conquer the island. Probably he was not
acquainted with its real dimensions, and cir-
cumstances occurred that made him change his
plans. Originally, however, he had in his
mind something more than a reconnaisance
en force. He brought with him six legions
and 2,000 cavalry, more than a half of his
whole available force, coming at the end of
July, and leaving about the middle of Sep-
tember. He advanced some sixty or seventy
miles into the country, crossing the Thames,
possibly near Weybridge, possibly a little below
Eton. The Britons could not, of course, stand
against him in the field, but they proved them-
selves to be formidable enemies. Caesar does
not expressly say that he had underrated the
difficulties of the task ; but he acted as if he
had. He was engaged in Gaul for five more
years, and during the last two of these five was
practically master of the country, but he seems

FURTHEST BRITAIN 325

to have entirely abandoned the idea of sub-
jugating Britain.

For 89 years the island was left practically
to itself. Augustus, in the scroll of his achieve-
ments which he inscribed on a slab in a temple
at Ancyra (the capital of the Roman province
of Galatia) mentions the tribute paid by certain
British kings; the inscription is imperfect at this
place, and we know no particulars. It is certain,
however, that no serious attempt was made on
Britain between the years 54 B.C. and 43 a.d.
There are various allusions to the people in the
literature of the time, but they are always
spoken of as savage enemies of whom very
little was known.

In 43 a.d., however, Rome, at the invitation
of a native prince, who conceived himself to
have suffered wrong, seriously undertook the
conquest of the Island. Aulus Plautius was
appointed to the command, took four legions
with him, and in the course of the year the
Emperor himself (Claudius) brought over an
additional force. A great battle was fought
near Camalodunum (Colchester), in which the
Britons were, as usual, defeated. Vespasian,
afterwards Emperor, was actively engaged in
the west of the Island. We know very little
of the details of the campaigns which followed.

326 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

One heroic figure, however, stands prominently
out. This is Caractacus (Caradoc). For seven
years this prince (elder son of Cunobelin, the
Cymbeline of Shakespeare) held out against the
Roman forces. We cannot identify the scene
of the final battle,1 but a sufficiently clear
description of it has been preserved. The
Britons occupied a hill which had an un-
fordable river in front, and was itself fortified,
wherever the ground permitted or required it,
with ramparts of stones. So formidable did
the position, crowded as it was with warriors,
seem to the Roman general, that he was in-
clined to manoeuvre, probably to attempt a
flanking movement. But the soldiers demanded
to be led to a frontal attack, and their general
yielded. The river was crossed, how we are
not told. The space between the river and
the British ramparts was not traversed without
loss. Many were wounded and some killed by
a storm of missiles from the British lines. But
when the teshido was formed under the ram-
part, rudely constructed of uncemented stones,
the battle was practically over. The rampart
was soon pulled down, and the Britons retired
to the heights. Here they were outmatched.

1 It was probably somewhere in Shropshire or Hereford-
shire.

FURTHEST BRITAIN 327

The artillery played upon them from a distance,
and they had nothing wherewith to reply to it.
In close combat the armour and weapons of
the legions gave them an immense advantage.
Finally the Britons were driven headlong from
their position. Caractacus' wife and daughter
were captured, and his brothers surrendered
themselves. The king himself was handed
over to his enemies by the treachery of a
neighbouring potentate, Queen Cartismandua.
The story of his dignified behaviour before
Claudius, and of the generous spirit with which
it was taken, need not be repeated here.
Roman manners had been somewhat softened
since the days when the brave Vercingetorix
had been put to death. It was not that
Caractacus had ceased to be formidable ; he
was never allowed to return to Britain.

Nor need I tell in detail the story of the
revolt of Boadicea, Queen of the Iceni, a tribe
of Eastern Britain. It was provoked by the
insolence of Roman officials and the greed of
Roman financiers,1 and for a time it shook

1 According to Dion, the philosopher Seneca had some-
thing to do with the disturbance by suddenly calling in
money which he had lent at usurious interest. We may
hope that it is a slander, but Romans of good repute were
not above such conduct. The patriotic Brutus lent money

328 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

the Roman power in Britain to its base.
Londinium, already the largest and wealthiest
town in Britain, though not ranking as a
colony, was sacked ; so was Verulamium (St.
Alban's) and other places. As many as seventy
thousand persons are said to have perished.
The majority must have been Britons,
"friendly natives," as we should now call
them ; but there were many Italians among
them. " Citizens and allies " is the historian's
term. As only seventeen years had passed
since the conquest of Britain had commenced,
it is remarkable how far the Romanising of the
country had proceeded. Traders and settlers
must have swarmed into it, as they do in the
United States when an Indian reserve is
thrown open. Besides these frightful mas-
sacres, there were military disasters. One
legion was cut to pieces. The commander
of another was so cowed that he did not
venture out of his camp. But Paullinus, the
commander-in-chief, behaved with consummate
discretion. He refused to risk a battle with
insufficient forces, though his delay meant the
destruction of London. But when he struck

to a town in Cyprus at 40 per cent., and was much annoyed
with Cicero for refusing the help of the military in collecting
the debt.

FURTHEST BRITAIN 329

he struck with terrific force. The British army
was practically annihilated. In Southern
Britain, at least, the dominion of Rome was
never seriously threatened for many years after
the great victory won by Paullinus.

When, in a.d. j8, Agricola took over the
command of Britain, it was in North Wales
that he carried on his first campaign. The
campaigns that followed I need not describe
in detail. The last of them was finished by
a great victory over the Caledonians near the
Grampians, probably at Aberfoyle, in Perth-
shire. The Roman sway, however, did not
really extend so far. Its high- water mark
was, probably, reached about a.d. 200, when
the Emperor Septimius Severus marched to
the extreme north of the Island, and on his
return added a second wall to the great
rampart constructed by Antoninus Pius be-
tween the estuaries of the Forth and the
Clyde. But this advanced post was not long
held. The most permanent, as it was the
most elaborate barrier against the northern
tribes, was the Great Wall built by Hadrian,
about a.d. 120, between the Solway Firth
and Newcastle-on-Tyne. Britain south of
this was completely Latinised. But the ex-
istence of the walls and the fact that the

330 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Island had the reputation of being to the
Empire what India is to us, a nursery of
captains, prove that the North was practi-
cally independent. Here then — and this is
what makes Britain really important in
Roman history — was the furthest limit of
Roman advance. And it was here that the
first overt confession of weakness had to be
made. In a.d. 408 one of the many soldiers
of fortune who attempted to seize the
Imperial throne crossed over into Gaul
with the British legions. The legions never
came back, and Britain, though nominally
included in the Provinces of the Empire, was
actually abandoned.

VIII

BEYOND THE RHINE

IN the German tribes Rome found at last
the antagonist who was to vanquish her.
The victories of Marius and of Caesar had
been complete, but they did not crush the
race. Their numbers and the solidity of their
character, moulded as it was by a tenacity
and a power of resistance which neither the
Spaniard nor the Gaul had shown, made
them practically unconquerable. The early
Empire was not without ambitions in this
direction. Drusus, the step-son of Augustus,
carried on several campaigns in Lower
Germany, and executed besides some im-
portant engineering works, in the way of
canals and embankments, which were intended
to make the country more accessible. But he
came, once at least, very near to a terrible
disaster. In B.C. 1 1 he had got as far as the

331

332 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Weser, thanks, in part at least, to the absence
of his most formidable enemies, the Sicambri,
who were busy fighting with the Chatti. At
the Weser he felt that it would be prudent to
halt and to retrace his steps. It was well that
he did, for the Sicambri had settled their
quarrel with their neighbours, and were now
in the opposite ranks. At a place called
Arbalo, which we have no means of locating,
he was almost surrounded. The allied tribes
threw away, by their rashness, a victory which
was almost in their hands. They divided, so to
speak, the Roman wolfskin before they had cap-
tured the wolf. Each tribe chose its own share
of the spoil, rushed in a headlong charge to
secure it, and were driven back with heavy loss,
Drusus built two forts which might be convenient
centres for future operations, and returned to
Rome, where he had so much of the honours
of a triumph as the jealousy of the Emperor
permitted a subject to enjoy. In the following
year (b.c. io) he returned to the same country,
and in b.c. 9 he did the very same thing again,
It was in this campaign that he reached his
furthest point, making his way as far as the
Elbe itself. Here indeed — so it seemed to the
men of the time — was the fate-appointed limit
of the Roman arms. As he was making ready

BEYOND THE RHINE 333

to cross the Elbe, a female figure, of more
than human proportions, appeared to him.
"Whither goest thou, insatiable Drusus ? "
cried the strange apparition. " Destiny forbids
thee to go further. Here is the end of thy
exploits and thy life." He erected trophies
on the river bank to mark the spot which he
had reached, and turned back. But he never
reached the Rhine. He was thrown from his
horse, and received injuries from which he
died. His younger brother Tiberius arrived
just in time to see him alive. The last duties
to the dead performed — Tiberius is said to
have walked before the bier all the way from
the Rhine bank to Rome — he returned to
prosecute the campaign. For some years the
Roman arms met no serious check, and by
a.d. 9 so much had been done in subjugating
the country that Augustus conceived the idea
of making it into a Roman province. For this
purpose he sent an officer of high rank, who
had for some years administered the province
of Syria — Quintilius Varus. The new-comer
was totally mistaken about the real condition
of the country, which was on the brink of
revolt. The native chiefs, at whose head was
the famous Arminius (the Latin form of
Hemann), pretended friendship and submis-

334 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

sion, assisting at the courts which he held
after the fashion of an Indian durbah, and
promptly executing his orders. The report
of an insurrection in South Germany reached
him while thus employed, and he marched
southward to quell it. Arminius and his
fellow-countrymen left him, under a promise
to return, but really with the intention of
preparing an attack. His road lay through
the valleys of what is now called the
Teutoburgerwald Wald, between Osnabruck
and Paderborn, in Westphalia. He marched
without any suspicion of danger, his army in
a straggling line, encumbered with baggage
and a multitude of non-combatants. Half-way
through the pass they were attacked. There
were three legions and a considerable force
of cavalry, and for a time they successfully
resisted the enemy. The camp which they
pitched at the end of the first day's battle
was of such a size, when it was discovered
some years afterwards, as to show that the
three legions were then substantially intact.
The next day, after destroying his baggage,
for he recognised that his position was one of
extreme peril and that his only hope was to
give to his army all the mobility possible, he
made for the fortress of Aliso on the Lippe.

BEYOND THE RHINE 335

All the day he was attacked, and had to
struggle for every yard of road. By evening
his forces had been greatly diminished, for
the second camp was seen to be much
smaller than the first. The third day's
march brought them out of the woods, but
only to encounter a fresh multitude of the
enemy. Their strength was now exhausted,
and they could no longer keep their ranks.
Varus killed himself; his army, a very few
excepted who contrived to reach Aliso, was
destroyed. The effect in Germany was to
throw back the frontier of Rome to the
Rhine ; in Rome the news produced some-
thing like a panic. The disaster embittered
the remaining years of Augustus. Again and
again he was known to start from his sleep
and cry in tones of agony, " Quintilius Varus,
give me back my legions ! "

Rome could not, of course, submit to such a
defeat without vindicating her honour. This
was not an easy task. In a.d. 14, Germanicus,
the son of Drusus, marched into the country
with a powerful force. He narrowly escaped
disaster. Had not the divisions between the
German chiefs hindered them from following
up their successes — both Germanicus and his
lieutenant, Csecina, suffered serious reverses —

336 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

he might have met with the fate of Varus. In
the campaign of 1 6 he was more fortunate, and,
if the Roman narratives are not exaggerated,
restored the old frontiers. Arminius himself
was nearly taken, and Northern Germany,
between the Rhine and the Elbe, was once
again Roman. But Tiberius did not like a
" forward " policy. Tacitus, who abhorred the
man, tells us that his motive was a mean
jealousy of Germanicus, but it is likely that he
saw that the resources of the Empire might be
better expended. Anyhow, Germanicus was
recalled, and Germany recovered her freedom ;
nor was any serious attempt again made, as far
as the northern part of the country was con-
cerned, to reassert the authority of Rome. It
was to the south that Rome limited her efforts
for dominion.

IX

THE LAST ADVANCE

WHEN Tacitus speaks of the urgentia
imperii fata, the irresistible destinies
of empire, he uses a phrase which every
Englishmen understands. A great empire
cannot stand still. Its adventurous subjects
are always pressing forward, and must be pro-
tected. Its neighbours are continually feeling
and resenting the pressure which it exercises
upon them. It has to defend boundaries which
represent to those who are outside them a
series of aggressions, and it has to satisfy the
warlike tastes of the huge force which it has to
keep under arms. Augustus had done his best
to limit the growth of the Empire. His testa-
ment to his successors was an injunction, it
would be better, perhaps, to say a counsel, that
no new dominions should be sought. Tiberius

religiously observed this advice. But the

23 337

338 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Csesars that followed Tiberius found the circum-
stances of the situation too much for them.
Caligula made an expedition against the nations
yet unsubdued beyond the northern frontier,
which might have been serious but for his own
lunatic folly. Claudius began the subjugation
of Britain, which was carried to a conclusion
by the brilliant generalship of Agricola in the
reign of Domitian. Domitian was not so fortu-
nate in his other great enterprise. This was
the invasion of Dacia. Agricola was still alive,
but Domitian was too jealous of his abilities
and his renown to entrust to him the manage-
ment of the campaign. He found a substitute
in the person of Cornelius Fuscus, Prefect of
the Praetorians, who had at least the recom-
mendation of being a subservient courtier.
Juvenal includes Fuscus among the counsellors
who were summoned to discuss the important
question of how the gigantic turbot which a
fisherman had presented to the Emperor
should be cooked. He seems to have been a
student of the military art, for he is described
as "planning battles in his marble halls."
Possibly he wrote a book on the subject. In the
field he seems to have had little or no capacity.
The Dacian chief, Decebalus by name, enticed
the Roman general to cross the Danube, turned

THE LAST ADVANCE 339

on him when the opportunity came, and
defeated him with the loss of at least one
legion and its exile. We have absolutely no
record of the battle. It came within the period
of events covered by the histories of Tacitus,
but the book which contained the narrative
is lost. Even did we possess it, we should
still be ignorant of one important detail, for
Orosius, who had the narrative before him,
tells us that Tacitus held it to be the part of a
good citizen to conceal the losses suffered by
the armies of Rome. The whole story is
wrapped in obscurity. It is said that the
defeat of Fuscus was retrieved in the next
campaign by his successor Julianus. But
again we have no details. There is even to be
found the statement, whether well or ill-founded
we cannot say, that the Dacians exacted from
Rome an annual sum of money as the price of
their forbearance.

It was to Dacia then that Trajan turned his
thoughts when he found himself seated on the
imperial throne. Trajan had many reasons for
undertaking the enterprise. It was much to
his taste. He was a soldier, who had already
distinguished himself in the field. And he had
to justify his elevation to the throne. The
Empire really rested on the swords of the

340 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

soldiers, and no man who could not count on
the respect of the army could feel himself safe.
And there was also the cogent reason that it
was easier to attack than to defend, that the
barbarians, if left to themselves, would sooner
or later invade the Empire, and that the wisest
plan would be to assume the offensive,

Trajan was busied with protecting the
German frontier of the Empire when he
received the news that he had been adopted by
the aged Nerva. He spent a year, after receiv-
ing the tidings, in completing the preparation
for its defence. Then he went to take up his
new dignity. Home affairs settled, he started
for the Danube. Of the campaigns which
followed we know little in one way, and much
in another. We know, from the sculptures
on Trajan's Column, exactly what arms and
armour, and what engines of war were used by
the soldiers of Rome. But as to the strategy
of the campaign, and its chief incidents, we are
almost wholly in the dark.

Trajan crossed the Danube at two places
without molestation. At first it seemed as if
the Dacians were going to give in without a
struggle. An embassy arrived to beg for
peace, offering surrender without conditions.
But this was a palpable imposture. The envoys

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THE LAST ADVANCE 341

were men of low rank — so much Trajan knew
from the habits of the country — for they were
bareheaded. The next envoys were certainly
nobles, but they had no real authority to treat.
The Dacian king, Decebalus by name, was
simply trying to gain time. Not long after he
fell upon the legions as they marched. A fierce
battle followed, in which the Dacians were
defeated, but at a heavy cost. The Romans
still advanced ; when they were near his chief
stronghold, Decebalus again gave battle. This
time he was beaten even more decisively than
before. For the time his spirit was broken.
The envoys whom he now sent were nobles of
the highest rank, who came into Trajan's
presence with their hands bound behind their
backs in token of absolute submission. Dece-
balus himself consented to pay his homage to
Trajan in person, and to send deputies to Rome
to arrange conditions of peace. This was in
102 A.D,

Scarcely had Trajan turned his back — his
presence being much wanted at Rome — when
the Dacians were in arms again. Decebalus's
own hereditary kingdom lay far to the east, in
what is now called Transylvania, but nothing
could stop the march of the Roman legions.
They made their way over river and mountain,

342 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

and stormed stronghold after stronghold. At
last Decebalus, in despair, put an end to his
own life. The new province of Dacia was
thoroughly organised, for Trajan was as great
an administrator as a soldier. To this day the
remains of the great works which his engineers
and architects raised at his bidding remain to
testify to the completeness with which the work
was done. For more than a century and a half
it remained one of the most orderly and civi-
lised of the Roman provinces. It was not till
275 a.d. that Aurelian withdrew the legions to
the southern bank of the Danube.

During the time of the Good Emperor1 Rome
kept her dominions unimpaired. Even under
their weaker successors, though decay was at
work within, her power for awhile was not
visibly shaken. It was with the appearance
of the Goths upon the scene that the end
began.

1 It began with Nerva in 96 a.d. and ended with the
death of Marcus Aurelius in 1 80.

BOOK VI

ROME AND THE BARBARIANS
THE DECLINE

I. A CENTURY OF DISGRACE

ONE of the strangest facts in history is the
rapid decline of Roman power that set in
immediately after the Empire had enjoyed such
a succession of good rulers as had never before
fallen to its lot. The period of eighty-four years
which began with the accession of Nerva and
ended with the death of Marcus Aurelius has
always been regarded, and rightly regarded, as
the golden age of Rome. Trajan was, it is true,
a warlike Emperor by choice, and Marcus
Aurelius the same by necessity, but Rome
had never had since its founding any but the
briefest intervals of peace. War, in short, was
its natural condition, and it had seldom been

carried on with more success than it was by

343

344 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Trajan in Dacia and by Aurelius against the
Quadi and the Marcomanni. On the other
hand, the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius
(117-161) made up together forty-four years,
considerably more than what is usually reckoned
as a generation, of almost unbroken peace. Yet
the good effects of nearly a century of wise rule
seemed to vanish almost immediately when the
last of the " Good Emperors " passed away. It
is true that Aurelius had a deplorably weak
and vicious successor.1 But Commodus was
not more contemptible than Caligula, Nero, or
Domitian, and Rome had survived their rule
without much apparent injury. Some writers
have found a cause in a succession of plagues
which raged throughout the Empire with an
almost unexampled severity, and it is true that
the century which followed the year 165 2 was
terribly distinguished by this visitation, but no
external calamities are sufficient to account

1 It is remarkable that the most philosophic of the
"Good Emperors" departed from the rule of adoption
which had apparently been so beneficial to Rome, and
left the succession to his son, of whose real character he
could hardly have been ignorant. Gibbon, however, thinks
that the want of the hereditary principle was one of the
great causes of the troubles of the Empire.

2 In 165 the legions returning from the East are said to
have brought the Oriental plague into Europe.

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 345

for a nation's decay. These causes are to be
sought elsewhere, within rather than without,
in the life of men more than in the calamities
which years of famine or of pestilence inflict
upon them. And it is clearly beyond my
province to do more than indicate them in
the very briefest way. We see signs of what
was going on in days when to all appearance
the Empire was most flourishing, while it was
certainly still pursuing its career of conquest.
Virgil writes a great poem to commend the
honest healthy toil of a country life to a
generation which had ceased to care for it.
The cities were more and more crowded, for
the luxuries which they put within the reach of
even the poorest were more and more sought
after, but the country was passing into a desert
or a pleasure ground. The farmers or peasants
who had formed the backbone of Roman armies
had ceased to be ; their fields, where they had
not gone out of cultivation, were tilled by huge
gangs of slaves. Provincial towns which in
old days had been strong enough to make
treaties on equal terms with Rome were now
half in ruins, with a scanty population that
barely contrived to exist. With every year
things grew worse and worse. And the Em-
pire aggravated the evils which at first it had

346 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

done much to palliate if not to remedy. It
had superseded the Republic, because this
had become utterly corrupt ; but in time it
became as corrupt itself, and for the corrup-
tion of a despotism there is no cure. A
succession of able rulers put off the end for
a time, but it had to come. And when it came
there came with it more vigorous races out ot
whom was to be formed by degrees, not without
help of the old order which they swept away,
a new civilisation.

Commodus, the unworthy son and successor
of the good Aurelius, reigned but for a short
time. He was assassinated in his thirty-second
year. With his death began, it may be said, the
rule of the sword. His successor, indeed, Perti-
nax by name, was chosen by the Senate, and well
deserved his election, but he reigned for some-
thing less than ninety days, and the Praetorians,
the soldiers of the capital, murdered him and
sold the throne openly to the highest bidder.
To this arrogance the legions in the provinces
refused to submit. The principal armies put up
candidates of their own. We need not follow the
succession of these short-lived rulers. It will
suffice to say that in the hundred and five years
which intervened between the death of Aurelius
and the accession of Diocletian (180-285) there

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 347

were no less than twenty Emperors, not to
mention innumerable Pretenders — it was said
that at one time thirty * claimed the throne.
For a time the spectacle of the Roman armies
engaged in almost incessant struggles with each
other does not seem to have produced the effect
which might have been expected on the tribes
outside the frontiers of the Empire. No move-
ment of any importance among the barbarians
is recorded during the fifty years which followed
the murder of Pertinax by the Praetorians.
In 209, indeed, the Britons of the north
attacked the Roman province, and were
punished, without any lasting effect, by Sep-
timius Severus. But the event was of no
particular importance, for the North Britons
were not powerful enough, even if they had
succeeded, to seriously affect the course of
events. Causes with which we are not exactly
acquainted kept the far more formidable tribes
of Germany inactive. We hear of a combina-
tion among them in the reign of Aurelius which
might well have become dangerous, if, to use
the language of Gibbon, it included all the
nations from the mouth of the Rhine to the
mouth of the Danube. But it came to nothing.
The tribes which first took the field were
? Gibbon reduces the number to nineteen.

348 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

defeated. Discouragement and dissension kept
the others inactive. Dissension, indeed, was
the most potent influence which worked in
favour of the Romans. In his remarkable
treatise on Germany and its tribes Tacitus
gives a description of the people which em-
phasises their superiority in many important
respects to the degenerate sons of Rome. But
he speaks with satisfaction of the internal strife
which prevented them from becoming formid-
able, mentioning one great conflict in which
one tribe had been wholly destroyed by its
neighbours, and adds, " While the destinies of
Empire hurry us on, fortune can give us no
greater boon than discord among our foes."

But this state of things naturally would not
last. It would cease when some chief of com-
manding ability and strong personal influence
should come to the front, or when some tribe
should become so powerful as to attract or
compel its neighbours to unite with it. Such a
tribe came upon the scene later on in the first
half of the third century of our era. The Gothi,
to use the most common of the various forms
of their name, are first mentioned many
centuries before the time of which I am now
speaking. Pytheas, of Marseilles, who travelled
in Northern Europe about the time of Alexan-

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 349

der the Great, speaks of them as inhabiting the
coasts of the Baltic, and Tacitus, writing about
90 a.d., locates them in much the same district.
A hundred years or so after this date, however,
they are spoken of as dwelling near the Black
Sea. We need not trouble ourselves, however,
with their place of abode, nor yet with the
question of their race. Some writers hold that
they were of the Slavonic family, not the
Teutonic. That there were some Slavs in the
great multitude which the Romans knew by
the common name of Goths is more than
probable. In just the same way there was a
Celtic element in the great Teutonic swarm
which had so nearly overrun Italy at the close
of the second century B.C. But all that we
know about them, whether as regards their
habits or their appearance, would lead us to
think that they were Germans.

Some time, therefore, about 247 a.d., the
Goths invaded and overran the province of
Dacia. Crossing the Danube into Msesia l
(Bulgaria) they besieged its capital town, now
known by the name of Pravadi (twenty-five
miles to the west of Varna). The town was
ill-protected, for with the whole province of
Dacia between it and the frontier of the Empire
1 The Eastern division of the province.

35o ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

it anticipated no danger. The inhabitants saw
nothing better to do than to buy off the enemy
by the payment of a large ransom. Such a
policy is seldom successful, as we know from
the history of our own island, where the plan of
buying off the Danes was tried again and again
to very little purpose. The Goths departed,
and before long came back again.

Decius, who had by this time supplanted
Philip the Arabian on the imperial throne, on
receiving the news of this second invasion,
marched to the relief of the provinces attacked.
He found the barbarians besieging Nicopoli
(on the southern bank of the Danube). On
his approach they promptly raised the siege,
marched across Msesia and made their way
over the Balkans with the intention of attack-
ing Philippopolis. Decius followed them,
without apparently taking due precautions
against surprise, for the Goths turned upon
him, and routed his army. His forces were so
shattered that he could not attempt to help
Philippopolis, which not very long afterwards
was taken by storm and sacked.

Decius, though he had made a disastrous
mistake, was a brave and capable soldier. He
took prompt measures to retrieve his defeat,
guarding the places where the Danube could be

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 351

crossed and the Balkan passes so as to pre-
vent reinforcements from reaching the Goths.
These, on their part, had suffered severely.
The siege and storms had cost them many-
lives ; their supplies were running short, for
they carried no stores with them, and could
draw but little sustenance from a country which
they had wasted. And they were much
alarmed at the prospect of having their
retreat cut off. Under these circumstances
they offered to surrender all their booty and
all their prisoners, if they were permitted to
return unharmed to their own country. Decius
refused to accept the offer. He probably
thought, and had some reason for thinking,
that no agreement could be profitably made
with barbarians. The only way to deal with
the Goths was to deal with them as Marius had
dealt with the Cimbri and Teutones. The
invaders prepared to fight. The battle that
followed was obstinately contested. The Goths
were drawn up in three lines — we may observe
from the first indications of a certain military
skill and training in the tribe — the third of
which was protected by a morass. The first
and the second of these were broken ; the third
stood firm, and repulsed all the attacks of the
legions. The Emperor's son had fallen early

352 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

in the day ; of the fate of Decius himself noth-
ing was ever known. What is certain is that
the army was almost annihilated. The Goths
were able to make their way home without
losing their spoil or their prisoners. They even
received a great sum for promising not to
molest again the provinces of Rome, till, of
course — for such must have been the proviso
understood on both sides — they should find it
convenient to do so. This battle lacks a name,
for the place where it was fought cannot be
identified, but it was an event of the greatest
importance. Rome had suffered worse disasters
before, but never one that entailed so great a
loss of credit. A barbarian army destroys a
provincial capital, defeats two armies, slays the
Emperor himself, and returns home, not only
with all its booty, but with a heavy bribe with
which its forbearance had been purchased.
Clearly this was the beginning of the end.

For some years after their campaigns in the
region of the Danube, the Goths occupied
themselves with expeditions which bear a
curious resemblance to those made by their
kinsmen of later times, the Vikings and North-
men. They do not seem to have had any
seamanship of their own, but they lured or
compelled the maritime population of the

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 353

Black Sea coast-line to assist them. Their
first voyage was eastward. They sailed along
the northern coast of the Black Sea, taking
Pitsunda on their way, rounded the eastern
end, and finally captured Trebizond, the
wealthiest city in northern Asia Minor, where
they possessed themselves of a vast quantity
of spoil and a multitude of prisoners. Their
next voyage had a westerly direction. They
overran the province of Bithynia. The famous
towns of Nicala and Nicomedia, among others,
fell into their hands, almost without any attempt
at resistance. It was more than three centuries
since these regions had known the presence of
a foreign enemy. They had no troops of their
own, except, possibly, some local levies which
certainly had had no experience of warfare, and
the legions which should have defended them
had sadly degenerated both in courage and in
discipline. The third expedition of the Goths
took them outside the Black Sea into the
^Egean. Their fleet sailed into the Piraeus.
Athens, which had not attempted, possibly
had not been permitted, to repair its walls,
demolished more than three hundred years
before by Sulla, was taken and plundered.
Greece could offer no resistance. It had
neither means nor men. The invaders still

24

354 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

advanced westwards, and threatened Italy
itself. Here, however, their progress was
stayed. But from this expedition also, auda-
cious as it was, they returned in safety. It
gave another proof, not less significant than
the death of Decius, how low the Empire
had already fallen.

While the Goths were evading the south-
eastern provinces of the Empire, other enemies
were busy in the north and west. The Franks
now make their first appearance in history.
The name which meets us frequently in the
modern world, notably in France, and in such
terms as Franconia, Frankfort, Frankenthal,
means the " free," and probably originated in a
combination of the tribes who inhabited the
eastern bank of the Rhine, and who assumed
this title by way of distinguishing themselves
from the subjects of Rome on the opposite side of
the river. The Franks laid waste the province of
Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees and desolated Spain.
We know very little of the details of their in-
vasion. One of the so-called " Thirty Tyrants,"
Postumus by name, is said to have checked their
progress, and done something to protect the
Roman provinces of the West. Postumus was
slain in 267 a.d.

This date belongs to the period of extreme

A CENTURY OF DISGRACE 355

depression which coincides with the reigns of
Valerian and Gallienus. Valerian was a
favourite lieutenant of the Emperor Decius,
and seems to have been a man of high character
and ability. But circumstances were too strong
for him. Great as were the dangers that
threatened the European provinces of the
Empire, it was on the Asiatic frontier that he
found his presence more imperatively demanded.
A revolution in Parthia had restored the ancient
dynasty of the Persian kings, or, at least, a
family that claimed that character. The new
line of kings was now represented by a certain
Shapar, or, as the Romans spelt it, Sapor.
Armenia, long a bone of contention between
Rome and Parthia, was overrun ; the garrisons
on the Euphrates were forced to surrender.
Valerian hastened to meet the new enemy,
encountered him near Edessa, and suffered a
crushing defeat. We know next to nothing
of what happened except that the legions were
led, by the folly of their chief or the treachery
of those whom he trusted, into a hopeless situa-
tion ; that their attempt to cut their way through
the hosts of the enemy was repulsed with great
loss; and that in the end Valerian had to sur-
render himself to Sapor, and that the legions
laid down their arms. There was nothing now

356 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

to stop the Parthian king. The splendid city
of Antioch was taken and plundered or burnt.
He even crossed the Taurus range, and captured
the wealthy city of Tarsus. It is impossible to
say where he would have stopped, had it not
been for the courage and ability of Odenatus,
the governor of Palmyra and his wife Zenobia.
It was they, not the Roman arms that com-
pelled the Parthians to make their way back to
their own country,

Valerian was never released from captivity.
Stories — whether true or no it is impossible to
say — were told of the humiliations to which he
was subjected by the Persian king. Whenever
Sapor mounted his horse, he used to put his
foot on the neck of his captive. And when the
unhappy man was released by death, his skin
was stuffed with straw, and the figure preserved
in one of the Persian temples, "a more real
monument of triumph," remarks Gibbon, " than
the fancied trophies of brass and marble so often
erected by Roman vanity." Whatever may be
the truth about this or that fact, it is certain
that this period witnessed the infliction of two
unprecedented humiliations on the dignity of
Rome, one Emperor slain in battle, another
kept in a dishonourable captivity.

II

A CENTURY OF REVIVAL

AN observer of the calamities and disgraces
which overtook the Empire in what I have
called " A Century of Disgrace," might have
supposed that the end was at hand. But an
ancient institution does not perish so easily.
The Empire still possessed a great prestige, an
organisation of government which had been
worked out by a succession of able statesmen
and rulers, and an army with numberless tradi-
tions of victory. Given an able leader, there
would certainly be a revival of vigour, or, to say
the least, a check to the progress of decay. A
better time began with the death of Gallienus,
the son of Valerian, in a.d. 268. He perished,
it is doubtful whether by treachery or accident,
in one of the numberless conflicts that occurred
during this period between the possessor of
the imperial throne and the numerous pretenders
who aspired to it. His successor was a soldier

357

358 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

of humble origin, though he bore the old
patrician name of Claudius. He had soon an
opportunity of showing his qualities as a soldier.
In the year after his accession to the throne a
huge army of Goths and of other tribes who
were accustomed to fight under their standard
invaded the provinces south of the Danube.
Claudius hastened to encounter them, and fought
a great battle at Nissa in Servia in which
50,000 of the barbarians are said to have
perished. Little is known of the details of this
or indeed of any of the conflicts of the time;
the chronicles of the age are wanting in the
power of description and, indeed, in all literary
gift, but we gather that the legions were
beginning to give way when Claudius brought
up reinforcements to their help. These fresh
troops fell upon the barbarian rear, and wholly
changed the fortunes of the day. But the
victory of Nissa did not put an end to the war.
Nor, indeed, did Claudius live to finish it. He
did enough, it is true, to win the title of Gothicus,
and to deserve it better than was sometimes
the case with Emperors who were similarly
honoured.1 But he died — the victim, it was

1 Domitian, for instance, was styled Germanicus, though
his campaigns against the Germans were marked by disaster
rather than by victory.

A CENTURY OF REVIVAL 359

said, of a plague which had originated in the
barbarian camp — after a reign of little more
than two years, and left the completion of the
war to his successor Aurelian.

Aurelian's reign was but little longer than
that of Claudius. It began in August, 270,
and was ended in March, 275, by assassination ;
but this brief period was crowded with great
achievements. In dealing with the Goths he
showed that he was a statesman as well as a
soldier. After conclusively proving to them
that he could vanquish them in the field, he
turned them, by a seasonable generosity, from
enemies into friends. It had become evident
that the province which Trajan had added to
the Empire could no longer be held with advan-
tage ; Dacia, accordingly, was given up to the
Goths, and a tribe associated with them, of
whom we shall hear again, the Vandals. The
Goths remained loyal to Rome, till, as we shall
see, they were forced into hostility. They even
furnished a body of auxiliary cavalry to the
imperial army.

But while Aurelian was thus engaged, Italy
and even Rome were endangered by the attack
of another multitude of the same German race.
The Alemanni, a people of which we know next
to nothing except the stock to which they be-

360 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

longed,1 suddenly crossed the Roman frontier,
and made their way as far as the north of Italy.
The armies of the Empire were engaged else-
where, and the invaders plundered the country
without hindrance. They had even made their
way back to the Danube when Aurelian en-
countered them. It is not easy to understand
the story of what followed. The Emperor
outmanoeuvres the barbarians, and reduces them
to such extremities that they beg for peace.
When their envoys are introduced to the
presence of Aurelian, there is a sudden change
of circumstances. The Alemanni, instead of
imploring pardon, dictate conditions. They
must have a subsidy, if Rome would have them
as allies. The Emperor dismisses them with
an indignant refusal, and we expect to hear of
the severest punishment being inflicted on them.
Nothing of the kind occurs. Aurelian, called
elsewhere by some demand which he cannot
refuse, disappears from the scene, and leaves
the completion of the business to his lieutenants.
They neglect their duty or fail to perform
it ; the Alemanni take the opportunity, break
through the cordon of troops which had been
formed round them, and make their way back

1 The historians of the time do not give them the same
name.

A CENTURY OF REVIVAL 361

to Italy. We next hear of them as ravaging
the territory of Milan. Aurelian orders the
legions to follow them with all the speed that
they could manage, and hastens himself to
defend Italy with a quickly moving force,
partly composed, it is interesting to observe, of
auxiliary cavalry levied from the new settlers in
Dacia. The struggle that followed is not what
we should have expected after hearing of the
straits to which the Alemanni had been reduced
at the Danube. At Piacenza the Roman army
came perilously near to destruction. The
barbarians fall unexpectedly upon the legions
as they march carelessly through a wooded
defile. Only by the greatest exertions does
Aurelian rally them. But though the army
is saved from destruction, it cannot arrest the
progress of the enemy. When we next hear
of them the barbarians have advanced more
than a hundred miles nearer to Rome. Near
the Metaurus, and not far from the spot where
Hasdrubal had perished, the Emperor over-
took them. This time they must have suffered
a serious defeat, for their third and last appear-
ance in Northern Italy, near Pavia (the ancient
Ticimirn). Historians relate that they were
exterminated, and this is probably true, for it
was the fate that would naturally overtake
unsuccessful invaders of Italy.

362 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

I may mention in the very briefest way that
Aurelian restored the Roman power in the East
by overthrowing Zenobia, who, since the death
of her husband Odenathus, had remained inde-
pendent at Palmyra, and in the West by putting
an end to the usurpation of Tetricus, who
had maintained his independence in Gaul and
Britain for several years. To all appearance,
the Empire was restored to what it had been
at the death of Marcus Aurelius.

Ill

THREE DEADLY BLOWS

TO tell the story of the last century of the
Roman Empire in any fullness of detail
would be impossible in any space that I can
command. I must limit myself to a narrative
of what may truly be called the three most
significant incidents in that period.

The first of the fatal blows which may be
said to have brought the Empire of Rome to
an end was dealt almost against the will of
those from whom it came. The policy of
Aurelian in ceding Dacia to the Goths had
been, on the whole, successful. They had
been contented and even friendly, finding
sufficient employment for their arms in ex-
tending their power among their barbarous
neighbours, and furnishing not a few recruits
to the imperial armies. In 375 they were

disturbed by reports of an invading host which

363

364 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

was advancing from the north and east. These
reports pictured the new-comers as hideous
in appearance and cruelly savage in character.
We are now used to the Tartar countenance,
but to Europe in the fourth century the broad,
almost beardless face, flat nose, eyes set wide
apart, and squat figure, were as frightful as
they were strange. As for the savagery of the
Huns — for so the new-comers were called —
rumours were scarcely exaggerated. The
Goths had themselves in former times been
scarcely less ferocious in their manners, but
they had now for several generations been in
contact with civilisation, and the Christian faith
had begun to find its way among them. Both
divisions of the nation, known by the names
of Ostrogoths and Visigoths, were successively
defeated by the invading host, which showed
military skill as well as courage. The Ostro-
goths submitted, as a body, to the invaders,
though a considerable minority contrived to
escape, taking with them their infant king.
The Visigoths resolved to throw themselves
on the protection of Rome. They sent envoys
to the Emperor (Valens), and begged that
they might be permitted to cross the frontier.
After some delay Valens gave his consent, and
the whole nation — a few scattered companies

THREE DEADLY BLOWS 365

excepted — was transported across the Danube.
The numbers of the refugees may be calculated
at a million, as there were no less than two
hundred thousand males of the military age.
It had been stipulated that all weapons should
be given up. But this condition was very
generally evaded. The corrupt officials of the
Empire were ready, for a consideration, to
permit the Gothic warriors to keep their arms.
Having thus allowed them to remain formid-
able, they proceeded, with almost incredible
folly, to insult and oppress them in every
possible way. They robbed them of their
wives and children, and sold at extortionate
prices the food which the Imperial Govern-
ment was bound to provide without cost.
Meanwhile the generals of Valens neglected
to maintain the defences of the Danube, and
a large body of Ostrogoths who had been
refused a passage over the river, took the
matter into their own hands, and crossed over
into the province. The two branches of the
nation were not long in coming to an under-
standing, and making common cause against
their oppressors. It was not long before the
smouldering fire burst into flame. The first
battle took place not far from Pravadi,1 where
1 See p. 349.

366 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

Claudius had defeated the Goths many years
before. We know little about this conflict
except its result, which, as the historian of the
Goths (or, as he calls them, Getse) puts it, was
to bring about a state of things in which the
Goths were no longer strangers and foreigners,
but members of the State and lords of the
country which they occupied. An indecisive
engagement followed at a spot called Salices
("The Willows") in the low land near the
mouth of the Danube, but the great battle of
the war was fought at Hadrianople. Valens,
who had spent a considerable time, with little
profit to the Empire, at Antioch, returned in
the early summer of 378 a.d. to Constantinople.
After a brief rest in that city, where he made
some changes in the chief commands of his
army, he marched northwards and fortified a
camp under the walls of Hadrianople. It was
debated between the Emperor and his chief
advisers whether or no they should fight at
once. There were many reasons for delay.
Valens occupied a strong position, and had
the command of unlimited supplies. The
barbarians, on the other hand, were ill-pro-
vided in every respect, and would most
certainly grow weaker the longer they were
compelled to keep the field. Another power-

THREE DEADLY BLOWS 367

fill consideration was, or should have been, the
approach of Gratian, Emperor of the West,
to whom Valens had appealed for help, and
who was now advancing eastward by forced
marches. Gratian had, indeed, sent a special
messenger imploring Valens not to risk a battle
before his arrival. Unfortunately this request
had an effect exactly opposed to what had been
intended. Valens was anxious to secure for
himself all the glory which would come from
the victory which he confidently expected, and
when Gratian begged for delay, he at once
resolved to fight.

It was the height of summer, and Valens
was scarcely acting with judgment when he
moved out of his position under the walls of
Hadrianople, and commenced a march which
could not be expected to be accomplished
under four hours — the distance to be traversed
was ten miles — with the intention of attacking
the enemy. In any case the men would have
been not a little wearied or exhausted ; as it
was, one wing of the army considerably out-
marched the other, and that which had lagged
behind was forced to hurry that it might take
its proper place in the line. Even after this
time was wasted, for Valens was amused with
proposals for a truce or cessation of arms which

368 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

the enemy had no intention of acting on. One
of the imperial generals, possibly impatient of
the delay, made an attack which was easily
repulsed. The Gothic cavalry, in reply,
charged with fatal effect. The Roman horse-
men fled before them, and the legions, left
alone in an open plain to face an enemy
superior in force, were practically destroyed.
The fate of Valens is uncertain ; but the more
generally received account was that, having
been severely wounded, he was carried off
the field to a cottage in the neighbourhood.
Before any way of escape could be discovered,
before even his wound could be dressed, the
cottage was surrounded by the enemy. The
inmates did their best to defend it, and the
Goths, impatient of delay, set fire to it and
burnt it to the ground. Valens, anyhow, was
never seen again. The army of Rome was
swept from the earth at Hadrianople as com-
pletely as it had been at Cannae, but Rome
had lost in the five centuries that separated
these two great disasters her power of re-
covery.

The next great blow received by Rome
came also from Gothic hands. The first
mention of Alaric shows us a significant
change in Roman policy. The Gothic chief

THREE DEADLY BLOWS 369

holds a high command in the armies of the
Empire, and was employed by the ruler in
possession in his struggle against a pretender.
When he turned against his employer it was
because he was disappointed in his ambition
of filling a yet higher post. There is no need
to describe his career at length. A brief out-
line shows plainly enough, not only his genius,
for he was certainly a statesman and a soldier
of great ability, but the deplorable weakness
of the Empire. At first, indeed, he had an
antagonist who was more than his match. In
396 he openly revolted, and marched into
Greece, which he plundered without meeting
with any resistance, for the country had long
since passed into a condition of helpless servi-
tude. But he was pursued by Stilicho, himself
a barbarian by birth — a soldier who was equal
to any of the great commanders of the past.
The Goths found themselves shut up in the
Peloponnesus. Their leader, however, con-
trived to extricate himself from his difficul-
ties, transporting his army across the western
end of the Gulf of Corinth, and occupying
Epirus. The next thing in his extraordi-
nary career was that he was appointed by
the Emperor of the East — the Eastern and
Western Empires had been finally severed

25

370 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

four years before ] — to be the Governor of
the province of Illyricum. Here he was
able to plan and prepare his schemes for
the final conquest of Rome. That the oppor-
tunity for so doing should have been given
by the power that should have been Rome's
closest ally was a sure sign of the approaching
ruin.

A few years after his establishment in
Illyricum, Alaric, who had been in the mean-
time saluted king by his countrymen, felt
himself equal to the task of invading Italy.
Stilicho, however, was still in command of the
Roman armies — now almost wholly recruited
from barbarian tribes — and he proved himself
more than a match for the Gothic king. The
great battle of Pollentia (in Northern Italy)
was contested with more than usual stubborn-
ness. Fortune changed sides more than once.
Stilicho's genius prevailed, however, in the
end ; the Goths were driven from the field ;
their camp was taken, and Alaric's wife fell
into the hands of the conquerors. But the
great leader was not yet beaten. His cavalry,
the principal strength of his forces, had not

1 When the Emperor Theodosius died (394 a.d.) his
two sons Honorius and Arcadius became emperors of the
West and East respectively.

THREE DEADLY BLOWS 371

been broken, and he formed the bold scheme
of marching upon Rome. This, however, was
given up ; he accepted, in preference, the offer
of Stilicho, who proposed to allow him to
depart unharmed from Italy, on condition of
his becoming for the future an ally of Rome.
He did not, however, intend to perform his
part of the bargain. On the contrary, he
formed a scheme for possessing himself of
Gaul. But his plans were betrayed to Stilicho,
and he suffered another defeat in the neigh-
bourhood of Verona which was not less dis-
astrous than that of Pollentia. Even then,
however, he was a formidable enemy, and
Stilicho allowed him to retire from Italy,
rather than drive him to extremities,

After four years, years of incessant drain
upon the resources of the Empire, Alaric pre-
pared to renew his attempt on Rome. Stilicho
was dead. Possibly he had deserved his fate,
for he had certainly cherished ambitions which
did not become a loyal subject. But there
was no one to take his place at the head of
the legions. Certainly Alaric met with no
opposition as he marched through Italy, finally
pitching his camp under the walls of Rome.
Resistance was impossible ; it only remained
to see what was the smallest price at which

372 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

the enemy could be bought off. Two envoys
from the Senate approached the king. They
began by counselling prudence. It would be
well, they said, if Alaric did not drive a brave
and numerous people to despair. "The thicker
the hay, the easier to mow," was the king's
answer. When asked to name the ransom
which he was willing to accept, he declared
that he must have all the gold and silver that
they possessed, all their valuables, and all the
slaves of barbarian birth. " What then do
you leave us ? " was the question which the
envoys in their consternation put to him.
" Your lives," he answered. In the end,
however, he consented to a compromise, by
which he was to receive five thousand pounds
of gold, thirty thousand pounds of silver, and
a quantity of precious articles, silk, cloth, and
spices.

The respite thus purchased was but brief.
The ministers of the Emperor, safe themselves
in the fortress of Ravenna, behaved with a
strange mixture of weakness and treachery.
Their crowning act of folly was to permit a
barbarian chief in their pay to make an un-
provoked attack on a detachment of Goths.
This was indeed destroyed, but the victory
was dearly purchased. Alaric, justly indignant

THREE DEADLY BLOWS $73

at such behaviour, broke off all negotiations,
and marched on Rome. The Senate prepared
to make all the resistance possible. But
nothing was really done. Some traitors within
the city opened one of the gates, and the
Goths made their way into the city, which
was given over to slaughter and plunder for
six days. Rome may be said to have thus
lost for ever her claim to rule the world.
But her cup of humiliation was not yet full..

Alaric did not long survive the conquest
of Rome. He died in the same year, and
was buried — so, indeed, the story runs — in the
channel of a stream whose waters had been
diverted for the time, the labourers who per-
formed the work being slaughtered to keep
the secret of his resting-place from being ever
divulged.

But Rome was to fall into the power of a
conqueror yet more powerful and more fero-
cious. Attila was a Hun, and is said to have
even exaggerated in his personal appearance
all the characteristic deformities of his race.
The boundaries of the Empire can hardly be
defined, but it is certain that it was of enor-
mous extent. It is scarcely an exaggeration
to say that it reached from China to the Rhine.
The hosts that followed him were almost

374 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

beyond counting. For once the incredible
numbers in which the historians of antiquity
delight were no exaggeration. It is probably
a modest estimate of his host to say that it
consisted of half a million combatants.

Powerful as he was, the king of the Huns
was not permitted to pursue his course without
opposition. Rome could still produce or rather
adopt great soldiers — Aetius, the great antago-
nist of Attila, was a Scythian by birth as
Stilicho was a Vandal — and great soldiers can
always find men to follow them. In the earlier
part of Attila's reign,1 his operations were
carried on within the limits of the Eastern
Empire. In 450 he attacked the West, one
of his pretexts being the refusal of the Emperor
Valentinian III. of his proposals for the hand
of the Princess Honoria. He crossed the
Rhine with a huge army at Strasburg, and
marched on Orleans. But Aetius was pre-
pared for him. A great battle was fought at
Chalons-sur-Marne, the last successful effort of
the Roman arms. One of the notable features
of the battle is the division of the Goths, the
Ostrogoths following the standard of Attila,

1 He succeeded to the throne in 434 in partnership with
his brother, and by this brother's death, or murder, as some
said, became the ruler of the nation in 445.

THREE DEADLY BLOWS 375

while the Visigoths fought for Rome. The
loss of men amounted to between two and
three hundred thousand, but it was not un-
equally divided. Aetius could not prevent
the retreat of Attila, who retired into Eastern
Europe, where he spent some months in
recruiting his army.

Early in the following year he crossed the
Alps, descended into Italy, and after capturing
and totally destroying the city of Aquileia,
marched Romewards. He never reached the
city, indeed. Not far from Mantua he was met
by three ambassadors, one of them the bishop
of Rome known as Leo the Great. They
brought the offer of a complete submission.
The Emperor no longer refused the condition
which he had before peremptorily rejected.
The Hunnish king was to have the hand of
the Princess Honoria, and with her, as Gibbon
epigrammatically puts it, "an immense ransom
or dowry." The marriage never took place,
for Attila died in the following year, but
he had inflicted on Rome a humiliation even
greater than that which she had suffered at
the hand of Alaric.

One more event I must record, because in
a way it completes this great period of history.
In 475 a youth who bore the name of Romulus

376 ROME AND THE BARBARIANS

and the nickname of Augustulus was raised
to the throne by his father Orestes, who
secured for a time control of such armies as
still obeyed the Empire. In the following
year Orestes was defeated and slain, and his
son permitted to abdicate. Italy passed into
the hands of Odoacer, king of the Heruli.
The Old World had passed away and the
New had begun.

E P I LO G U E

I TAKE it for granted that none of my
readers doubt the existence of a definite
purpose — some may prefer to call it a tendency
— in human history. Writers on this subject
have often been accused of dwelling too much
on war. But war is the ultimate expression of
human will, and war, with all its horrors and
losses, has worked, we are glad to believe, for
the general good. The fittest among the
nations have survived. We cannot estimate
the loss which mankind would have suffered
if the great military monarchies of the East
had crushed out of existence the insignificant
tribe which was to be the world's teacher in
righteousness. Something of the same kind
may be seen in what is called secular history.
Greece struggled bravely, against what must
have seemed almost hopeless odds, to preserve
herself from Persian domination. If the eleven
thousand " Men of Marathon" had been trodden

377

378 EPILOGUE

under foot by the hosts of Persia, the Athens of
the fifth century, with its free political life and
unrivalled intellectual development, would not
have existed. A sterile despotism, without
literature or art, would have taken its place,
and the world would have been incalculably
the poorer for the exchange.

What is true of the struggle between Greece
and Persia is true also of the great conflict,
lasting for more than two centuries, in which
the Sicilian Greeks, with now and then a little
help from the motherland, held their own
against Carthage. Persia and Carthage, though
differing much from each other, were equally
hostile to the essential principles of Western
civilisation.

Little need be said as to the issue of the
wars between Rome and Carthage. Rome,
indeed, took up the cause for which Greece
had contended. It is impossible to conceive
a Carthaginian Empire exercising a world-
wide sway with anything like the beneficial
results for which the world has to thank the
dominion of Rome. Carthaginian politics and
morals, as far as we have any knowledge of
them, seem to have been narrow and inhuman.

When we come to the conquests of Alex-
ander, we are not able, it must be confessed,

EPILOGUE 379

to see our way so plainly. We may perceive,
however, in it the spread of Greek influence
over Western Asia. That influence had already
been at work. Greek colonies had been planted
far to the east ; the Oriental nations had been
much affected by Greek thought and manners.
Alexander's brief career — it lasted but eleven
years — did much to promote this Hellenizing
process.

The empire of the great conqueror fell to
pieces at his death, but two Greek kingdoms,
to speak only of his Eastern dominion, were
built out of the ruins. It was in these king-
doms that some of the earliest victories of
Christianity were won. Given to the world
by a Semitic tribe, our faith used largely for
its spread Greek means, of which a common
Greek language is the most obvious.

We need not prove that it was for the lasting
good of the world that Rome was not crushed
by the Celtic invaders of 390 B.C. or the Teu-
tonic swarm of 112 b.c. It is equally plain
that the development of the human race was
largely helped by the subsequent spread of the
Empire, till it embraced all Europe west of the
Rhine and south of the Danube, all Northern
Africa, and Asia west of the Euphrates. It is
enough to say that Roman law is a dominating

380 EPILOGUE

power in most of the codes of modern Europe,
and an important element in all.

Finally, we have the overthrow of the
Roman Empire by barbarians from the north
and east. This overthrow may seem at first
to be "chaos come again." So doubtless
many thought at the time. Yet out of the
turmoil of the fourth and the fifth centuries
there came a new order, the order which we
see in the Europe of to-day. The subject
lies outside my province. I can only indicate
the fact.

UXWIN BROTHERS, THE GRESHAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON

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